Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF
This week’s Maritime Crescent looks at the conditions attached to choices that, on the surface, appear relatively straightforward.
In Brunei, Maryam Zulaidi revisits the region’s decades-long struggle with transboundary haze, questioning how far another appeal to the “ASEAN mechanism” can go when the economic incentives behind the fires and the absence of meaningful penalties remain largely unchanged.
In Indonesia, Amallia Utami examines mounting pressure on the country’s digital public sphere, where efforts to moderate harmful content increasingly intersect with restrictions on political expression, automated amplification, and persistent regulatory ambiguity.
Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Sydney Gan considers DAP’s decision to remain in Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government despite electoral setbacks and internal unease, with the party making clear that its continued support comes with expectations for reform.
Regional cooperation can only go so far without stronger accountability. Content moderation becomes increasingly contentious when its boundaries begin to encroach on political expression. And political loyalty becomes harder to sustain when promised reforms remain outstanding. In each case, the initial decision is only one part of the equation. What comes after may prove far more consequential.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Breathing the Same Smoke
by Maryam Zulaidi
To have lived in the Southeast Asian region means to have lived through seasons of haze coming from neighbouring countries. The people of ASEAN have been exposed to this environmental catastrophe for nearly three decades, making Bruneians no stranger to transboundary air pollution (TAP). Brunei, situated on the northern tip of Borneo, right above Indonesia’s future capital in Kalimantan, only amplifies this problem.
As of late, concerns regarding TAP have reemerged due to Kalimantan’s worsening forest fires rapidly diffusing into Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. On August 22nd, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated during the leaders summit, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, that both Malaysia and Brunei have agreed to jointly push the haze issue through the “ASEAN mechanism”. Brunei leverages this, using Malaysia’s heavier diplomatic weight within ASEAN as a cover to break from its own long-standing policy of non-interference.
This is not the first time such a statement or promise has been issued. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was adopted, building on the Regional Haze Action Plan introduced in 1997. In the same year, El Niño first turned Kalimantan’s peatlands into an international health crisis - where roughly five million hectares were destroyed. Fast forward three decades, the region still finds itself in a diplomatic rinse and repeat cycle: hot weather forecasts arrive, smoke crosses borders, and a letter gets sent to the ASEAN Secretariat. The Singapore Institute of International Affairs has labelled 2026 the first ‘red’ risk year since 2023.
The uncomfortable truth is that the underlying economics of the fires haven’t changed. Land clearing through burning remains the cheapest method available to companies, and ASEAN’s haze framework has never carried real penalties. Nearly 30 years after the first action plan, it is a matter of corporations taking accountability and facing penalties, not just repeated joint statements. If successful, the cycle will be broken. And if not, Bruneians will be breathing this same story again next dry season.
Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
The Growing Pressure on Digital Public Sphere
by Amallia Utami
Over the past five months, communication researchers and journalists in Indonesia have identified growing concerns within the country’s digital public sphere. According to a recent report by Tempo, four X users, previously posted criticisms regarding government policies and political communication, received warning notices from the platform requiring them to delete posts deemed to contain violence, hate speech, or privacy violations. Content is also liable to be taken down or have access restricted if deemed to violate platform safety standards or local laws. In its report, SAFEnet noted that from April to June 2026 was marked by practices restricting civil liberties, such as the silencing of dissent and recurring data violation.
SAFEnet verified that the Ministry of Digital Communication (Komdigi) issued requests to take down or restrict access to content addressing public issues and criticising government programmes. In 2026’s Q2, there was an increase of 37 cases involving internet access restrictions compared to the previous quarter. Meanwhile, violations of freedom of expression rose by 18 cases compared to the previous year. Protests that took place in several Indonesian cities between August and September 2025 are considered a turning point, marking the start of large-scale takedown and content removal actions by Komdigi.
A further concern lies in the information environment on social media, such as X, which appears to be manipulated by automated messaging. Monash University Indonesia identified organised re-uploads of videos and photos depicting student protests on social media, alongside centralised amplification, activities that would be impossible for human users to do on their own. For instance, certain accounts were capable of executing multiple distinct retweets within a span of less than a second, while specific accounts would also initiate and disseminate a narrative, which was then retweeted by thousands of other accounts. The narratives that emerged included claims of massive protests going unreported by the media or assertions that such stories had vanished from mainstream coverage.
The Komdigi responded differently when asked about the takedown and access restrictions. When asked by Tempo journalists, they offered no definitive answers, except asking them to wait for a response that first needed to be coordinated. The Komdigi Minister, Meutya Hafid, and the deputy minister did not respond to phone requests for confirmation. Meanwhile, when asked about access restrictions and the removal of content related to demonstrations, the minister admitted that she had never prohibited media outlets from covering them as long as they adhered to journalistic principles. She claimed that, per July 2026, almost 17,000 hoaxes were circulating on social media and urged people not to spread false information or engage in fearmongering using incorrect data.
Indonesia’s content moderation remains an ongoing dilemma due to vague legal definitions such as “negative content”. The problem is further worsened by data security vulnerabilities in government systems and a regulatory approach that lacks consultation with digital platforms and civil society. Furthermore, automated messages, especially those using AI tools, are dangerous because of the intense negative emotions they produce, such as anger and fear, by exploiting sensitive messages. This deliberate manipulation drives high engagement around deceptive content and traps the public inside ideological echo chambers. These practices will deepen polarization and erode public trust in constructive cross-perspective dialogue.
Safeguarding the digital public sphere against content manipulation is a crucial first step. The Indonesian government could update its regulatory frameworks, as current legal definitions of prohibited content stifle legitimate democratic discourse. Secondly, there is a need to enhance digital literacy, even in areas with low literacy rates, and to foster emotional intelligence among citizens.
Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
DAP’s Conditional Commitment
by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur
On 16 August, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of Malaysia voted to remain in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s MADANI unity government, despite Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) recent state-level losses to a resurgent Barisan Nasional (BN). Consisting of five Cabinet posts, seven deputy minister positions and 40 parliamentary seats, DAP’s decision shores up Anwar’s immediate stability ahead of the General Election. Attention now shifts to Melaka, where DAP and Anwar’s party People’s Justice Party (PKR) will again contest under the PH banner against a stronger BN and new competitor Bersama.
DAP’s decision was backed by 88.2% of those voting. Supporters argued that leaving now would amount to abandoning voters and handing political advantage to rival parties, while jeopardising policy commitments already underway. Despite the landslide result, criticism has emerged over the low overall turnout, with more than 50% of DAP delegates absent from the special congress. Former member P. Ramasamy argued that the motion could have been defeated had more delegates attended, and that the low turnout may indicate internal unrest and a sign of dissatisfaction with the government.
DAP has also made clear that its support is not unconditional. The party expects Anwar to advance several institutional reforms by year-end, including separating the roles of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, imposing a two-term limit on the prime minister, and finalising amendments to the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) and the Peaceful Assembly Act. DAP remains hesitant to fully invest in the partnership without Anwar delivering on his reform agenda, as continued inaction will risk further erosion of public trust that could affect DAP’s longer-term prospects, even if it eventually separates itself from the PH coalition.
Amid political turmoil, poor state-level results, and DAP increasingly being scapegoated for broader government failings, some supporters believe that stepping down from government could re-earn goodwill for the party. Exiting the government would allow it to distance itself from unpopular decisions, rebuild a more independent political identity, and reposition itself as a stronger opposition force. However, withdrawal would also destabilise Anwar’s government and empower BN to push for an early General Election, at a time when neither PH nor DAP appears well-positioned to contest one comfortably. The decision to stay with PH is therefore the most risk-averse choice in the short run, but cannot feasibly protect DAP from the turning public sentiment in the long term.
The Melaka state election in October/November will provide the next indication of whether PH can maintain its power. Considering that BN remains the clear favourite for Melaka, currently holding 20 of the 28 seats in the State Legislative Assembly, a more realistic objective for PH is to defend support in urban constituencies rather than take control of the state government. DAP’s continued participation allows PH to enter the election as a functioning coalition rather than one in open crisis, but another weak showing would deepen questions over Anwar’s ability to rebuild support ahead of the federal election.
Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.
Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
