The Maritime Crescent
Issue 9
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
In this issue, we cast a critical eye in Southeast Asia’s geopolitical terrain — one shaped not only by great power rivalry, but also by how the region’s own actors react, resist, and recalibrate.
This week, The Maritime Crescent covers three distinct responses to this complex environment. Brunei’s cautious posture in the South China Sea reflects the delicate trade-offs faced by small states seeking security without confrontation. Indonesia’s recent trade deals with the United States, though framed as a loss, may yet become a springboard for economic transformation if its leaders can reframe the narrative and act swiftly. Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Putrajaya’s role in brokering peace between Cambodia and Thailand suggests that when regional leadership is exercised, the bloc’s commitment to peace-building remains within reach.
Each of these coverages offer a window into how ASEAN members navigate hard choices in a moment defined by both external pressure and internal fragmentation. They ask: What does it mean to lead in Southeast Asia today? How do small states protect their interests without provoking conflict? And most urgently, can ASEAN still define its own terms of engagement, or will others continue to shape peace, prosperity, and power in its place?
At a time when external powers loom large, these stories remind us that agency is not always absent; it just often speaks in a quieter voice.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
ASEAN’s Quiet Front in the South China Sea
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
As an international hotbed of maritime diplomacy and regional security, the South China Sea (SCS) remains intertwined with ASEAN’s interests and China’s maritime ambitions. With an estimated 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas beneath its waves, these resources have fueled contentious claims since the 1970s.
Over many years, ASEAN has attempted to resolve issues with China through diplomacy and its multilateral platforms. Yet two ASEAN-led preventive diplomatic declarations have failed to deter China’s continued island reclamation and base-building activities around the Spratly Islands—or to challenge the sweeping nine-dash line claim. The collective ASEAN effort to counter these challenges has often been overshadowed by a divided consensus on how to respond to isolated issues concerning maritime sovereignty. Amid these challenges, one nation has quietly taken a different approach: Brunei Darussalam.
Though Brunei’s only claim is the Louisa Reef, the additional maritime features of Bombay Castle, Owen Shoal, and Rifleman Bank still fall within Brunei’s EEZ. However, Brunei has not decided on a position vis-à-vis China in its EEZ, at times even deferring to Beijing over the SCS. This calibrated restraint coincides with Brunei-China bilateralism, a result of Brunei's need to diversify its economy through further cooperation with China.
Since 1984, Brunei’s foreign policy has emphasized adherence to the international rule of law and the promotion of peace and stability, both regionally and globally. However, its lack of assertion may deviate from its core tenet of territorial integrity, creating a paradox with its principle of ‘social and economic prosperity through international engagement’.
As a small state, Brunei may not afford to punch above its weight class nor sour relations with China too badly. Consequently, Brunei may find ASEAN’s law and policy framework one of the most reliable mechanisms; through which Southeast Asian claimant states, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, have already acted by deploying coast guard and maritime constabulary forces to deter unlawful incursions.
The SCS issue within the context of Brunei’s EEZ may fall under the framework of compromising—rather than militarily challenging—the integrity of its territorial maritime law. Military confrontation may ideally be substituted by Brunei’s right to safeguard its national resources. This approach utilises policing presence and the patrolling of Brunei’s natural resources, including offshore installations and marine life, through its maritime law enforcement bodies, rather than an offensive naval presence. This potentially underscores how a small state like Brunei may leverage legal frameworks to defend its sovereignty without sparking open conflict.
In the past, Brunei has been a strong advocate for cooperative regional security through ASEAN, during which it initiated proposals that led to the formation of the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime. Additionally, the continuation of ASEAN’s maritime security exercises and programs would ideally prepare Brunei, regardless of the aggressor, as a definitive statement against any major power. In light of its own economic needs, it would be prudent for the small country to reserve its lawful right to territorial sovereignty against external elements, indirect or otherwise, through thoughtful steps forward.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism. With experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service, he focuses on regional security developments across the Asia-Pacific, combining strategic analysis with practical field insight.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Why Losing the US Trade Deal Doesn’t Mean Defeat for Indonesia
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
Make no mistake: Indonesia's trade agreement with the United States was a comprehensive defeat. After Trump threatened 32% tariffs, President Prabowo capitulated to a 19% tariff rate by eliminating 99% of Indonesia's own trade barriers as well as accepting the $24 billion commitment package. The package 'forces' Indonesia to purchase $15 billion in US energy, $4.5 billion in agricultural products, and 50 Boeing jets. Additionally, digital trade concessions eliminate tariffs on intangible products and guarantee American data transfer rights, among others.
Indonesian officials called negotiations an "extraordinary struggle" and rightly so. Even when discounting the additional concessions Indonesia was forced to make, the tariff asymmetry alone represents a significant capitulation. While US exporters gain unfettered access with zero tariffs, Indonesian exporters face punitive rates that will devastate sectors like textiles, which are already experiencing mass layoffs. The deal successfully undermined Prabowo's nationalist credentials and Indonesia's sovereignty narrative. Every metric suggests Indonesia emerged as the weaker party.
Yet this apparent defeat opens Indonesia's most significant economic opportunity in decades. US technology giants are frantically diversifying supply chains away from China, and Southeast Asia represents their primary hedge. While Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam have captured most initial investments, Indonesia's market size and Washington’s latest trade framework create unprecedented leverage.
Technology and manufacturing investments offer the most transformative potential for Indonesia's post-deal strategy. As US companies seek alternatives to China, Indonesia's 280 million consumers and now-guaranteed market access provide compelling investment propositions. The semiconductor industry alone represents a massive opportunity, as major industry players require extensive manufacturing footprints—something Indonesia can offer at scale. The AI industry represents another goldmine, with US tech companies expanding in Southeast Asia potentially attracted to Indonesia for various manufacturing, infrastructure, and research center investments; with the deal's digital trade provisions creating the regulatory framework these critical investments require.
Actively courting technology investments from other major economies will amplify this strategy. If Indonesia capitalizes on the opportunities created by this deal, the resulting favorable conditions will trigger a competitive investment spiral. As global powers recognize Indonesia's emerging strategic value, they'll compete to establish footholds before competitors do and create a positive dynamic that multiplies Indonesia's leverage and technological advancement opportunities.
Indonesia's window for transforming this defeat into long-term advantage is narrow and requires the government to immediately establish investment promotion mechanisms targeting US tech companies seeking China alternatives. These include streamlined permitting and infrastructure building for semiconductor facilities, dedicated industrial zones for AI infrastructure, and tax incentives for advanced manufacturing. The government also needs to leverage the conditional purchases for technology transfers and position the entire trade relationship as proof of Indonesia's reliability to potential American investors.
Most critically, Prabowo's administration must publicly reframe this narrative. Rather than defending a bad deal, Indonesia should boldly claim it sacrificed short-term trade benefits to secure long-term technology partnerships. Whether Indonesia can turn this apparent loss into its greatest strategic victory depends on how quickly the government acts to capitalize on US-China tensions while favorable trade conditions still exist.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Who Shapes Peace in Southeast Asia?
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
ASEAN’s relevance is once again being tested, this time by an old security dispute that reveals how the legacies of colonialism continue to shape regional relations. On July 24, 2025, a long-dormant dispute between Cambodia and Thailand resurfaced. This time, the cause of the clash remains unclear, with both sides accusing each other of provoking and initiating the conflict.
While both parties traded blame, it was Malaysia, as current ASEAN Chair, that stepped forward to host emergency talks in Putrajaya. The result: a ceasefire agreement within days, offering a rare moment of diplomatic clarity in a region often hindered by hesitation.
Beyond the immediate tensions, the situation also highlights Malaysia’s capacity as chair and ASEAN’s potential to mediate member states’ dispute. This isn’t unprecedented. Malaysia has played similar roles in the past, including brokering peace in the southern Philippines, facilitating post-conflict reconstruction in Aceh and even helping to ease tensions between China and Japan during its 2005 ASEAN chairmanship.
As ASEAN Chair in 2025, Malaysia finds itself at a critical crossroads. The sudden outbreak of conflict between Cambodia and Thailand presents not only a threat to regional stability but also a defining moment for Malaysian leadership. Unlike past chairs who have struggled to respond swiftly to crises, Malaysia took a bold step by convening both parties in Putrajaya for immediate ceasefire negotiations. This response is more than a diplomatic tool, it’s a litmus test of Malaysia’s ability to lead a fragmented regional bloc in uncertain times. Can Malaysia reinvigorate ASEAN’s role in regional peacebuilding, or will it fall into the familiar pattern of passivity and indecision?
Although many remain skeptical about whether this meeting can bring lasting peace between the disputing parties, the concern is valid as ASEAN lacks a robust monitoring mechanism.
Yet behind the contested borders lies a more profound narrative where one is shaped by power politics and the enduring question of who holds the reins in shaping peace across Southeast Asia. This was evident when Donald Trump actively asserted the United States role in the mediation process, even going so far as to proclaim himself the “President of Peace”. By contrast, China maintained a more neutral stance with general calls for peace and expressing support for the ASEAN-led negotiation process.
For ASEAN, this moment could be both an opportunity and a reminder. Malaysia’s diplomatic manoeuvring proved that the regional bloc remains capable of meaningful action in times of crisis. By taking the lead in brokering a ceasefire, Malaysia helped bring ASEAN out of the shadows, showing that it need not remain a passive observer.
Yet the central question remains: Can ASEAN take ownership of its security challenges? This case may be just the beginning—future crises will demand equally proactive, collective responses. Or, in the end, will peace in the region still hinge on Washington and Beijing?
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Editorial Deadline 03/08/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
