Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
Throughout the centuries, the great cities of Southeast Asia have existed in some form or another, shifting with the times. But even now, in 2026, the work of modernization is never really over.
This week, the streets of Vietnam and Singapore once again bear witness to the steady march of progress. In Vietnam, the country’s famed sidewalk culture and its accompanying street life are in danger, thanks to a renewed push for urban development. In Singapore, the city-state’s busy streets are being examined for their readiness for autonomous vehicles, while other countries in the region lag behind.
But for the Philippines this week, we take a look back to more than a year ago. As all eyes once again turn to Manila as it gears up to host the 49th ASEAN Summit next week, we must ask ourselves: how much of the country’s original hopes and pledges ended up becoming reality?
Vietnam 🇻🇳
The End of Vietnam’s Sidewalk Culture?
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
As Vietnamese cities invest in metro lines, bus networks, and pedestrian zones, the pavement beneath them has become a policy priority, a posture consistent with the stricter enforcement now taking hold in 2026. Under Decree 168/2024/ND-CP, stopping or parking on the roadway in a way that obstructs traffic, or gathering three or more vehicles on a road or in a road tunnel, can draw a fine of VND 400,000 to VND 600,000 (roughly US$15 to US$23), a figure state media has highlighted as a sharper deterrent for sidewalk parking.
The penalties climb for commercial use of public space. Individuals who use roadways or sidewalks without permission to hold markets, serve food, wash vehicles, or display goods face fines of VND 2 million to VND 3 million, while organizations face VND 4 million to VND 6 million. Separately, Decree 282/2025/ND-CP on public order offenses sets penalties that can reach tens of millions of Vietnamese dong depending on the offense, and larger cities such as Hanoi may apply additional local rules on top.
The urban development rationale is straightforward. Sidewalks are designed for pedestrians, and when motorbikes, tables, and merchandise take them over, walkers are pushed into traffic, with the elderly, children, and people with disabilities the most exposed. A usable walking network is also a precondition for the public transport ambitions many cities now hold, which gives enforcement a purpose beyond tidiness.
The cultural dimension is less tidy. In Vietnam, the sidewalk has long doubled as a social and commercial space, hosting the pavement café, the bánh mì cart, and the late-night food stall that visitors often cite among the country’s defining urban experiences. For many low-income workers, street trade is also a livelihood requiring little capital and no formal premises. A fine of VND 2 million represents a considerable share of a vendor’s income, so stricter enforcement raises a question the decrees do not answer: where these workers are meant to go.
Other Asian cities have generally pursued regulation over prohibition, through designated food streets, time-limited and paid sidewalk permits, and organized night markets close enough to customers to remain viable. Vietnam’s own rules already contemplate temporary sidewalk use for other purposes, suggesting some room for a managed approach.
However, several limits apply. Outcomes will depend heavily on local implementation, since provincial and municipal authorities set much of the practical enforcement tone. Rules also tend to lose public acceptance when applied through periodic crackdowns rather than consistently, and as of now there is little public evidence that cities have expanded legal alternatives at the pace fines have risen.
In that sense, the policy’s significance may rest on what accompanies the penalties more than on the penalties themselves. Clearer pavements serve a modernizing city, but whether Vietnam can reclaim its sidewalks without emptying its street life will depend on the legal spaces, permits, and predictable enforcement that follow.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Is Singapore Ready for Autonomous Vehicles?
by Ryan
On the morning of 5 November, a Grab autonomous shuttle turned left on a green light at Punggol Field Walk just as a schoolgirl stepped off the curb on a blinking green pedestrian signal. She stopped, a woman pulled her back, and the vehicle passed in front of her. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) told news website Mothership that preliminary data showed the shuttle had detected two pedestrians and was tracking them; it braked and veered right when the child began to cross, after which the safety operator took over and steered clear. Dashcam footage that surfaced three days later showed a ComfortDelGro (CDG) vehicle at another Punggol Field junction beginning a U-turn into the path of an oncoming car, the Straits Times reported. LTA has directed Grab to pause testing at such junctions and CDG to halt U-turns at the junction concerned while it investigates both.
Neither episode ended in a collision, and the regulatory response was calibrated rather than blunt: a scenario-specific pause instead of a fleet-wide suspension. That echoes January, when a CDG vehicle on a test run clipped a road divider in Punggol. LTA found that the safety officer had taken manual control after seeing the car drift into another lane without an obvious reason, and a simulation showed the vehicle would likely have completed the maneuver safely. Testing resumed on 30 January after LTA and CDG reviewed when humans should intervene. Across these episodes, human intervention has both caused an accident and served as the final safeguard in a near miss, which suggests the hardest problem in Punggol is less the software than the handover between machine and person.
So is Singapore ready? Institutionally speaking, more than most. The 2017 amendments to the Road Traffic Act created a legal pathway for trials, and LTA’s milestone regime requires a closed-circuit M1 test, with a tougher M2 test and a mandatory on-board operator for complex deployments such as busy junctions. Insurance is a prerequisite. KPMG’s 2020 Autonomous Vehicles Readiness Index ranked Singapore first globally, although it is important to note that the ranking is now six years old. The weakness exposed in Punggol lies elsewhere. Test tracks can script a stationary obstacle or an emergency stop; they struggle to script a pedestrian who hesitates or a driver who closes a gap at a junction. With on-demand rides due to reach the wider public in the fourth quarter, those discretionary moments will multiply. Readiness is better judged by how quickly a system detects and contains failure than by whether failure occurs, and on that measure Singapore has performed well. It is a narrower claim than “ready,” but an honest one.
The regional picture flatters Singapore without offering much comfort. Punggol hosts what Productnation called Southeast Asia’s first autonomous public ride service, launched by Grab and WeRide in April. Malaysia’s Deputy MITI Minister Sim Tze Tzin said in May that the country is aiming for Level 3 autonomy by 2030 but has yet to formalize a strategy, according to Paul Tan’s Automotive News. Vietnam’s VinFast announced in June a partnership with NVIDIA and Autobrains to build a Level 4 robotaxi platform for the region. Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer noted in 2025 that Thailand and Indonesia had no AV-specific legislation, relying on existing laws, although Indonesia began AV testing for its Nusantara capital in July 2024.
ASEAN’s roads will accept driverless vehicles not when machines stop erring, but when operators disclose their errors, regulators act on them, and everyday road users learn what the machine can and cannot see.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
ASEAN 2026: A Crucible for Reform?
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
Note: This article was first published in Issue 17 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 3 October 2025. The Philippines is set to host the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila next week.
The Philippines is set to chair and host the 2026 ASEAN Summit, stepping into a leadership role during a politically turbulent time at home. Originally scheduled for Myanmar, the hosting was reassigned to Manila after Naypyidaw stepped aside due to ongoing instability. For President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., the responsibility is both an opportunity and a test.
To prepare, Marcos issued Administrative Order No. 17, establishing a National Organizing Council (NOC) tasked with ensuring seamless coordination across government agencies. In his directive, Marcos underscored the weight of the task: “It is imperative to constitute a National Organizing Council to organize, manage, and supervise all major and ancillary programs, activities, and projects related to the hosting of ASEAN 2026 in the country.”
The NOC spans multiple agencies, from Foreign Affairs and Trade to Public Works, Tourism, and National Defense. It will also include local government executives of host cities. An Office of the Director-General for Operations has been created within the Office of the President to serve as the NOC’s implementing arm and coordinating body.
ASEAN 2026 will not merely be a routine ceremonial event, but an opportunity to project Manila’s modernization agenda. The Department of Trade and Industry has already identified digital transformation—with an emphasis on artificial intelligence, blockchain, and inclusive technology—as a key theme for Manila’s chairmanship. This reflects an attempt to showcase the Philippines not only as a host, but as an innovator in Southeast Asia’s ongoing digital shift.
Yet the stakes go beyond logistics and policy themes. Domestically, the Marcos administration is facing intensified criticism over corruption scandals and governance challenges. For many observers, the ASEAN Summit will be judged not only on Manila’s ability to host, but also on whether the Philippines can present itself as a credible and stable leader at a time of public distrust.
Regionally, the challenge is just as complex. ASEAN is under pressure to respond more decisively to global tensions, economic realignments, and internal governance crises. The Philippines will chair not just the flagship leaders’ meetings, but also the full agenda of ASEAN’s Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural Communities. How it sets priorities could shape the bloc’s trajectory in a period of increasing strain.
If Manila uses ASEAN 2026 to showcase reforms in transparency, procurement, and governance, it could strengthen both its credibility and ASEAN’s. If not, the Summit risks being remembered as another display of ceremony without substance. For now, the Philippines has pledged order and continuity. The real question is whether it can also deliver vision and leadership.
Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.
Editorial Deadline 10/11/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
