The Price of Neglect
Issue 48 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Across the Mekong Belt this week, the bill for a past of neglect is coming due.
In Myanmar, the military junta and radical monks are contributing to the revival of anti-Muslim hate speech and ultra-nationalist mobilisation — a pattern that mirrors the climate that preceded the 2017 Rohingya genocide according to observers’ warnings. In Laos, a cassava factory discharged industrial wastewater into the Xe Don River for over a month before authorities acted, killing hundreds of kilograms of fish and leaving riverside communities without a safe water source. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the cabinet has pushed through a 6-billion-dollar "energy transformation" fund with so little detail that the opposition is calling it a blank cheque — raising serious questions about whether structural reform is the goal or merely the cover. And in Cambodia, the ambition to reach high-income status by 2050 is running headlong into decades of underinvestment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure that no single decree can quickly reverse.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Revival of Ultra-Nationalist Movements and Anti-Muslim Hate Speeches in Myanmar
by Mozart
New waves of ultra-nationalist movements and patterns of anti-Muslim hate speech are re-emerging in Myanmar. Driven by a strategic alliance between the military junta and radical monks to consolidate power, state-sanctioned Islamophobia — reinforced by discriminatory post-earthquake reconstruction and aggressive rhetoric surrounding ICJ hearings — is being amplified through social media, threatening to exacerbate regional instability and mirror past atrocities against Muslim populations.
On 2 May 2026, authorities and MaBaTha-aligned monks raided a tuition centre in Daw Pone Township’s Nway Aye ward, Yangon. Radical monk U Taw Wun Tha and nationalist media outlets like Myanmar Post framed the incident as a crackdown on “illegal Bengalis” from Buthidaung and Maungdaw who were allegedly teaching “unknown scripts,” although investigations revealed that the students and teachers held valid identification documents — including pink and green cards — and were primarily internally displaced persons from Rakhine State.
This systemic exclusion was further demonstrated during the humanitarian crisis following the 7.7-magnitude earthquake on 28 March 2025. The disaster resulted in over 1,600 deaths, with many victims being Muslim worshippers gathered for Ramadan prayers. While the military junta’s official damage reports detailed the destruction of 670 monasteries and 290 pagodas, they pointedly omitted the destruction of over 50 mosques. Many of these mosques collapsed, and long-standing bureaucratic restrictions had prevented the Muslim community from obtaining the permits necessary for repairs even a year after the disaster, forcing them to worship in temporary spaces near the destroyed buildings.
Parallel to these local events, nationalist movements have weaponised international legal proceedings, particularly the resumed merits hearing of the Rohingya genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in early 2026. During the hearing, both Sitagu Sayadaw and Ashin Wirathu were accused of mobilizing hate speech and contributing to a genocide campaign. The military junta and radical figures like Ashin Wirathu consistently frame the ICJ hearings as a conspiracy funded by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These international developments are used to fuel domestic hate speech, portraying the legal accountability process as an existential threat to Buddhist Myanmar and its sovereignty. Facebook, Telegram, and Tiktok serve as the primary platforms for the rapid spread of hate speech.
These patterns of dehumanisation and religious scapegoating serve as a grave reminder of past atrocities in Myanmar. The resurgence also appears to be accelerating. Observers note that the present rhetoric and militia mobilisation mirror the climate that preceded the 2017 Rohingya genocide, which displaced over 700,000 people. Similar state-sanctioned violence was seen during the 2013 Meiktila pogrom and the 1997 Bago and Mandalay riots. In Bago, historical records show that mosques were targeted by mobs including soldiers dressed in monastic robes, a tactic used to provide ideological cover for military-led violence. Across decades, the persistent use of dehumanising slurs like “kalar” and “illegal Bengali” has been a consistent precursor to systemic violence against Muslim populations. Without immediate international monitoring and accountability for these extremist actors, the cycle of violence is likely to repeat, and the junta will continue positioning itself as the only institution capable of restoring order — often using these crises to undermine democratic forces and justify its brutal rule.
Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Names Cassava Factory as Culprit in Xe Don Pollution Case
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
An official investigation has confirmed industrial wastewater as the cause of a mass fish kill along the Xe Don River, raising urgent questions about environmental enforcement, community protection, and corporate accountability.
On 9 May 2026, Lao authorities officially confirmed what riverside communities in Salavan and Champasak had suspected for weeks: a cassava starch processing factory illegally discharged wastewater into the Xe Don River, killing an estimated 460 kilograms of fish across five villages and affecting two provinces.
The findings came from a joint investigation led by the Department of Environment under the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, alongside multiple government departments, two provincial authorities, and Champasak University.
The Investigation found that Khounmixay Kongxedone Co., Ltd., located in Kongxedone District, Salavan Province, had been documented discharging wastewater illegally as early as 21 March 2026 and more than a month before fish deaths were first observed on 23 April.
The wastewater reduced dissolved oxygen (DO) levels in the river below national environmental standards. Without sufficient oxygen, the fish suffocated and died. When rains arrived in late March, rising water carried decomposed carcasses downstream into Champasak Province which is why the crisis appeared to spread.
Water quality measurements taken at 11 sites between 2–5 May confirmed that current levels of pH, electrical conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and temperature have returned within national standards, although ecological recovery takes considerably longer."
The factory has been suspended under official order No. 1395/MAE.SV, and legal action is being pursued under Decree No. 389/PM on Environmental Impact Assessment (2022).
Why does this matter beyond the river? The Xe Don is a shared lifeline for drinking water, irrigation, fishing, and daily livelihoods. When oxygen is stripped from a waterway by industrial effluent, it does not just kill fish. It destabilises an entire ecosystem that rural communities depend on, often without alternatives.
There is also a direct human health dimension. Contaminated water and affected fish pose real risks particularly for children, pregnant women, and elderly residents, who are most exposed and least able to seek alternatives. The government’s public advisory not to use river water or consume dead fish was necessary, but it prompts a harder question: what do communities do when the river they rely on is suddenly off-limits?
Rivers do not belong to any single industry. Under international human rights standards, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. Both governments and businesses carry a shared responsibility to prevent harm to people and the environment. For Laos, upholding these principles is not only a matter of international commitment, but a practical foundation for sustainable development. When a factory’s operations contaminate a shared waterway, it is not merely an environmental violation. It is a human rights concern. The communities downstream had no say in that decision, yet they bear the full cost.
What needs to happen now? Authorities have announced legal action, factory suspension, and ecosystem restoration requirements. These are necessary steps. In parallel, communities deserve – transparent, regular water quality updates in accessible formats and local languages; immediate livelihood support for fishing families who lost income during the affected period; and independent verification of the restoration process, with meaningful community participation.
This case is not isolated. The Xe Don incident is a clear reminder that effective environmental monitoring, enforced EIA compliance, and accessible grievance mechanisms are not bureaucratic formalities but they are protections for people’s lives, health, and futures. The river can recover. But only if the systems meant to protect it are taken seriously by industry and government alike.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand’s Energy Transformation Push Faces ‘Blank Cheque’ Criticism
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
The Thai cabinet has approved a 6-billion-dollar bill to transform its economy away from fossil fuel reliance, amid criticism from the opposition People's Party, which describes it as a blank cheque for unlimited government spending.
Thea Asia-Pacific is the most vulnerable region in this energy-price crisis, especially Thailand due to its over-reliance on imported oil. he country relies on imports for 90% of its oil consumption, and 50% of those imports are shipped through the temporarily shut Strait of Hormuz.
To mitigate the impact of surging oil prices on households and implement structural reform, the Thai government last week passed an emergency decree authorising 400 billion baht (roughly 12 billion dollars) in borrowing. The first 6 billion dollars will be used for household subsidies, while the other 6 billion dollars will fund what Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas calls “energy transformation initiatives”.
According to the Emergency Decree on Borrowing, Finance Minister Ekniti's energy transformation plans include items such as energy efficiency initiatives, renewable and clean energy promotion, the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy, greenhouse gas emissions reduction, carbon credit development and monetization, new economy infrastructure and innovation development, and climate adaptation and resilience measures.
Deputy leader of the opposition People's Party Sirikanya Tansakun called the emergency decree a "blank cheque," allowing the government to spend freely without clear details on which concrete projects it intends to implement to transform Thailand into a greener economy.
“The government shouldn’t rush to pass the 6 billion dollars intended for energy transformation since the initiatives are intended to have medium- to long-term impacts anyway. There is still time to think carefully,” said Sirikanya.
She added that, based on the previous two emergency decrees authorising the government to borrow more money, the government tended to provide very few details. “It is like signing a blank cheque for them to borrow as much money as they want to do whatever they want,” said the deputy leader of the opposition.
Keiju Mitsuhashi, the ADB's Energy Director, told local media outlet Bangkok Business News during the ADB Annual Meeting in Uzbekistan last week that the bank is in talks with the Thai government to support the Kingdom's green energy transition. he forms of support are still being discussed; potential options include financing methods such as green bond issuance instead of direct lending.
The ADB's Energy Director also suggested that the administration spend the 6-billion-dollar fund on power grid initiatives allowing people to sell their own clean energy directly, as well as on building power storage infrastructure.
During the meeting, the ADB announced a plan to lend USD 70 billion to its member countries by 2035 for building the Pan-Asia Power Grid and regional digital infrastructure, costing USD 50 and 20 billion respectively.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
How far is Cambodia from reaching its goal of high-income status in 2050?
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia’s ambition to reach high-income country status by 2050 faces major structural hurdles. The country would need to raise its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita by more than fivefold, from USD 2,520 in 2024 to around USD 14,000. At present, Cambodia is only about 11% of the way from the lower-middle-income threshold to the high-income threshold, highlighting the need for capable and adaptive institutions to avoid the middle-income trap.
The first major constraint is human capital and education financing. Although education spending rose to 2.2% of GDP in 2022, much of the increase went to wages, with the wage bill rising 27% between 2017 and 2021, while capital spending fell by 20%. Public education remains officially free, but parents still bear high costs. A recent study found that households spend an average of approximately USD109–121 per child per year on secondary education, with private tutoring forming a substantial portion of the burden. A large share of parents continue to pay for supplementary tutoring and related expenses. As a result, 30% of surveyed firms say they face hiring difficulties because workers are not sufficiently qualified.
The second major challenge is the healthcare sector, which faces financial and operational pressure. Current health expenditure stands at 4.6% of GDP, while out-of-pocket payments account for 60% of total health spending, causing financial hardship for 22% of the population. More than 80% of citizens seek care from private providers rather than public ones. Public facilities remain under strain, with 88% of referral hospitals and 65% of health centers reporting critical understaffing. Informal payments are also widely seen as a problem, with 60% of surveyed individuals identifying them as the most common form of corruption in the sector. Bureaucratic delays add to the problem, as around 64% of health centers and 62% of referral hospitals take more than a month to prepare their budgets.
The third barrier is infrastructure and regulatory friction. Only 16.6% of Cambodia’s road network is paved, falling to just 5% for the country’s 42,000 kilometers of rural roads. Public investment has relied heavily on external financing, at around 5% of GDP, and public-private partnerships, at 14% of GDP. However, project planning remains weak. he transport sector alone has proposed 174 projects worth USD 36.6 billion over a ten-year cycle, without adequate prioritization of maintenance. Complex procedures also continue to slow business activity and limit competition. It takes about 28 days to obtain an import license in Cambodia, compared with 13.2 days in Vietnam, while export clearances take an average of 30 days. Courts are another concern, with 57% of firms identifying them as a major obstacle.
These challenges are closely linked. A highly centralized public administration gives public sector workers an 18.8% overall wage premium over private sector workers, but service quality remains weak because of limited accountability and fragmented multi-year budgeting. To move beyond this low-growth path, Cambodia would need a more merit-based civil service, fully digital public services, and more decentralized financial management. Without faster institutional reform and a stronger link between spending and measurable results, the goal of high-income status by 2050 remains difficult to achieve.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Editorial Deadline 9/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
