The Illusion of Control
Issue 28 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Across the Mekong this week, authorities are sending out signals designed to reassure—announcements meant to suggest control, transition, or restraint. But as it often happens, words and actions do not always advance in parallel, and beneath those carefully broadcast messages, conditions on the ground seem to suggest a different reality. In Myanmar, prisoner releases and election preparations are framed as steps toward political normalization. In reality, they function more like calming signals: selective amnesties alongside continued arbitrary detentions, intensified surveillance, and airstrikes that kill civilians. Thailand’s political reset follows a similar pattern. The dissolution of parliament is presented as a democratic gesture in the face of crisis, yet it also suspends scrutiny at a moment when floods, economic strain, and constitutional deadlock demand accountability. Nowhere is the gap between message and reality more dangerous than along the Cambodia–Thailand border. Ceasefires are announced, mediators step in, and restraint is promised—yet fighting resumes, civilians flee, and trust collapses further. Beyond Cambodia, the conflict’s aftershocks are already tangible in Laos, where Thailand’s decision to suspend fuel exports at the Chong Mek border underscores how regional tensions quickly translate into economic pressure for neighbors, turning trade routes into pressure points even as diplomatic language urges restraint.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Prisoner Releases ‘For Show’ Amid Ongoing Arbitrary Detainment and Airstrikes
by Myat Moe Kywe
On December 3, Dr. Tay Zar San, a prominent figure in the early anti-coup protests, led a rally alongside other well-known pro-democracy activists near Mandalay’s Zay Cho Market, urging the public to boycott the military-planned election in late December. The appearance was significant given the heightened surveillance and legal charges he has faced since 2021.
Dr. Tay Zar San has been wanted by the military since the weeks following the February 1 coup and was charged under Section 505(a) of the Penal Code for defaming the state. Despite the risk of arrest, he and other activists appeared publicly ahead of the election, demonstrating continued resistance to military rule. On December 12, military-controlled media announced that the protest organizers had been charged under Section 23(b) of the military commission’s Election Protection Law. Local residents reported that authorities offered rewards of 20 million kyats (approximately USD 9,000) for information leading to the arrest of the protest leaders. Despite these threats, Dr. Tay Zar San continued to post on social media, calling for public participation in a nationwide Silent Strike on December 12, International Human Rights Day.
The renewed calls for protest come as the military seeks to frame the election as part of a broader political transition. Earlier this month, the junta announced it had released more than 3,000 prisoners and dropped charges against over 5,000 others, presenting the move as an effort to build domestic and international support for the polls. Independent media, however, reported that most of those freed had minor convictions or were nearing the end of their sentences.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), 30,039 people have been detained since the February 2021 coup under Section 505(a), and at least 605 political prisoners have died in prisons or interrogation centres as of November 27. Commenting on the recent amnesty, AAPP’s general secretary said that “if the military were genuinely pursuing a political resolution, it would release key political figures, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint,” who remain in detention.
At the same time, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party has intensified its election campaign. Party chair U Khin Ye explicitly stated that any party winning the election but refusing to cooperate with the military would “fall.” Residents in Mandalay have also reported pressure from ward administrators to vote in the upcoming poll. While the junta continues to present the election as a step toward political stability, conflict and violence persist across the country. On December 12, two days after International Human Rights Day, more than 30 civilians and patients were killed when military airstrikes struck a hospital in Mrauk-U, Rakhine State, an area controlled by the Arakan Army.
Ultimately, these latest developments highlight the military’s dual approach: presenting a public image of political engagement through prisoner releases and elections, while continuing arrests, carrying out airstrikes in civilian areas and infrastructure, and keeping key political figures and detainees in custody.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand’s Political Deadlock Deepens
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
On December 12, 2025, Thailand’s parliament was dissolved after Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul submitted a proposal citing the border conflict with Cambodia and other ongoing crises. He argued that, as a minority government, returning power to the people was the most appropriate course of action. While the Anutin administration has faced multiple challenges—ranging from deadly border clashes with Cambodia to severe flooding in the south since taking office three months ago—the primary trigger for the dissolution appears to be the stalled constitutional amendment process.
Before forming the government, Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Under this agreement, Bhumjaithai committed to supporting constitutional amendments aimed at reducing the power of the upper house and independent entities, in exchange for the People’s Party’s backing. However, the promised vote never took place, as Anutin and his cabinet ultimately reneged on the agreement.
Although Anutin claimed that dissolving parliament was the only way to resolve the ongoing crises, critics argue that the move was intended to preserve the power of conservatives, the military, and royalist networks. The proposed amendments sought to reduce the authority of the upper house. In Thailand’s current political system, the upper house is not elected by the public but selected through a complex process that favors local elites and varies by term. Despite this, senators play a decisive role in choosing the prime minister, as candidates must secure at least one-third of upper-house votes. This structure was designed to limit the rise of new, often younger, reformist politicians and to preserve existing power arrangements.
Bhumjaithai has also faced mounting criticism over its handling of the severe floods in Thailand’s south, broader crisis management, and a sluggish economy. The opposition People’s Party had signaled its intention to pursue a no-confidence motion, prompting the dissolution. By dissolving parliament, Bhumjaithai effectively removed a key mechanism for parliamentary scrutiny. Nevertheless, the party remains in power as an interim government, continuing to manage state affairs.
Under Thailand’s constitutional framework, the interim government retains authority over key areas, including foreign policy, national security, emergency declarations, and disaster relief. It will remain in office until a new administration is formed, with elections expected as early as February.
This raises a central question: was parliament dissolved to restore political legitimacy through elections, or to allow the ruling party to remain in office while avoiding accountability from the opposition?
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia–Thailand Clashes Resume Seven Days After Failed October Peace Talks
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
The long-running Cambodia–Thailand border dispute has flared up again, barely a month after both sides signed a peace agreement in Kuala Lumpur in the presence of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and U.S. President Donald Trump. Since then, diplomatic efforts have faltered, with Thailand accusing Cambodia of laying new landmines along the border—an allegation Phnom Penh has firmly denied.
On the afternoon of December 7, 2025, Cambodian and Thai forces clashed once more. By the following day, the situation escalated into large-scale armed conflict, with both sides accusing the other of firing the first shot.
In the days that followed, fighting spread across multiple flashpoints along the provincial border areas of both countries. Thailand deployed air power, including F-16 fighter jets and drones, alongside infantry, tanks, and mortars, striking targets across seven border provinces. Cambodia stated it would avoid large-scale retaliation, limiting its response to defensive operations at key strategic positions and conducting counterattacks when deemed necessary. Cambodian forces reportedly relied on infantry units and BM-21 multiple-launch rocket systems, adopting what Phnom Penh referred to as a “policy of restraint.”
After seven days of fighting, more than half a million people on both sides have been displaced. On the Cambodian side alone, over 300,000 civilians were evacuated. As of December 13, Cambodian authorities reported 11 civilian deaths and 59 injuries, as well as damage to infrastructure, private homes, public buildings, and hospitals. Several cultural and religious sites were also reported to be affected, including Ta Kra Bei Temple—known in Thailand as Ta Kwai—which Cambodia says was completely destroyed by airstrikes. Phnom Penh has since indicated it is compiling evidence and plans to submit a file to the International Criminal Court.
The renewed hostilities prompted a fresh diplomatic intervention by Anwar Ibrahim and Donald Trump, resulting in a new ceasefire agreement on December 13, according to Anwar. However, reports of continued gunfire along the border on December 14 raised doubts about the durability of the agreement, suggesting the ceasefire remains fragile.
Talking to The ASEAN Frontier, Thong Mengdavid, Deputy Director of the China-ASEAN Studies Centre, said the renewed fighting reflects the failure of the earlier peace agreement and, as he claims, it is driven largely by Thailand’s internal political crisis. He argued that Bangkok’s reluctance to adhere to bilateral mechanisms such as the General Border Committee and the Joint Boundary Commission contributed to the escalation. Despite renewed mediation by Trump and Anwar, who currently serves as ASEAN chair, Mengdavid noted that Thailand’s domestic turmoil, including the dissolution of parliament, has left the military with greater control and deprived the country of stable political leadership.
“The impact is profound and long-lasting, particularly in undermining people-to-people trust and economic cooperation,” he said, claiming that Cambodia continues to advocate political reconciliation through bilateral diplomatic channels.
Political observer Ok Serei Sopheak described the conflict as a “meaningless war,” arguing that it sacrifices civilian lives for political ambition. He accused the Thai military of crossing into disputed areas and Cambodian civilian zones, displacing communities and deliberately targeting infrastructure. He warned that Thailand risks deeper political instability and suggested Cambodia could seek the deployment of ASEAN or international military observers to protect civilians and independently investigate the conflict.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Caught Between Tensions as Thailand Suspends Fuel Exports Through Chong Mek Border
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Thailand’s army has imposed tighter controls at the Chong Mek border checkpoint in Ubon Ratchathani Province, suspending the export of all fuel products and military equipment effective midnight on 14 December. The Thai military said the measure aims to safeguard national security and maintain public order amid ongoing tensions with Cambodia.
According to Thai authorities, the restrictions will remain in force until further notice.
Chong Mek is a key crossing between Thailand and southern Laos, directly opposite the Wang Tao International Border Checkpoint in Champasak Province. The checkpoint serves as a vital route for bilateral trade and as a transit corridor connecting Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.
Following Thailand’s closure of direct border crossings with Cambodia after tensions escalated in late July, exports were expected to be rerouted through Laos via Chong Mek before continuing to Cambodia. A ceasefire was initially reached in early August, providing temporary relief, but fighting renewed in early December, heightening uncertainty for regional trade and logistics.
From the Lao perspective, disruptions at Chong Mek could affect fuel supplies, transport services, and trade flows in southern provinces, particularly Champasak. While the Thai order does not target general commercial goods, the suspension of fuel exports may have ripple effects on trucking, cross-border transport, and businesses reliant on energy imports from Thailand.
Historically, Chong Mek has served as a passage for Thai and Lao communities engaged in small-scale trade, particularly in agricultural and forest products. Today, it plays a more strategic role in supporting Laos’s vision of becoming a land-linked country within mainland Southeast Asia.
In response to the escalating situation, Laos has expressed concern over the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand and has urged both sides to exercise restraint. In a statement issued on December 11, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Laos, as a neighboring country sharing borders with both Cambodia and Thailand, was closely monitoring developments.
“Laos expresses concern over the ongoing conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. As a neighboring country with borders with both countries, Laos calls on both sides to exercise restraint, refrain from the use of force, uphold goodwill and friendship as ASEAN member states, return to the bilateral agreement signed on 26 October in Kuala Lumpur, and use existing mechanisms to find a peaceful solution,” the statement read.
Despite this diplomatic intervention, Lao authorities have not yet issued an official response to Thailand’s 14 December decision. Nevertheless, given Laos’s role as a “land-linked” country connecting Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, officials are expected to monitor the situation and its potential economic impacts closely.
Meanwhile, Thailand’s military stated that the measure aims to maintain security and public order in line with the evolving border situation, emphasizing that adjustments will be made as conditions change.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Editorial Deadline 12/12/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
Brillaint coverage of the Laos predicament here. The fuel export suspension at Chong Mek really underlines how these 'bilateral' conflicts inherently drag in third parties thru economic chokepoints. Back in 2021 saw similiar cross-border trade bottlenecks near Myanmar when sanctions redirected routes, and prices for basics shot up fast in smaller towns.