The Caracas Next Door
Issue 30— Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Hree P. Samudra examines the United States’ operation in Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro, an act that has triggered global alarm over the erosion of one of the most fundamental principles of international law: the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For countries like Indonesia, whose security depends less on military dominance than on the integrity of legal norms, the selective application of sovereignty is existential. History shows that when violations go unanswered, precedents harden.
In Malaysia, Sydney Gan looks at Malaysia’s newly enacted Online Safety Act (ONSA). The Act reflects a growing regional consensus that online harms require firmer intervention, particularly to safeguard children and vulnerable users. Yet it also raises difficult questions about discretion, freedom of expression and regulatory overreach. The challenge is not whether to regulate, but how to do so without hollowing out the rights such laws claim to defend.
Finally, our guest writer explores Brunei’s labour localisation push and how it underscores structural pressures: unemployment and skills mismatches; reshaping policy choices across Southeast Asia. Efforts to prioritise local employment may deliver short-term relief, but they risk longer-term distortions if not matched with realistic workforce reform and regional coordination.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
When Sovereignty Becomes Negotiable
by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta
On January 3, the United States executed a military operation in Venezuela, capturing President Nicolás Maduro. This operation sparked a global outcry on violations of national sovereignty and international law – such as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – which prohibits the use of force against any state’s territorial integrity. Only two exceptions exist: self-defense under Article 51 or Security Council authorization. Neither applies here. Venezuela posed no threat. The Security Council gave no authorization. Counter-narcotics operations and democracy promotion have never constituted legal grounds for military force. The International Court of Justice established in Nicaragua v. United States (1986) that these prohibitions are binding on all states.
The pattern in Venezuela is identical to what destroyed the chemical weapons norm. OPCW inspectors documented Syrian chemical use in 2013. Evidence was irrefutable. The Security Council stayed paralyzed. By 2018, the norm eroded through repeated violations plus geopolitical justifications. Today, that norm is weaker.
The Venezuela operation does the same to sovereignty: rules binding only the weak. Catastrophic for Indonesia, which cannot defend itself through military force alone.
Jakarta is finalizing a trade deal with Washington worth $2-3 billion annually in tariff relief. The government’s measured response reflects fear of jeopardizing this deal. Compare it to actual strategic cost.
China asserts maritime claims intersecting Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands. Beijing has not yet used military force, partially because Article 2(4) still carries normative weight. If Washington can conduct regime change operations, what prevents Beijing from citing this precedent? Indonesia’s Natuna EEZ contains natural gas reserves worth billions, plus fisheries supporting millions.
The trade-off is not principle versus economics. It’s $2-3 billion against the legal architecture preventing Indonesia from losing sovereign control over resources worth orders of magnitude more.
The notion that a principled stance would kill the trade deal is wrong. Washington needs Indonesia’s nickel for EV supply chains. Jakarta needs market access. Trade negotiations survive policy disagreements routinely.
Indonesia is campaigning for a UN Security Council non-permanent seat in 2029-2030. The Venezuela crisis is the test case. Indonesia should have called for an emergency General Assembly session under the Uniting for Peace resolution, coordinated with NAM members, and requested an ICJ advisory opinion.
ASEAN’s founding principle is non-interference. Indonesia should have invoked the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Articles 14-15 to convene foreign ministers and the High Council. Not using these mechanisms signals that ASEAN principles are decorative.
Indonesia knows sovereignty violations have generational consequences. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor, violating Article 2(4). The response was tepid. That violation took 24 years and thousands of lives to resolve. When INTERFET deployed in 1999, it succeeded because it had Security Council authorization.
Indonesia has two choices: defend the rules now, or watch them erode until sovereignty means nothing. Trade agreements last a decade. Sovereignty norms last generations. The economic benefit from tariff relief pales against the cost of normalized Article 2(4) violations.
The rules matter not because of idealism. They matter because Indonesia cannot defend itself without them.
Hree serves as Project Associate for Asia and the Pacific at the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), where she leads multi-country initiatives integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) frameworks into security policies across ASEAN and South Asia. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the University of Glasgow’s Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age program. Previously, she served as Chair of the Humanitarian Disarmament and Inclusive Governance Working Group at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), advocating for more accountable and inclusive nuclear policy frameworks.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
A Chronically Online Malaysia Requires Guardrails
by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia ushers in the new year with a notable evolution in online safety policy, going down the well-trodden path paved by its British and Australian forebears. As of January 1, 2026, the Online Safety Act (ONSA) has finally come into force. The demand for this kind of legislation has ramped up over the last few years, as emerging technology introduces both exciting prospects and unprecedented digital harm to netizens across the region. As the slew of online-motivated stabbing cases and AI-generated obscenities grows rampant, there is little doubt to the fact that the ONSA is a necessary barrier for the liberties taken by bad actors in the online space.
Notably, the ONSA does not apply to individuals - instead, a distinct obligation to take proactive steps addressing harmful content is placed on Licensed Service Providers (which, as of 2026, automatically includes all major social media platforms with over 8 million users in Malaysia, under the MCMC’s Deeming Provision). The ONSA singles out priority harmful content, including child sexual abuse materials and financial fraud, to be mandatorily taken down and also compels licensed providers to cooperate during relevant investigations. While the Act does not specify specific anti-harm technology/methods to be adopted, the ONSA aims to implement a stronger legislative push towards more consistent and proportionate industry responses to online safety, especially for services primarily used by underage users.
With any regulation addressing content, the ONSA naturally runs the risk of infringing on freedom of speech - a delicate balance to strike, especially in a digital-forward country like Malaysia. Within the nine “harmful content” categories listed out in the Act, it empowers not only the licensed providers, but also the MCMC to make permanently inaccessible any online materials such as “indecent content” and content that “may disturb public peace” - both of which are loose enough definitions that may be conceivably manipulated to the whims of political persuasion.
However, as demonstrated by the Ministry of Communication’s restraint in discarding the blanket ban for social media users under 16, one can expect the MCMC to take on a more cautious approach in addressing online harms. The ONSA draft also includes guardrails by design, represented by the Online Safety Appeal Tribunal, where any aggrieved individual may raise their case to a body chaired by an impartial high court judge, with both industry and regulatory representatives on the panel. In other words, this curbs MCMC’s absolute power and permits an appellate route in any pertinent cases where the freedom of speech and expression is unjustly threatened.
As part of Malaysia’s ambition to become a digital leader, online harms are an unavoidable byproduct of rapid digitalization. The ONSA is a necessary addition to curtail such harms, especially for vulnerable groups, but inevitably undercuts the sanctity of certain freedoms in the online space. It is crucial for Malaysia to enact the legislation, not as an act of reactionary law-making, but a carefully curated and consulted process that carefully balances the importance of human rights with digital protection.
Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Tackling Unemployment?
by Hannah Zafirah
Unemployment remains a pressing issue in the region. Brunei’s government acknowledges this problem and has been planning initiatives to tackle it — creating more opportunities for locals to take up jobs that are currently held by foreign labourers. This was highlighted in Brunei’s Legislative Council Meeting held back in March of 2025 whereby the Second Minister of Finance and Economy, Dato Dr Hj Mohd Amin Liew Abdullah stated that many jobs held by foreign talent could be filled by locals, signaling the government trying to shift its dependency on foreign labour to workforce localisation.
Brunei currently faces accumulating pressure to address its predicament of unemployment and utilise the nation’s highly-skilled and educated workforce. This shift coincides with global trends toward economic nationalism and workforce protectionism that can be seen in other Asian counterparts like Vietnam and Thailand. The new initiative may also affect Brunei’s economic goals in the long run since there is still a high chance of skills mismatch when highly skilled graduates are forced into non-specialised roles. As of December 2024, Brunei ranked third from last regionally with an unemployment rate of 4.7% compared to its neighbouring countries, Singapore and Malaysia. By laying off 5,000 foreigners, local jobseekers benefit.
Though deliberately omitting which sectors will be affected, the Second Minister alluded to the idea of diversifying job opportunities in the tertiary sectors. According to the latest report published by CSPS, the share of job seekers with a bachelor’s degree and above increased to 40% in November 2024. However, construction, retail, and manufacturing sector jobs usually offer low-paying opportunities. Therefore, these roles may not be as appealing nor fitting to the highly educated and skilled locals actively searching for higher-paying white-collar jobs.
Furthermore, in a regional context, if all 5,000 workers were sending remittances to their home countries, their layoffs will reduce remittance outflows from Brunei, potentially straining relations with labour-sending nations. The move woul run counter to ASEAN’s ‘Free Flow of Skilled Labour’ agenda.
If the policy is is implemented, the government should be cautious of potential unintended consequences and knock-on effects across the wider economy. For example, skills mismatch could potentially lead to locals taking a job opportunity but resigning quickly as it does not meet their expectations, creating high turnover rates and economic instability and uncertainty. Another downside would be that Brunei may lose highly skilled and educated foreign workers who could help in improving local skills, especially in entrepreneurship and IT fields. This will be unfavorable for FDI as multinational businesses may avoid investing in Brunei due to its high labour costs and small population. Henceforth, it is vital for the government and policymakers to implement adequate reforms better aligning jobs with the specialisations of local job seekers.
In sum, only time will tell whether this change in labour policy will result in unemployment rate changes following its implementation.
Hannah is an external contributor writing this week’s piece on Brunei.
Editorial Deadline 04/01/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
