Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
All around the world, the changing climate has put dozens of cities at risk of disappearing underwater. In the Pacific Corridor, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City is one such sinking example. Our newest correspondent, Thao-My Mai Vu, talks about how the city’s rapid urbanization is now taking its toll: with frequent flooding battering Saigon and urbanization showing no signs of stopping, low-income and working-class residents may well be the first to pay the costs of a city sinking around them.
Meanwhile, stories from the rest of the region: in the Philippines, a rash of fatal school shootings — previously a rarity in the country and in the region at large — have left officials searching for answers, almost four months since the first incident in Tacloban. In Singapore, the opening of the long-awaited Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System Link has been postponed, but ties between Singapore and Malaysia remain as strong as ever. And for Timor-Leste, we take another look at how closer ties with the rest of Southeast Asia can generate opportunities for Timorese students.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Built to Flood
by Thao-My Mai Vu, in Ho Chi Minh City
During the evening rush hour on 29 September, a sudden deluge paralyzed traffic on at least 12 roads in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Thousands of commuters pushed their motorcycles home through severe gridlock, and some waited in their offices until midnight to wait for the floodwaters to recede. This scene is the epitome of the frequent floods that have plagued the city since late September 2026, as it enters the peak rainy season and a period of rising tides. However, a more-than-one-meter level of flood after just 79.2mm of rain in 45 minutes implies a deeper layer of the ‘climate change vulnerability’ discourse.
This metropolis of 14 million sits atop soft, compressible sediments, and is sinking twice as fast as the sea is rising, at 2 to 8 centimeters per year. Decades of costly government efforts have made little progress in halting this. On 2 October, after the deluge, the HCMC People’s Committee issued Plan No. 537 to address the issue of flooding for 2026 to 2030. This plan has reflected a necessary shift in mindset: from solely gray to more green and blue infrastructure, and from ‘anti-flooding’ to ‘flood management.’ However, it barely touches upon one of the main contributors — the city’s urban planning strategy.
In the whirl of its rapid urban sprawl and concretization, more than 90% of wetlands in HCMC have been converted to impervious built-in areas since 1990, which significantly undermined its rainwater retention, groundwater filtration, and flood mitigation capacity. This expansion is currently accelerating, with an apartment construction boom in 2026 in the southern and southeastern parts of the city — the fastest-sinking and most subsidence-prone areas. High-density, high-rise apartments — branded as ‘eco-metropolis’ or ‘green paradise,’ mostly aimed at upper-middle-income buyers — are mushrooming in Nha Be, Thanh Da - Binh Quoi Peninsula, and Can Gio commune, adding load on soft delta soil.
The pressure on the city’s resilience is also set to amplify. Recently, authorities requested approval to convert 4.57 hectares of protective mangrove forest in Can Gio, long vital to the city’s flood mitigation, for a US$3.9 billion metro line project. This land conversion, if approved, could adversely encroach upon the wetlands and cause significant canopy loss and vegetation stress. The cost is likely to fall not upon buyers of green-branded towers, but more on the city’s low-income and working-class residents, who remain the most vulnerable amid climate change crises.
The implications of one deluge in HCMC can extend to ASEAN as a whole, particularly for urban planning strategy as climate vulnerability raises the stakes. Megacities need to develop subsidence maps and give them greater weight as a basis for issuing construction permits. They should also decelerate land-driven growth in low-lying and flood-prone areas, so that these areas can remain as water-retention zones and flood corridors for the whole city.
Thao-My is a young researcher focusing on small-power statecraft, Vietnam-Cambodia relations, and the politics of water infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion. As Vietnam’s Student Delegate to the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, she contributed to global dialogues on multilateral reforms and bridging the North-South divide from a Southeast Asian perspective. She also has professional experience in policy advocacy and government affairs.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
When School Shootings Reach Southeast Asia
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Makati City
School shootings have long been associated with the United States and other Western countries. However, recent incidents in the Philippines are challenging the idea that this is not a distant problem.
Three fatal school shootings have occurred in the Philippines within just the last three months. In June, a shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban City killed three students and injured several others. In August, a student in Zamboanga City killed a classmate before taking his own life. In September, another shooting at Banga National High School in South Cotabato left two students and the gunman dead, with several others injured.
The incidents are concerning partly because school shootings remain relatively uncommon in the Philippines. Their emergence raises questions that go beyond school security. How are minors gaining access to firearms? How are violent ideas reaching them? And can schools identify risks before they escalate?
The South Cotabato shooting has also drawn attention to online spaces. Authorities are investigating alleged online interactions that may have influenced the student. Officials have raised concerns about online communities that glorify school shootings and exposed these kids to violent content.
This makes the issue more complicated than simply increasing security at school entrances. Firearm access, online platforms, and student support systems all form part of the environment surrounding the youth.
The Philippines is also not alone in this challenge. In August, a 14-year-old student in Thailand carried out a shooting at a school outside Bangkok. The attack killed several people and injured more than 20. These cases have prompted renewed attention to access to firearms and school security.
The parallel is significant for Southeast Asia. The region does not experience school shootings at the same frequency as the United States. In this regard, the recent cases show how violence can increasingly intersect with schools and digital spaces.
This presents a new challenge for education systems across Southeast Asia. School safety can no longer focus only on physical security, but must also consider child protection and early intervention. Consequently, schools should remain places where students can learn without fear, but the recent experience of the Philippines shows that the security environment around them is changing. The question now is whether Southeast Asian education systems can adapt before school shootings become a more familiar regional concern.
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Timor-Leste 🇹🇱
ASEAN Membership: What’s In It for Timorese Students?
by Lucreicha Jane
Note: This article was first published in Issue 52 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 12 June 2026.
Timor-Leste just joined ASEAN. For Timorese students, this is more than just a political achievement; it could mean new opportunities that were not readily accessible before.
When Timor became part of ASEAN, it also became part of a much bigger regional space with many countries in Southeast Asia. This raises a simple question: “What does this actually change for students in real life?”
One of the main possible changes is access to educational opportunities. Being part of ASEAN could open more chances and scholarships, exchange programs, and study abroad opportunities across Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Some of these opportunities already exist, but ASEAN membership may make them more structured and easier to access.
With regard to student exchange programs, instead of being rare or limited, exchanges between universities in ASEAN countries could become a more regular occurrence. This means students might have more chances to study abroad for short periods of time, join training programs, or experience different education systems in the region. There are also youth and skills development programs within ASEAN. These programs often focus on leadership, entrepreneurship, climate issues, and digital skills. Timorese students could now take part in more of these regional activities, which may help them prepare for future employment.
Beyond education, ASEAN membership also means connection. Students in Timor-Leste are now part of a wider student network across Southeast Asia. This could help in building friendship, academic cooperation, and even career opportunities. But even with all of these possibilities, one important question remains: “Will students actually take these opportunities?” Having access is one thing, but being ready and informed is another.
In the end, ASEAN membership is not just about politics or government decisions. For students, it could shape their education, skills, and future paths, but only if they are willing and ready to seize those opportunities.
Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore-Johor RTS Delayed to 2027: What the Setback Means for Cross-Border Connectivity
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
The Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link, a long-awaited cross-border rail project intended to ease congestion between Singapore and Johor Bahru, has been delayed from its original target of December 2026 to February 2027. While the delay postpones the project’s anticipated benefits by several months, the RTS Link remains a significant piece of infrastructure in strengthening connectivity between Singapore and Malaysia.
The project was conceived in response to persistent congestion at the Causeway, one of the world’s busiest land crossings. By providing a dedicated rail connection between Singapore’s Woodlands North and Johor Bahru’s Bukit Chagar, the RTS Link is expected to offer a faster and more reliable alternative for daily cross-border travel. The RTS Link is designed to carry up to 10,000 passengers per hour in each direction, with the journey between the two stations expected to take around six minutes. Its capacity could significantly reduce pressure on existing road and rail connections, which currently handle large volumes of commuters, tourists, and goods traveling between the two countries.
The RTS Link therefore represents more than a new transport option. By shortening travel times and improving the predictability of cross-border journeys, it could make it easier for people to live, work, and conduct business across both sides of the border. Although the delay may be frustrating for commuters anticipating a faster journey across the border, completing these stages thoroughly is important for ensuring that the RTS Link can operate safely and consistently once passenger services begin.
The significance of the RTS Link extends beyond transportation. It is being developed alongside an economic relationship between Singapore and Johor that is already deeply established. Johor offers Singapore-linked businesses access to land and industrial space, relatively lower operating costs, logistics and manufacturing capabilities, a large labor pool, and proximity to Singapore. Singapore, meanwhile, contributes capital, financial and advanced business services, technology, infrastructure, international connectivity, and access to global investors.
For businesses, improved connectivity could make it more practical to distribute operations across the border while maintaining close links between headquarters, workers, suppliers, and customers. The RTS Link is also part of a much broader relationship between Singapore and Malaysia. The two countries are closely connected through trade, investment, tourism, employment, commuting, and shared infrastructure. Easier movement between Singapore and Johor could further improve connectivity and support tourism, employment, and family connections, all while making everyday interaction across the border more accessible.
The delay of the RTS Link to February 2027 may postpone the project’s immediate benefits, but it does not diminish its broader significance. The rail connection is being developed at a time when Singapore and Malaysia are seeking to deepen economic integration and strengthen the Johor–Singapore corridor.
Once operational, the RTS Link could help alleviate congestion while supporting the movement of workers, visitors and businesses between the two countries. Together with the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone and other forms of bilateral cooperation, it reflects a relationship in which transport connectivity, economic integration, and people-to-people ties are increasingly interconnected.
Ultimately, the RTS Link is not simply a six-minute train journey between Singapore and Johor Bahru. It is part of a broader effort to make the border less of a barrier and the two economies more closely connected.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.
Editorial Deadline 06/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
