The Great Reclamation
Issue 19 — Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
On this week’s Maritime Crescent issue, our correspondents capture how power, principle and pragmatism intersect across Southeast Asia.
Rayhan Prabu, in Indonesia, reports on President Prabowo Subianto’s sweeping forest reclamation campaign that marks one of the boldest interventions against corporate interests in decades. By reclaiming 3.4 million hectares of land, his administration projects strength and a redistributive agenda. However, the practice emphasizes selective enforcement, lack of transparency and transfer of assets to state-linked entities, raising deeper questions about power consolidation and institutional checks.
Brunei, by contrast, has chosen the language of diplomacy to steady itself amid global turbulence. Wira Gregory explores how the recent statements welcoming the Gaza ceasefire reflect a careful blend of solidarity with the Muslim world and alignment with international law. At a time when the Middle East conflict reverberates through Southeast Asian economies and societies, Brunei positions itself as a small but principled actor projecting stability.
Meanwhile, Muhammad Aiman writes on Malaysia stepping into complex waters with the upcoming Aman Youyi 2025 military exercise alongside China. Framed as humanitarian and security cooperation, the drill carries strategic weight. It reflects Malaysia’s pragmatic defence diplomacy but also highlights the delicate balancing act required to engage major powers without undermining regional cohesion.
Assertive state action, principled diplomacy and strategic pragmatism; each path carries its own opportunities and risks, shaping how Southeast Asia navigates an increasingly contested landscape.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Spoils of War
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
On 6 October 2025, President Prabowo Subianto announced that his Forest Area Regulation Task Force (Satgas PKH) had reclaimed approximately 3.4 million hectares of forest land—worth an estimated Rp 150 trillion (USD 9.4 billion)—from palm oil and mining operations allegedly occupying protected zones illegally. The move represents one of the most aggressive interventions against corporate interests in Indonesia’s modern democratic era.
While the task force was established in January, enforcement dramatically intensified following deadly riots in August. Those August protests appear to have awakened something within Prabowo: a deepened conviction that bolder action was needed. He has framed Indonesia’s crisis in existential terms, arguing that the nation’s wealth remains captured by less than 1% through “collusion between large capital owners, government officials, and political elites.”
Satgas PKH was formally established through Presidential Regulation 5/2025 on January 21, with implementation led by Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes Febrie Adriansyah and staffed by military officials alongside law enforcement personnel. The task force wields broad investigative and prosecutorial powers over forest violations.
The choice of institutional vehicle is revealing. Indonesia’s Attorney General’s office has increasingly handled politically sensitive cases—a pattern predating Prabowo but intensifying under his presidency, including prosecutions of former Trade Minister Tom Lembong, former Education Minister Nadiem Makarim, and former Director General of Budget Isa Rachmatarwata. The issue isn’t lack of legal merit but selective enforcement: why these individuals, why now, and why through the AG’s office rather than the more institutionally independent Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)?
This selective approach to enforcement extends to what happens after reclamation. Reclaimed lands are being transferred to state enterprises, with millions of hectares of palm plantations to Agrinas Palma Nusantara, while mining areas go to the state mining holding MIND ID.
Enforcement also appears highly selective: while the task force ostensibly targets three clear categories—unlicensed operations, permit holders lacking forest-use authorization, and those exceeding permit boundaries—the question isn’t whether violations exist, but why certain violators face immediate action while others remain untouched. Indonesia’s history of anti-corruption drives doubling as political instruments makes this pattern familiar and troubling.
The retroactive enforcement regime destabilizes property rights and investment climate. Companies that secured mining permits (IUP) but lacked supplementary forest-use permits (IPPKH)—often due to bureaucratic complexity rather than malicious intent—now face asset seizure. Meanwhile, the task force operates with minimal parliamentary oversight, virtually no civil society monitoring, and a quasi-military structure that distances operations from civilian legal norms. Even environmental groups who are natural allies of forest protection, have criticized the campaign.
The concentration of reclaimed assets under state control, combined with selective enforcement routed through politically-sensitive channels and operating with minimal oversight, crystallizes these concerns about transparency and due process.
Prabowo has warned that unchecked wealth extraction risks making Indonesia a “failed state.” Yet his methods challenge the post-Suharto institutions designed to reassure both citizens and markets. Whether this campaign delivers genuine redistribution or becomes a tool for consolidating state control will define his legacy.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei Signals Steadfast Statement on Middle Eastern Developments
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
On 9 October 2025, Brunei Darussalam issued a statement welcoming “positive developments towards the Gaza ceasefire agreement.” The text commended the mediating roles of the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye, and reaffirmed support for a sovereign Palestinian state based on pre‑1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The statement is notable for two reasons. First of all, it places Brunei firmly within the mainstream of international consensus, echoing United Nations resolutions and aligning with the positions of larger Muslim‑majority states. Second, it arrives at a moment when the consequences of the Middle East conflict are already visible in Southeast Asia. The language is diplomatic, yet the timing is practical. Brunei had only recently closed its embassy in Tehran due to escalating tensions. By welcoming ceasefire progress, the government underscores its preference for de‑escalation while limiting its own exposure to regional instability.
The words are outward‑looking, yet their effects are local. Brunei has experienced boycotts of multinational franchises linked to some extent to the conflict in the Middle East. Some incidents escalated into vandalism and threats against employees, forcing companies to issue clarifications about ownership and humanitarian commitments. Against this backdrop, a reaffirmation of solidarity with Palestine helps to contextualise these pressures within a broader international framework, showing that Brunei’s official position is consistent with the sentiments already shaping its domestic market.
The message is national in form, yet regional in implication. Maritime Crescent countries have become a frontline for the socioeconomic ripple effects of Middle Eastern conflicts. Boycotts, supply chain disruptions, and reputational risks converge in these markets, threatening workers and small businesses.
October 13th saw another statement by Brunei, welcoming the signing of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza while praising the United States’ “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”.
For decades, Brunei has anchored its foreign policy in international law, multilateralism, and solidarity with Muslim causes. By explicitly referencing UN resolutions and the basis of the two-State solution, the government signals continuity rather than departure, an important marker for a small state whose credibility rests on predictability. In a region where ASEAN members often diverge on Middle Eastern conflicts, Brunei’s clarity stands out within the international sphere. The statement therefore functions less as a new position than as a reaffirmation of Brunei’s identity: a small but principled actor that aligns itself with international consensus while maintaining solidarity with the wider Muslim world.
In short, the statement is diplomatic text, yet it functions as a stabilising tool. It aligns Brunei with international law, reassures domestic audiences that solidarity remains intact, and signals to investors and regional partners that Brunei is alert to the risks of external conflicts spilling into Southeast Asia. In moments when global conflicts reverberate through local economies and societies, even a carefully worded communiqué can act as ballast. The value lies not in shifting the course of negotiations abroad, but in showing that Brunei reads the currents, steadies itself, and signals resilience to those watching at home and across the region.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism. With experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service, he focuses on regional security developments across the Asia-Pacific, combining strategic analysis with practical field insight.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Strategic Calculus Behind the ‘Aman Youyi 2025’
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
Malaysia and China are gearing up for Aman Youyi 2025, a bilateral military exercise scheduled from mid-October in Selangor and the Straits of Malacca. The exercise, now in its sixth iteration, is officially framed around humanitarian assistance, disaster relief (HADR) and maritime security cooperation.
Its timing and operational footprint, however, carry significance beyond training. The choice of the Straits of Malacca, a maritime chokepoint crucial to global and regional trade underscores a symbolic message. China, which depends heavily on sea routes for energy and commerce, benefits from familiarising its forces in strategic maritime corridors. For Malaysia, the exercise provides a platform for defence diplomacy, joint readiness and benchmarking its own operational capacity against one of Asia’s most advanced militaries.
From a strategic perspective, Malaysia’s participation in Aman Youyi 2025 can be read as a signal of pragmatism. It reflects a willingness to engage with China on security matters, even amid South China Sea tensions and superpower rivalry. By embracing cooperative military engagement, Malaysia may aim to balance its relations with multiple powers, projecting itself as a neutral actor that resists polarization.
Yet the drill is not without its risks. Deepening military ties with China could raise alarm elsewhere among ASEAN neighbors or states wary of Beijing’s influence. Observers may question whether the enhanced interoperability with China’s People’s Liberation Army could carry unintended strategic dependencies. A joint exercise like this, even if officially benign, may subtly shift perceptions of alignment or influence, particularly among smaller regional actors.
For ASEAN as a whole, Aman Youyi 2025 offers both opportunity and challenge. On one hand, inviting ASEAN observers to such exercises could foster greater transparency, trust, and security cooperation across the bloc. On the other hand, if such bilateral drills become more frequent without matching multilateral frameworks, ASEAN’s collective security posture may be undermined by bilateral dependencies or fragmentation.
As the ships sail and drills proceed, Malaysia must walk a fine line. It needs to ensure that its participation bolsters capacity and diplomacy, not perception of alignment or concession. Given the region’s contest of influence, ASEAN partners will closely watch whether Malaysia leverages this exercise to strengthen multilateral cooperation rather than deepen bilateral asymmetries. In short, Aman Youyi 2025 is more than a military drill. It is a geopolitical act, a test of strategic identity, and a moment for Malaysia and ASEAN to affirm that security cooperation must be inclusive, transparent and balanced.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Editorial Deadline 12/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
