Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
The 6th issue of the Mekong Belt shows that Southeast Asia is entering a new chapter, defined by hard choices, shifting alliances, as the region grapples with the tension between principle and pragmatism. From Thailand’s need to contain the economic strain of U.S. tariffs to Laos’s delicate dance with Russia and other Western partners, each story reflects the pressures faced by ASEAN states in a shifting global order. At the same time, the region is confronting deeper questions of identity and principle: Timor-Leste’s incoming onboarding offers a moral test for ASEAN on human rights in Myanmar, while Cambodia’s leadership in mine action shows what committed regional cooperation can achieve. Together, these stories trace a region at a crossroads: caught between competing powers, divergent ideologies, and the push for a more principled, united future.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
How Timor-Leste Could Shift ASEAN’s Stance on Myanmar
by May
Timor-Leste’s upcoming accession to ASEAN signifies more than just the regional bloc's expansion: it could potentially reshape ASEAN's stance on activism and human rights. Is ASEAN ready to adapt to a more democratic future?
Most importantly, the bloc's consensus-driven diplomacy will be put to the test, particularly in the context of Myanmar. Following the 2021 coup, the country is under multiple sanctions and has been excluded from official meetings, which limits its influence within the bloc. Timor-Leste’s expected accession in October highlights Myanmar’s decaying influence, as the longstanding opposition of the country’s junta to Timor-Leste’s entry has proven irrelevant to the final decision.
The President and Prime Minister of Timor-Leste have, in the past, advocated for human rights in Myanmar and strongly opposed the military junta. They have maintained an open dialogue with Myanmar's democratic opposition, the National Unity Government (NUG), and are working with Myanmar refugee associations. However, the State Administration Council (SAC), the military-led governing body established after the 2021 coup, urged Timor-Leste to refrain from engaging with organizations that conflict with the opinions of the ASEAN Member, such as the National Unity Government (NUG) and resistance groups that are against the military junta.
If ASEAN allows exceptions to its non-interference principle in the name of promoting democracy, it risks becoming a platform for ideological intervention, which is considerably different from the consensus-driven organization it was initially designed to be. At the same time, Myanmar is facing a human rights crisis that can no longer be ignored. The junta is widely documented to have engaged in systematic torture, such as making prisoners march through minefields, and using people as human shields in rural areas, as claimed by defectors.
Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN, despite the country’s limited bureaucratic capabilities, represents a new type of ASEAN member: one that places a higher value on moral leadership. With its accession, the bloc could be faced with the decision of whether to reform the organization to address urgent crises, or to continue being constrained by the requirement of consensus. With ASEAN members ideologically divided, such a shift would not be seamless. Even now, the junta continues to exploit the consensus model to shield itself from accountability, despite its diminished influence. This has been argued by analysts to undermine ASEAN’s credibility and its stated goal of becoming a community grounded in democracy, justice, and human rights.
Timor-Leste’s accession offers ASEAN a potential turning point: to either maintain its tradition of shielding authoritarian regimes or to evolve toward stronger human rights leadership. In this new chapter, Timor-Leste may bring more than just a new flag to the table—it could offer a new moral compass, starting with how the bloc engages the Myanmar crisis.
May has previously worked in the editorial department at a media group in Myanmar. She also has experience in film and photography, and engages with people-centered stories through her travels and creative work.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Denies Allegations by Ukraine Amid Deepening Ties with Russia
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
The Lao government has recently rejected claims by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency that it plans to send up to 50 military engineers to support Russian demining operations near the border region of Kursk. The government described the claims as a “serious accusation” and a “deliberate distortion of the truth”. It emphasised that the country has neither a plan nor the intention to deploy military personnel or civilians in foreign conflicts. However, the denial has not fully silenced public speculation, given Laos’s growing military ties with Moscow over the recent years.
For over half a century, Lao and Russia (formerly USSR) have been linked by ideology and the Cold War alike. During the Lao Civil War and the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 1975, the USSR provided vital support, including military training and equipment, as well as economic aid and education. Many current Lao leaders, including President Thongloun Sisoulith, were educated in Moscow.
In 2003, Russia wrote off 70% of Laos’s $1.3 billion debt and offered preferential repayment terms for the remainder. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the two countries have enhanced their military cooperation since 2018. Although details remain unclear, media reports suggest that Laos has received dozens of T‑72B1 “White Eagle” main battle tanks, BRDM‑2M armored reconnaissance vehicles, Mi‑17 helicopters, and Yak‑130 jet trainers from Russia. The two countries have also conducted annual joint military exercises since 2019, making Laos the only Southeast Asian nation to host such bilateral drills with Russia. Russia was also involved in UXO clearance in Xieng Khouang province, which was seen as paving the way to construct a dual-use airport in the province to strengthen Russian military presence in the region.
While the military ties continue to deepen, Laos maintains that it follows a policy of neutrality. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, President Thongloun Sisoulith has stated that Laos “does not take sides in international conflicts” and opposes sanctions. Reflecting this stance, Laos has abstained from all United Nations General Assembly votes condemning Russia’s action. Many observers see Vientiane’s position as a broader strategy of hedging, where Laos may seek to diversify its diplomatic and economic relationships beyond its heavy reliance on China to better face its worsening public debt crisis. However, aligning too closely with Moscow may come at a cost. At the recent ASEAN Regional Forum, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas warned that any proven military support to Russia may affect European development aid to Laos.
Laos is thus facing a delicate challenge, having to balance the benefits of defense cooperation without compromising its neutral image or risking diplomatic backlash from Western partners. As the geopolitical landscape is changing, Laos must walk a careful line in maintaining its neutral image while managing the realities of its alliances.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Still No Changes about Trump’s 36% Reciprocal Tariff on Thailand: What Does It Mean to the Thai Economy
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
On July 7, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a letter confirming that a 36% reciprocal tariff on Thai exports will take effect next month, aimed at addressing the U.S. trade deficit. The announcement has caused alarm across Thailand’s business sectors, as the measure is expected to have serious repercussions for the Thai economy, especially in sectors such as electronics, vehicle parts, and machinery. With the U.S. being one of Thailand’s top export markets, the tariff risks not only jeopardizing important Thai export-oriented industries, but also impacting the country’s employment rate and business competitiveness.
Compared to its neighbors, Thailand could see its competitiveness erode as Vietnam and Malaysia have reportedly secured lower tariffs of 20% and 25% respectively. This means that these countries can offer lower prices as they bear a lower burden. Already struggling with comparatively higher wages and production costs, Thai manufacturers will now face the additional burden of steeper trade barriers. While this is expected to hinder Thailand’s entrance to the global market for sectors such as AI and semiconductors, other sectors, such as vehicle parts, are temporarily exempted from the tariff.
Agriculture remains the sector under the most pressure to reduce trade barriers. As noted by Mr. Pipat Luengnaruemitchai, Chief Economist of Kiatnakin Phatra Financial Group, the U.S. has long sought to dismantle Thailand’s high agricultural tariffs. As Thailand imposed over 26.6% on average for importing agricultural products, Trump’s decision to maintain a 36% reciprocal tariff seems aimed to pressure Thailand into lowering barriers on their protected sectors.
Aside from pressuring Thailand to liberalize its protected markets, another major factor behind the tariff decision is the transshipment issue. During Trump’s first term, Chinese goods were rerouted through Thailand and other countries, rebranded as “Made in Thailand,” and then exported to the U.S. avoiding tariffs. The Trump administration views this as a loophole that worsens the trade imbalance and erodes trust, and worries that without the imposition of tariffs, Thailand could remain a transshipment hub for Chinese products to evade high American tariffs.
Dr. Piyasak Manason, Head of Economic Research at InnovestX, estimates that if Thailand fails to renegotiate the deal, its GDP could shrink by 1.1%, adding to the country’s existing economic hurdles. Hence, to address the challenge, Thailand must consider a serious trade reform, particularly by opening up sectors that have historically remained closed. Previous negotiations offered only modest concessions, such as increased soybean imports. Unlike former negotiations, future talks will likely require deeper policy shifts affecting thousands of businesses.
Ultimately, unity among crucial ministries will be fundamental. For now, key ministries are led by rival political parties, making internal coordination weak. Without unified leadership and a clear strategy, Thailand may struggle to respond effectively to U.S. pressure, at the expense of economic stability and regional competitiveness.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
ARMAC Signs MoUs with UNDP to Boost Regional Mine Action for a Mine-Free ASEAN
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
The ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) has partnered with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Cambodia to enhance regional cooperation on mine action, aiming to accelerate knowledge sharing and strengthen joint efforts for a mine-free ASEAN. Cambodia, as the host country of ARMAC and one of the global leaders in mine clearance, continues to push toward this regional goal.
On July 4, 2024, ARMAC and UNDP signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Phnom Penh to promote technical collaboration and experience sharing on mine action. Both organizations believe the agreement will help reduce casualties from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), while reinforcing ARMAC’s mission to support peace and security in Southeast Asia.
The MoUs focus on strengthening ASEAN cooperation in key areas such as mine clearance and land release, victim assistance, risk education, and advocacy. In a press release dated July 7, ARMAC Executive Director Rothna Buth emphasized that the agreement demonstrates ASEAN solidarity, arguing that “this collaboration with UNDP will enhance the region’s knowledge, tools, and technical resources in line with international mine action standards.”
Alissar Chaker, UNDP’s Resident Representative in Cambodia, highlighted the importance of sustainable mine action, noting that “UNDP’s global and local efforts bring hope and support to mine-affected communities.” Chaker also praised Cambodia’s leadership and decades of experience in mine clearance and victim assistance, highlighting that “Cambodia’s hard-earned expertise is invaluable for other ASEAN countries and for strengthening regional peace and security.”
In fact, Cambodia continues to lead mine action efforts both at home and abroad. By mid-2025, the country plans to declare 15 provinces mine-free, clearing more than 700 square kilometers and funding over 80% of ARMAC’s operations from its own national budget. Furthermore, Cambodia also regularly deploys its mine experts on United Nations peacekeeping missions, including to Africa and Ukraine in 2022. As a testament to Cambodia’s leading role in mine clearance efforts, in 2023 Ukrainian demining specialists traveled to Cambodia to learn from its practices.
Kin Phea, Director of the Institute of International Relations at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, told The ASEAN Frontier that the MoUs will strengthen ASEAN’s response to the enduring threat of landmines and UXO. “Decades of war have left countries like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam heavily contaminated,” he said, “and in Myanmar, the current scale of the mine threat remains unclear.”
Phea also underscored Cambodia’s leadership and long-standing commitment to mine action, noting that “ASEAN’s recognition of the issue, and Cambodia’s initiative to establish ARMAC, reflects the region’s serious attention to this humanitarian and security challenge.”
Indeed, Cambodia has played an outstanding role within ASEAN’s broader commitment to “a peaceful, secure, and mine-free region,” first launching ARMAC during its 2012 ASEAN chairmanship. Ever since its inauguration in 2018, ARMAC has played a central role in coordinating regional cooperation, sharing expertise, and supporting the effective implementation of mine action across member states.
With renewed institutional support and Cambodia’s leadership, ARMAC’s strengthened partnership with the UNDP signals a deeper regional resolve. As ASEAN strives to become mine-free, this collaboration offers both practical support and symbolic commitment, advancing regional peace, humanitarian safety, and collective security across Southeast Asia.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Editorial Deadline 11/07/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
