The Vietnam Trap in Iran
What the Vietnam War can tell us about the US-Iran Conflict
by Sean Huy Vu, TAF Vietnam Correspondent
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East demonstrates the importance of studying Southeast Asian history and perspectives, and the costs of not doing so. Although leaders from both sides have claimed victory, to the average consumer the war is far from over. Tehran now controls approximately 25% of the world’s oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and negotiations have reached an impasse. Fuel prices around the world remain high, especially in Southeast Asia. The escalation of violence was entirely avoidable, and the Trump administration is now at risk of following the same trajectory as the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations during the Vietnam War.
This essay critically analyzes US foreign policy in its war on Iran by comparing it to the history of the Vietnam War. It examines the personalities, incentives, and organizational structures across US administrations to understand how policies and outcomes were made. This essay aims to show how identifying patterns in history can be applied to contemporary strategy and risk-management, and can inform future decision-making.
Personalities and Organization: The most important person in either the Iran or Vietnam War is the American President, for he sets the agenda and atmosphere of the administration. Although Democrat Lyndon Johnson and Republican Donald Trump are very different men, they are temperamentally similar. Historians and psychiatrists speculate that Johnson had bipolar disorder, a mental health condition that makes it difficult for an individual to self-regulate their emotions. Johnson was known by his wife and advisors to have wild mood swings between ecstasy and depression. His predecessor President Kennedy characterized him as “a very insecure, sensitive man with a huge ego.” Johnson’s lack of self-confidence and paranoia led to a “preoccupation with consensus and unity [in his administration],” writes lieutenant general and former national security advisor H. R. McMaster. “His quest for reassurance and support, rather than wide-ranging debate on policy issues,” negatively affected Vietnam policy. As a result, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor both prevented advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from reaching President Johnson out of fear of challenging him. Similarly, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has purged several JCS members who do not conform with his or President Trump’s views, including Army Chief of Staff General Randy George.
Donald Trump’s leadership style is even more centralized and hierarchical than Johnson’s. The President has replaced institutions with sycophantic loyalists, and routinely intimidates and blackmails appointees who fail to carry out his orders. This pressures subordinates, such as Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, from making accurate assessments that may upset the president. When asked by Congress whether Iran was an imminent threat to the United States, Gabbard simply replied, “the only person who can determine what is and is not an imminent threat is the president.”
Overconfidence in Air Power: In the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, Defense Secretary McNamara proposed to President Johnson a strategy of “graduated pressure” against the communist forces in Vietnam and Laos. McNamara hoped that slow escalation of bombing would communicate American resolve and deter the enemy from absorbing South Vietnam. A graduate of Harvard Business School and a former president of Ford Motors, McNamara calculated that a purely aerial campaign would be a cost-efficient means of achieving “maximum pressure with minimum risks.” Johnson, who believed a ground invasion of Vietnam would draw attention away from his domestic agenda, affect his popularity, and provoke the Soviet Union and China, accepted McNamara’s logic. The JCS insisted that a bombing campaign would be insufficient in preventing a communist takeover of the South, and that a full-scale ground invasion would be necessary. But it was too late by the time Johnson realized this.
Similarly, the Trump administration relied solely on air power in Iran to avoid the political and human costs of a ground invasion. At its peak, the United States sent over 500,000 troops to South Vietnam, a state of 174,000 km2 , and yet this was still insufficient to save the Saigon regime. Even if Washington sent the same amount of troops to Iran, a mountainous country of 1,650,000 km2, the operation would likely still be infeasible.
Absence of Strategy: From the period of 1963 to 1965, Johnson was initially reluctant to get deeply involved in Vietnam. He was focused on improving race relations in America and Great Society programs, which sought to reduce inequality in the United States. In addition to domestic social issues, Johnson was also preoccupied with securing election in 1964. Taken together, these issues prevent him from developing a coherent strategy for Vietnam.
Donald Trump has shown even less desire to deeply contemplate his country’s war in the Middle East. Virtually everyday, the administration has delivered inconsistent and competing explanations for the conflict in Iran. Since he is constitutionally ineligible for a third term, he has no incentive to develop a property strategy, or maintain his popularity for the next election.
Compared to the Trump or Kennedy/Johnson administrations, the Vietnamese and Iranians had very clear objectives for fighting. Both peoples faced an existential threat to their sovereignty and both had the home advantage. But above all both groups understood the power of nationalism and storytelling, inspiring collective effervescence from their population for a larger cause. With a few exceptions, US administrations have consistently failed to garner meaningful support for their wars.
Recommendations:
Consider the Qualitative, not just the Quantitative: Historians Philip and William Taubman point out how “McNamara’s mechanical prosecution of the Vietnam War… [and] his obsessive and misplaced reliance on statistical data in making decisions,” affected the outcomes of the war. He discounted the role of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning in shaping research. More importantly, he, and the rest of the administration, did not consider the emotional factors that motivated the Vietnamese resistance movement: the role of language, history, and culture. Although a deeper knowledge would not have necessarily guaranteed an American victory, it would have bridged greater understanding between combatants and possibly reduced the duration of the conflict.
Likewise, the American and Israeli governments, largely through quantitative assessment, overconfidently concluded that regime change in Iran was possible through overwhelming air power and a decapitation strike. However, they discounted how a humiliating history of Western intervention (i.e. the 1953 Coup), and Shia Islam could serve as powerful motivators of Iranian resolve.
Build Reliable Institutions: During negotiations under President Nixon’s tenure, the United States bombed North Vietnam to make concessions to conclude the war. Now, as talks stall in Iran, President Trump appears to be considering bombing again. In order for conflict to resolve, a foundation of genuine trust needs to be established. “Personal rapport is important,” writes Vietnam expert Zachary Abuza, “Trust must be based on an honest discussion and acceptance of the other side’s red lines,” such as domestic political pressures. Most importantly, Abuza concludes, trust must be based on “durable institutions that work together day in and day out.” Such institutions can be organized by governments or can arise from civil society. They should be open, transparent, dynamic, and creative to earn the trust and participation of outsiders. Institutions can require substantial funding and specific personnel to negotiate, investigate, and coordinate resources and information as well.
Offer Credible Concessions: During peace negotiations, President Nixon promised billions of dollars in reconstruction aid to Vietnam. However, since this money was technically not reparations, the US felt no obligation to compensate the Hanoi government after the fall of Saigon. Nonetheless, the US government, through NGOs, has helped Vietnam with dioxin remediation, removal of unexploded ordinances, and provided medical care to victims of Agent Orange. In the case of the current conflict, offering reparations to a designated state-sponsor of terror would likely not sit well with the American electorate. Instead, the United States can suspend arms sales to Israel to communicate a genuine attempt at reducing hostilities in the region while imposing costs on Israel for provoking the United States to launch preemptive airstrikes on Iran.
In the end, Johnson escalated the conflict in Vietnam due to lack of planning, a failed air campaign, and out of fear of appearing weak to the American public. Political scientist Robert Pape theorizes that there is a high chance that Trump will escalate to boots-on-the-ground in Ira. for similar reasons, despite current efforts to settle a peace deal. As Trump loses power domestically and on the international stage over the war, he may commit to a sunk cost endeavor and retaliate against Iran with more force out of desperation.
As similar as the Vietnam and Iran wars are, it would be a mistake to believe history ever repeats: it only rhymes. As Burmese historian Phyo Latt warns, “Analogy can illuminate, but it can also intoxicate… once resemblance becomes destiny, thinking stops.” History is a guide for decision-making; it does not determine it. As Latt writes, the past “warns, interrupts, complicates, and, at its best, slows the hand before it reaches for force.”
Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.
Edited by Phan Quang Anh Bui, Frontier Analysis Editor
