The Rules of the Game
Issue 29 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
This week’s issue of the Pacific Corridor takes a look at rules, regulations, and the games played by Southeast Asian states. For Vietnam, the recently concluded 33rd Southeast Asian Games was a triumph as it placed third overall. But beyond sports, the controversies surrounding the Games serve as a reminder of their more serious implications for politics, diplomacy, and beyond.
In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. calls for an end to the political dynasties prevalent in the country. Yet only time will tell if the President — himself a scion of one of the Philippines’ most prominent political clans — is resolute, or if this is yet another move in the country’s long-running game of politics and dynasties.
Meanwhile, in Singapore, a new rule in an effort to strengthen border security: the country’s Immigration and Checkpoints Authority will soon begin issuing No-Boarding Directive notices in January 2026. A first in the region, how this will affect Singapore’s neighboring states and their own strategic calculi remains to be seen.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Playing the Long Game
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
The 33rd Southeast Asian (SEA) Games concluded on 20 December, with Vietnam securing 278 official medals, including 87 gold, 82 silver, and 110 bronze, placing the country third overall in the medal standings. Despite deploying a relatively small delegation of 841 athletes — considerably fewer than host Thailand or Indonesia — Vietnam met, and marginally exceeded, its performance targets (90 gold medals) when medals from demonstration sports were included (92 gold medals). Domestically, the results were widely celebrated as evidence of aptitude and enthusiasm in regional sports. Simultaneously, however, SEA Games 33 highlighted how major sporting events in Southeast Asia extend beyond athletic competition to encompass political symbolism and diplomatic sensitivity. Institutionally framed as platforms for regional cooperation and sportsmanship, the SEA Games also function as a regional arena in which national identity, sovereignty, and interstate perceptions are implicitly negotiated.
This twofold nature became visible during the opening ceremony, when the presentation of Vietnam’s national map omitted the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, as well as Phu Quoc Island — territories that hold considerable political significance in Vietnam’s sovereignty discourse. Although the omission may have resulted from technical or organizational oversight, it nevertheless prompted public criticism and diplomatic engagement. Ultimately, it effectively underscored the sensitivity attached to cartographic representation in a region marked by unresolved territorial disputes. Similar concerns emerged during the closing ceremony, when Vietnam’s men’s football gold medal victory over the host nation was absent from the official highlight montage. Though not an explicit political statement, the omission was perceived by multiple segments of the Vietnamese public as symbolically meaningful, leading to questions about representation and recognition within regional sporting narratives.
In this conversation, representation and recognition are crucial topics to take into account. Beyond the isolated instances, the SEA Games 33 experience illustrates how sports function as a form of soft power within Southeast Asia. Athletic performance, ceremonial representation, and event management collectively shape how states are perceived by regional audiences. Successful participation can reinforce images of competence, discipline, and modernity, while symbolic missteps — intentional or otherwise — risk undermining goodwill and trust. In this sense, the SEA Games operate not only as a sporting competition but also as a performative space in which states project narratives about themselves and respond to the perceptions of others. For Vietnam, strong athletic results contributed positively to its regional image; however, the symbolic controversies surrounding SEA Games 33 demonstrate the limits of performance-based soft power when representation and recognition are contested. Even minor ceremonial details, such as maps or highlight selections, can acquire political significance in a regional environment where historical memory, nationalism, and unresolved disputes remain salient.
These dynamics suggest that sporting events are best understood as sites of implicit diplomacy, where cooperation and competition exist in a delicate balance. Even though the SEA Games still foster people-to-people interaction and regional familiarity, they also reflect structural tensions embedded within Southeast Asian interstate relations. As such, SEA Games 33 offers a particularly useful case for examining how sports simultaneously advance regional solidarity while exposing political sensitivities persisting beneath the surface.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Guardrails or Window Dressing? The Philippines’ New Push to Curb Political Dynasties
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has asked Congress to prioritize a long-stalled ban on political dynasties, reviving a constitutional promise that has sat unfulfilled since 1987.
Within two days of the directive, House Speaker Faustino “Bojie” Dy III and House Majority Leader Ferdinand Alexander “Sandro” Marcos III filed House Bill (HB) No. 6771, a joint measure that seeks to operationalize Article II, Section 26 of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees equal access to public service and calls for a law prohibiting political dynasties.
At least 72 anti-dynasty bills have been filed in past Congresses and 18 more in the present one, yet none has become law since a Senate version first passed in 1987 then died in the House.
HB 6771 proposes restrictions up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Spouses, siblings, children, parents, grandparents, in-laws, first cousins, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and similarly related relatives would be barred from simultaneously holding specified elective posts. The authors frame the bill as a “faithful execution” of the Constitution and a step toward merit-based public service, arguing that lineage should not determine who governs, as the House’s own press release emphasizes.
The Dy–Marcos draft would prevent relatives from occupying the same office at the same time, but would still allow them to hold different positions across levels and jurisdictions and to succeed one another in sequence. The arithmetic of Congress underscores the challenge.
Roughly 70% to 80% of House members hail from political families, and 19 of 24 senators have dynastic ties. The President himself is part of one of the country’s most prominent political clans and is related to several sitting lawmakers. History is not reassuring either. Aside from the 1987 Senate bill authored by Teofisto Guingona Jr., anti-dynasty proposals have rarely made it past committee. The gap between constitutional aspiration and legislative delivery has persisted for nearly four decades.
Substance will hinge on the details. Comparative drafts filed this Congress vary on how far the prohibition should extend. Many propose a second- or third-degree limit. Two other design choices are pivotal: whether the ban covers both simultaneous and successive candidacies, and whether it blocks geographical work-arounds that allow families to spread across neighboring jurisdictions or shift between district and party-list seats.
If Congress advances HB 6771, expect hard bargaining. The House press release pitches the bill as opening public service to more Filipinos and preventing the concentration of power, including in the Senate where siblings or close relatives would no longer serve together.
The political moment is real, but so is the risk of dilution. Four decades after the Constitution mandated an anti-dynasty law, the test facing this Congress is straightforward: write a statute with clear prohibitions up to the fourth degree, cover both simultaneous and successive occupancy, close jurisdictional and party-list loopholes, and subject the process to open, line-by-line scrutiny. Anything less will read as window dressing on an old problem.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore pushes border controls upstream with airline no-boarding directives
by Ryan
On 21 December 2025, the Straits Times published an article about 41,800 foreigners being denied entry into Singapore from January 2025 to November 2025. The figure has renewed attention on a longstanding problem for major hubs: by the time an ineligible traveler lands, the costs of interception, removal, and disruption are already locked in.
Singapore’s Immigration and Checkpoints Authority’s (ICA) answer to this is to move enforcement earlier. From 30 January 2026, ICA will issue No-Boarding Directive (NBD) notices to airline operators for flights bound for Changi and Seletar Airports, requiring carriers to deny boarding to identified “prohibited or undesirable” travelers, as well as those who do not meet entry requirements, such as having a valid visa (where required) or a travel document with at least six months’ validity. ICA says it will base decisions on advance traveler information, including SG Arrival Card submissions and flight manifests, then transmit NBD instructions that airlines must act on at check-in. Airlines that fail to comply face a strict liability offense under the Immigration Act, with penalties up to SGD 10,000, and additional liabilities for staff who enable boarding despite an NBD.
Operationally, this turns airline check-in into a harder control point. ICA has said the current model relies heavily on visual document inspection, which is prone to human error, and that travelers denied boarding must seek ICA approval before rebooking. The initial rollout cited carriers including Singapore Airlines, Scoot, Emirates, Turkish Airlines, and AirAsia, with more airlines expected to join later.
The regime also aligns with a global shift toward interactive advance passenger screening, where governments return a “board/no-board” response to carriers before departure. For travelers, the practical implication is simple: documentation hygiene matters more. ICA guidance says travelers should submit the SG Arrival Card within three days before arrival, and non-Singapore passport holders generally need at least six months passport validity.
How does Singapore compare within Southeast Asia? Two regional reference points show different starting positions. In the Philippines, the Bureau of Immigration has been rolling out an Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), including pilots with major airlines and connectivity testing with INTERPOL databases, which signals a move toward earlier risk screening. In Indonesia, customs and border agencies have long used passenger data, and have been strengthening capabilities to analyze Advance Passenger Information (API)/Passenger Name Records (PNR) to identify higher-risk movements. Singapore’s NBD approach goes a step further by formalizing pre-departure enforcement, explicitly shifting responsibility to airlines to stop flagged travelers before wheels-up.
For Singapore, the trade-off is clear. A tighter upstream filter can reduce downstream disruption and raise deterrence, but it also increases dependence on data quality, system integration, and clear redress for edge cases. If executed well, it could become a reference model for other ASEAN hubs balancing facilitation with security at scale.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Editorial Deadline 23/12/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
