Storms Along the Pacific Corridor
Issue 19 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In this week’s newsletter, we see storm clouds on the horizon for the countries of the Pacific Corridor. For all three countries, the forecast is unclear.
In Vietnam, recent typhoons have devastated the country’s northern and central regions. The widespread flooding has not only caused untold damage and upended the lives of many Vietnamese; it has also exposed Vietnam’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change. In fact, as correspondent Hang Nguyen reports, with other Southeast Asian countries also reckoning with natural disasters, Vietnam’s case illustrates how vulnerable the region is as a whole.
The Philippines finds itself facing a different sort of disaster, with Vice President Sara Duterte “in the eye of a political storm,” as reported by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr. Budget hearings for the Office of the Vice President have led to controversy and a budget cut, all as the Vice President herself remains glaringly absent.
Finally, correspondent Ryan in Singapore reports that the city-state’s population has reached a record 6.11 million. However, what lies behind the rise? And as Singapore continues to power its growth with foreign labor, how will neighboring countries react to the ripples of demand it sends out to the rest of the region?
Vietnam 🇻🇳
The Climate Emergency in Vietnam
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
Late September and early October saw Vietnam battered by a rapid succession of flash floods, landslides, vigorous rainstorms, and violent winds delivered by Typhoon Bualoi (Typhoon No. 10) and Typhoon Matmo (Typhoon No. 11). Extreme weather events hit the northern and central provinces annually; however, local residents and businesses still continue to be inundated with damages to their livelihoods and infrastructure. The lack of efficient climate change resilience further exacerbates civilian distress, signaling a call for urgency for the national government and regional institutions to ramp up natural disaster capacity-building and mitigation initiatives.
As of 11 October, preliminary statistics have reported catastrophic losses: 238 dead or missing, 367 injured, 258,000 private residences severely damaged, 500,000 hectares of agricultural rice fields destroyed, and automobile damages racking up to VND 76 million (US$3 million). Roads, schools, banks, health services, and other public infrastructure have suspended operations. The total economic loss is currently estimated to be tens of trillions VND (several billion US$), a burden to be placed on the Vietnamese government, taxpayers, and businesses.
Viewed from a more humanitarian perspective, the aftermath of flooding has devastated civilian normalcy in the afflicted regions. People have reported losing their entire life savings, properties, and important paperwork such as the “Pink Book” (Certificate of Land Use Rights) in the current calamities; livestock displaced; inability to contact family; no running water or electricity; and left to hopelessly wait for rescue forces. This is particularly the case in the agriculture-predominant regions of the Mekong Delta and of the central coasts, leaving the agricultural backbone of the nation critically incapacitated. Videos have surfaced on online platforms, portraying the cruelty of these historic typhoons and the despair of affected families.
In a swift response to the crisis, the government has mobilized military and security forces for emergency relief within hours after the incident. Notably, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh issued Decision No. 2221/QD-TTg to allocate aid from the 2025 central budget contingency fund worth VND 140 billion (US$5.6 million) for recovery and rebuilding in four northern provinces. Agencies and individuals have also participated in disaster relief efforts by donating and volunteering. While these expeditious short-term responses are well-coordinated and demonstrate solidarity amongst the Vietnamese people, the reliance on reactive measures rather than sustainable preventive frameworks will persist to disrupt civilian life on a frequent basis.
Vietnam’s recent calamities reflect the broader pattern of climate vulnerability across Southeast Asia, exposing the need for more extensive regional disaster mitigation and response mechanisms. Given that neighboring countries such as the Philippines also recently contended with the tropical cyclone Matmo, this presents an incentive to conduct data sharing and cross-border collaboration. The similar extreme weather phenomena that occurred across Southeast Asia reveals the shared exposure and susceptibility to environmental degradation. Ultimately, as climate risks transcend national borders, the coordination of ASEAN’s approach would facilitate more efficient capacity-building and would be indispensable to safeguarding livelihoods across the region.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭
When Silence Speaks: VP Duterte’s Budget Hearing Rift
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
Vice President Sara Duterte has found herself in the eye of a political storm after a series of contentious budget hearings for the Office of the Vice President (OVP). In a bold move, the House of Representatives approved slashing the OVP’s 2026 budget to PHP 733 million, down from the originally proposed PHP889.24 million.
The proposed budget adjustments coincided with concerns raised by lawmakers regarding the Vice President’s previous absences during budget hearings, where her non-appearance was viewed by some as a missed opportunity for legislative scrutiny.
The controversy began when Duterte declined to attend scheduled hearings. In response, the House appropriations panel cited “disrespect” in justifying its decision to impose the reduction.
“The Vice President’s repeated refusal to face this chamber is an insult and spits on the duty of accountability,” Mamamayang Liberal Representative Leila de Lima said during the budget hearing.
This standoff goes beyond personality and protocol. It points to tensions about power, autonomy, and the role of the vice presidency under a Marcos administration.
“It’s as if we’re parents of a child throwing a tantrum while refusing to explain where they spent their allowance,” de Lima added.
The timing also adds stakes. The OVP’s hearings come amid heightened public frustration over corruption scandals—especially those involving flood control projects and “ghost” contracts across key infrastructure agencies. The budget cut signals that even former allies of the administration may face checks when public trust is at stake.
In ASEAN terms, the incident underscores the fragility of political norms, even in relatively freer democracies. In countries where executive dominance is stronger—Malaysia under Mahathir, Indonesia under Jokowi—opposition voices have fewer tools to discipline officeholders. Here, Duterte’s absence triggered not silence, but a fiscal rebuke from the people’s representatives. That dynamic (citizen expectation meeting institutional pushback) is one of the more hopeful pulses in Southeast Asian governance today.
But the path forward is murky. Will the OVP budget cut lead to real reforms, open financial disclosures, and stronger performance measures? Or will it become another transactional battlefield in the lead-up to the 2028 elections? Whatever happens next, this episode serves as a reminder: legitimacy in public office is not given—it’s earned through accountability, not immunity.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore’s 6.11 Million: What the New Peak Reveals About a Tight Labor-Demand Economy
by Ryan
Singapore’s population has edged to a record 6.11 million as of June 2025, a 1.2% rise from a year earlier. The uptick is modest, but the composition matters: growth came mainly from non-residents, reflecting the city-state’s continued reliance on foreign labor to power construction, domestic care, and other essential services.
The Singapore government’s annual Population in Brief shows residents numbering 4.20 million, including 3.66 million citizens and 0.54 million permanent residents, while the non-resident population reached 1.91 million, up 2.7% year-on-year. Authorities attribute the increase primarily to more Work Permit holders in the construction sector, followed by migrant domestic workers, to support major projects such as Changi Terminal 5 and the ramp-up of public housing supply. This structurally mirrors Singapore’s post-pandemic trajectory: after borders reopened, headcount recovered in sectors where productivity upgrades alone cannot meet immediate demand, even as last year marked the first time the total population crossed six million.
Demographics highlight why the labor calculus is pressing. The resident total fertility rate remained at 0.97 in 2024, and the share of citizens aged 65 and above rose to 20.7%, with the median citizen age increasing to 43.7 years. These figures point to a shrinking working-age population and intensifying elder care needs, dynamics that both constrain domestic labor supply and raise demand for care workers.
For Singapore’s economy, the non-resident rebound is a short-to-medium-term bridge for capacity: it enables the state to push ahead on time-sensitive infrastructure and housing delivery while cushioning firms against a still-tight local labor market. The trade-off is familiar. A larger non-resident footprint increases pressure on housing, transport, and healthcare systems and can sharpen political scrutiny of immigration settings, even as the data shows a calibrated, sector-linked inflow rather than an indiscriminate surge. Media and official briefings consistently emphasize that foreign employment growth has been stable year-on-year and concentrated in clearly identified sectors.
Across Southeast Asia, aging is reshaping labor supply and demand in uneven ways that will matter for Singapore. Thailand and Vietnam are moving rapidly into older-age structures, while Indonesia and the Philippines remain younger but will age steadily over the next two decades. This divergence has funneled workers from younger to older economies for construction and household care, however the pool of migrant workers will tighten as sending countries age and as Japan and South Korea recruit from the same labor markets. The region’s care economy will expand, raising demand for trained caregivers, allied health workers, and technology that boosts productivity in eldercare settings. To keep growth inclusive, ASEAN governments will need to pair ethical recruitment and better social protections for migrants with skills pathways that move workers into higher-productivity roles. For Singapore, this means planning on two fronts: accelerating automation and job redesign at home and working with neighbours on portable benefits, standardized training, and recognition frameworks that sustain responsible mobility as the region’s demographic clock advances.
Regionally, the figures reaffirm Singapore’s role as an employment hub within ASEAN’s labor markets. Non-resident gains are effectively demand signals that ripple to sending countries, from construction to household services. The strategic question for policymakers is how quickly productivity, automation, and redesigned workflows can offset future labor needs.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Editorial Deadline 14/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)