Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
Diplomacy has often been likened to a dance: careful, choreographed, and when done well, graceful. But a single misstep, a single missed beat, and the entire dance becomes a disaster. This week in the Pacific Corridor, Manila and Hanoi find themselves dancing to two very different tunes with two very different partners.
For the Philippines, its dance partner is an unyielding China, and the music is discordant indeed: the Chinese ambassador’s recent threatening remarks have resulted in a diplomatic debacle and again stoked tensions over the two countries’ maritime dispute in the South China Sea. In contrast, Vietnam is dancing gracefully in time with Denmark, as General Secretary and President To Lam’s state visit to Copenhagen signals deeper bilateral cooperation in green energy and security.
Singapore’s concerns this week are closer to home: the city-state must deal with an ongoing disability employment retention gap. Policies are already in place, but full inclusion still has a long way to go as realities on the ground wait to catch up.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
China’s Strategic Ratcheting of the Philippines
by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan
On 19 October 2026, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro summoned Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan following his remarks on 15 October that China could “easily win” a confrontation with the Philippines, but that they preferred peace. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. condemned the statement as “undiplomatic,” with Chinese Ambassador Jing responding that China could retaliate by declaring them as persona non grata.
Beyond the diplomatic fallout amidst the tensions over competing maritime claims in the area of the South China Sea that the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines wrestles with the pressure exerted by China to defend its sovereign rights, even without the former’s initiation of outright military conflict.
According to Haroro Ingram, a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s tactics illustrate a pattern called “strategic ratcheting,” whereby China uses different forms of pressure to limit the Philippines’ choices. The approach does not necessitate force to achieve China’s objectives; instead, they deploy their coast guard and strengthen their military presence and diplomatic message to make resistance more challenging or costly for the Philippines. Chinese Ambassador Jing’s recent remarks is military intimidation, which is instrumental to shaping political calculations even if force is not used.
While the 2016 arbitral ruling reinforced the Philippines’ legal position, China’s aggressive rejection of the ruling implies that legal victories alone cannot ensure compliance nor dictate behavior. In the past few years, China’s campaign of unlawful and maritime coercion in the Philippines has intensified. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has tracked high levels of maritime activities, such as the deployment of floating objects, including buoys and floating barriers; the installation of temporary structures; and the increased presence of the China Coast Guard.
China has engaged in a multifaceted effort to employ deceptive and coercive activities, such as cyber-operations on Philippine government networks and China-linked intelligence operations to recruit government officials. Though below the threshold of armed conflict, both additional tactics are also designed to exploit identified vulnerabilities and collective private information, aiding them in altering behavior and norms in the Philippines.
The threat is not only to peace and security, but also to shared values and trust. For the Philippines, the challenge is to ensure that repeated coercion does not gradually redefine what it can defend, where it can operate, and how firmly it can assert its rights.
International legal recognition must be translated into stronger maritime enforcement, strengthened safeguards against foreign interference, and coordination with ASEAN member states to make it clear that coercive actions have diplomatic consequences.
Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Vietnam’s Nordic Overture
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
As relations between larger powers grow harder to predict, smaller states such as Vietnam have an evident interest in broadening their pool of partners, a posture consistent with the multilateralism General Secretary and President To Lam emphasized in Copenhagen. His 19 to 21 October state visit to Denmark fits this diplomatic agenda. Vietnam’s ambassador in Copenhagen noted that it is the first state visit to Denmark by a Vietnamese Party General Secretary and the only state visit the kingdom will host in 2026, which places the trip above routine courtesy.
The ceremonial elements carried considerable symbolic weight given the two countries’ shared history. On 19 October, King Frederik X conferred the Order of the Elephant on Mr. Lam, a high-ranking honor reserved for royals and foreign heads of state, to mark 55 years of diplomatic relations. Denmark was among the first Western European countries to establish diplomatic relations with Hanoi in 1971, while the Vietnam War was still under way, and Mr. Lam drew on that record in a speech at the University of Copenhagen to argue for a more ambitious relationship going forward.
The concrete proposal was to upgrade the Green Strategic Partnership, established in 2023, into a framework he described as more comprehensive and strategic. As of 2023, Denmark had signed such partnerships with only five countries, Vietnam among them. The economic rationale rests on complementary strengths: the Danish Energy Agency has estimated Vietnam’s technical offshore wind potential at 160 gigawatts, while Denmark leads in the technology itself. Mr. Lam also invited the University of Copenhagen to open a campus in Vietnam and proposed Danish involvement in planning the ASEAN Power Grid. The Vietnam News Agency reported that roughly 150 Danish companies already operate in the country, making Denmark its third-largest European investor.
A more subtle security dimension runs underneath the cooperation proposal. Mr. Lam expressed hope that Denmark would support freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a phrase commonly read as a reference to the South China Sea territorial disputes, and described each country as the other’s gateway to ASEAN and the European Union (EU). For Hanoi, a partner such as Denmark, which has no stake in the dispute, may offer diplomatic backing for rules-based maritime norms at limited risk of provoking either larger power, while Copenhagen gains a foothold in a fast-growing ASEAN economy.
However, several limits apply. Denmark’s capacity to influence the South China Sea balance is modest, and as of 20 October, the coverage reviewed does not indicate that a formal upgrade has been announced. Much of the available reporting originates from Vietnamese state media, leaving Copenhagen’s own priorities only partially visible. The delegation proceeds to the EU and Belgium, which suggests Denmark may function as a template for Hanoi’s broader European approach.
In that sense, the visit’s significance may rest on the signal it sends more than on what Denmark can deliver directly. A green, technology-oriented partnership with a respected small state adds stability to Hanoi’s foreign policy portfolio, though whether the ceremony translates into binding commitments remains to be seen.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Hiring Is Only Half the Job: Singapore’s Disability Employment Retention Gap
by Ryan
Singapore has made hiring people with disabilities a settled policy priority, but a statistic released for the first time in July suggests that getting a job and keeping one are separate problems. According to Ministry of Manpower data cited by The Straits Times, only about one in four employed residents with disabilities worked for the same employer for at least a year as of 2025. The Singapore National Employers Federation, by contrast, puts the share of local employees who stay that long at between 85% and 89%. SG Enable, the national disability agency, conceded the figure sits below the overall workforce and means few such workers stay long enough to build a sustainable career.
The gap sits awkwardly beside real progress on participation. The employment rate of people with disabilities rose from 28.2% in 2018/2019 to 34.7% in 2024/2025, according to Malay Mail, and the Enabling Masterplan 2030 targets 40% by the end of the decade. The Straits Times reporting shows what such aggregates can hide. Muhammad Nafiz Sulaiman, a 19-year-old with autism, completed a horticulture course, worked with a job coach, and interned for three months at a hydroponic farm, yet was not offered a full-time role because his employer felt he lacked initiative, which his mother attributed to difficulties with communication. Workplace dynamics and missing accommodations, rather than competence at the task, appear to be the fault line.
The task force report released on 4 October seems to recognize this. The Taskforce on Assurance for Families with Persons with Disabilities proposes an Employment Support Office offering longer-term career support, and beginning in 2028, job support for workers with higher support needs will run beyond the current one year. Three existing employer schemes will merge into a single Enabling Employment Grant, expected in the first half of 2027, after employers said they struggled to identify the right grant and file multiple applications. SG Enable will also extend its Sector Train-and-Place program from hospitality into five more sectors, with a goal of 800 placements between 2026 and 2030.
Measurement remains the weaker link. The Straits Times notes that Japan breaks retention down by intellectual, physical, mental, and developmental disabilities, a granularity Singapore lacks. The Disabled People’s Association has urged that employment retention and under-employment be added to the Masterplan’s indicators alongside the 40% target. A Singapore Management University survey, Engage.Me, similarly found goodwill toward workers with disabilities to be high but the supporting systems weak, with many workers and employers unaware of existing grants. A headline employment rate rewards entry; it cannot say whether a worker is still there next year.
Singapore’s question is also the region’s. The United Nations Development Programme reports that labor force participation among persons with disabilities across ASEAN is two to six times lower than for those without disabilities, even as Thailand’s quota system, Philippine tax incentives, and Malaysia’s 1% public sector target have opened doors. Malaysia’s human resources minister told Parliament that 68,191 persons with disabilities were placed in private sector jobs between 2023 and May 2026, yet a Nippon Foundation survey of seven ASEAN countries found that some workers are given limited responsibilities once hired.
Quotas can compel a hiring decision and grants can subsidize it, but the supervisor who explains the next task, the colleague who waits for a reply, and the manager who redesigns a shift decide whether anyone stays. Across ASEAN, inclusion will be settled less in ministries than at the workstation.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Editorial Deadline 20/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
