The Price of Peace
Issue 37 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
What is the price of peace? This week in the Pacific Corridor, we take a look at now-familiar issues as the three countries of the region grapple with this question.
For Vietnam, peace may very well be calculated in monetary terms, as it joins the United States-led pay-to-play Board of Peace while simultaneously activating its free trade agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Through its hedging strategy, can Vietnam carve out some peace for itself in a world order in constant flux?
Similarly, for Singapore, the price of its peace of mind and economic survival may also be measured in dollars, as the city-state pushes for AI through its 2026 budget. Should it succeed in becoming the region’s preeminent AI hub, will it rest assured in its technological dominance?
And for the Philippines, peace for a divided country may come at the cost of a highly-publicized trial. What factors led to the rise of former President and criminal populist Rodrigo Duterte, and will the results of a trial by the International Criminal Court help to heal a country half a world away?
Vietnam 🇻🇳
From Gaza to Dubai
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
Party General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Washington, D.C., in the middle of Vietnam’s most important holiday, transcended the par-for-the-course state visit and marked a definitive pivot in Hanoi’s foreign policy. Vietnam attended the inaugural meeting of the Gaza Board of Peace (BoP) from 18 to 20 February as a founding member state, at the invitation of US President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, back in Southeast Asia, the United Arab Emirates–Vietnam Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) officially entered into force on 3 February.
These two seemingly unrelated events are pieces of the larger strategic puzzle that Hanoi is assembling to both mitigate commercial friction vis-à-vis the US and simultaneously open new opportunities in the Middle East, serving as an insurance policy against the US risk.
First and foremost, for the BoP, the diplomatic dividends of joining are indeed substantial. Acceptance of the invitation reinforces the substance of the Vietnam-US Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and demonstrates Hanoi’s proactive willingness to engage in global high-level problem-solving. Simultaneously, Vietnam successfully maintains its non-aligned credibility by anchoring its participation strictly under the coverage of UN frameworks, advocating for the widely accepted two-state solution. This dual approach is the clearest manifestation of Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy,” maintaining diplomatic maneuvering space while also accommodating superpower initiatives that suit Hanoi’s strategic interests.
Economically, the Board represents a massive multilateral undertaking. With Vietnam affirming its readiness to contribute to the recovery process, especially in critical infrastructure, the country’s construction, telecommunications, and logistics enterprises could find unprecedented opportunities when involved in such efforts. More than that, Vietnam’s presence on the Board of Peace will also improve Hanoi’s position within the Trump administration, thereby somewhat diverting US pressure stemming from Vietnam’s huge trade surplus, a matter of great concern to the White House at the moment.
However, if Vietnam’s participation in the BoP is an attempt to remain on the good side of the Trump administration amid heightened trade pressure while bolstering Hanoi’s presence in the Middle East, the CEPA presents another opening into the region; at the same time, it helps to diversify Vietnam’s commercial activities away from an increasingly mercurial US.
Even standing against the loftiness of the BoP joining, the activation of the UAE–Vietnam CEPA this month is a landmark achievement in its own right. As Vietnam’s first free trade agreement with an Arab nation, the deal is highly ambitious, committing the UAE to phasing out tariffs on 99% of Vietnam’s exports. The agreement will also open the door to the larger Middle East and North Africa market while bringing high-quality Middle Eastern capital into Vietnam, as CEPA specifically targets foreign direct investment in renewable energy, logistics, and advanced manufacturing, moving beyond transactional trade.
As global trade remains subject to the vicissitudes of geopolitics, Vietnam’s dual-track strategy is becoming a masterclass in geo-economic hedging. By both improving its standing with Washington and opening a potential corridor into the Middle East, Hanoi is building the resilience necessary to sustain its ambitious economic growth targets in an increasingly unpredictable world.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore’s 2026 Budget Sees Significant Push for AI
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
When announcing the country’s economic budget on 12 February 2026, the Prime Minister of Singapore and Minister of Finance Lawrence Wong proclaimed that “AI is a powerful tool but it is still a tool. It must serve our national interest and our people. We will define how AI is used and developed in Singapore.” While AI is often framed as innovation, Singapore’s policy treats it as both a matter of sovereignty and economic survival, grounded in a pragmatic, whole-of-society approach where individual adaptability is as crucial as state investment.
This policy is set to encompass four areas: advanced manufacturing, connectivity, finance, and healthcare, all of which are key areas of Singapore’s economy and its public welfare. To set this moving forward, a National AI Council, chaired by the PM himself, will be established to carry out ‘AI missions’ by providing direction for strategy. In addition, co-working spaces will be made available for the AI community, alongside a larger AI park to be developed in one-north, building on the previous “Lorong AI” initiative. This space aims to bring together founders, practitioners, innovators, and researchers to collaborate and develop practical AI solutions.
Law and accounting will be among the first to see the impact of the AI drive, with workflow becoming more streamlined, especially in tasks involving the production of case notes, generating written submissions, summarizing or reviewing documents, and dealing with structured data and regulatory frameworks. This essentially aims to redirect lawyers to “higher-value work such as strategy, structuring, negotiations, and dispute resolution,” while AI is made to assist accountants in document reviews, compliance checks, financial analysis, and reporting. When it comes to interested individual learners, six months of free access to premium AI tools will be given to those taking selected courses.
In a post that has an underlying tone of both hopefulness and anxiety, a commenter pointed out that the nation’s AI approach could be a slight deviation from Singapore’s less cautious approach, where this is the remaking of an entire economy in “an AI present.” Additionally, there are unresolved concerns regarding copyright infringement, environmental impact, and the malicious use of AI. Meanwhile, others, such as Singapore Management University Assistant Professor Goh, have highlighted the potential resistance companies may face from frontline staff if AI becomes too burdensome to learn and use.
Apart from Singapore, Malaysia also launched a national AI office in 2024 aimed at managing policies and regulatory frameworks. With a US$2.2 billion investment by Microsoft, it is set to enhance cybersecurity and create jobs. In 2025, Thailand established a National AI Committee with the same ambition of becoming a regional AI hub in Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asian countries move forward in adopting concrete AI frameworks and government-backed guidelines, issues of digital sovereignty and data protection are becoming increasingly critical. With its growing role as a hub for data centers and semiconductors, the region is well-positioned to shape global conversations on the ethical use of AI.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
The Anatomy of Duterte’s Criminal Populism
by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan
On 20 February 2026, the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed that it granted former President Rodrigo Duterte’s request to skip the 23 February confirmation hearing, waiving his right to be present, as he faces charges of crimes against humanity in connection with his war on drugs campaign. Through a letter, Duterte continued to dispute the ICC’s jurisdiction while maintaining his claim that he has cognitive impairment.
This pre-trial proceeding is decisive: it is where the ICC prosecutors will determine whether Duterte’s case will proceed to a full trial. While the courtroom is in The Hague, the real answer lies at home.
Duterte and his war on drugs campaign continues to have widespread public support despite the numerous reports of human rights violations. Undeniably, he won the 2016 elections with 16,601,997 votes. His rise to power and strong base of support were a byproduct of anger, fear, anxiety, and dissatisfaction.
Prior to Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines ranked 70th out of 113 countries in the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, which measures a country’s adherence to the rule of law. Filipinos were infuriated by the weak legal system – slow courts, flawed prosecution, and high level of crime rates. Widespread dissatisfaction with former President Benigno Aquino III, who preceded Duterte, was also recorded, driven by high levels of poverty and inequality, the dominance of oligarchs, and the failure to address corruption in the government.
Political sociologist Nicole Curato argued that Duterte’s popularity was fueled by the politics of anxiety – which refers to the resentment of the Filipino middle class toward elites and frustration with ineffective institutions, inducing a desire for his “strongman” image.
Duterte transformed this politics of anxiety into a politics of hope. Filipinos longed for discipline and punishment, and he took the opportunity to position himself as the punisher, reinforcing the dichotomy between “the people” and the “dangerous other.” Curato notes that penal populism is behind this logic — a political strategy in which a politician advocates harsher criminal punishment and uses collective emotions to gain popularity and votes.
This practice did not originate in 2016. Former President and convicted plunderer Joseph Estrada’s 1998 “pro-masa” [pro-masses] campaign also relied on emotional identification with Filipinos and used anti-elite rhetoric. Using the “Erap para sa mahirap” [Erap for the poor] slogan, he reinforced the dichotomy between “the people” and the “corrupt elite,” harnessing the rampant socio-economic frustration caused by the liberalization policies of former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos, which were perceived to solely benefit the wealthy. Estrada leveraged this discontent, along with his educational background as an expelled high school student and college dropout to cultivate his “maka-masa” [pro-people] image and portray himself as representative of the poor.
The pattern is clear: criminal populists thrive because they embody the will of ordinary citizens against entrenched power structures. However, with the ICC now in play, Duterte’s rhetoric has become inverted: the man who cast himself as the punisher finds himself facing punishment.
The Philippines’ vulnerability to criminal populism stems from recurring political habits and institutional failures, which legitimize punitive governance even at the cost of human rights and accountability. If weak institutions and the lack of clear policies continue to persist, criminal populists like Duterte and Estrada will continue to attract support. Duterte’s ICC arrest calls for reflection, not just on his war on drugs campaign, but also on the political culture that allowed it to happen.
Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.
Editorial Deadline 24/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
