Tracks to the Future
Issue 36 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
With the election season coming to an end, political stability and momentum are building across the Mekong, but so are the tests for new and old leaderships. In Thailand, the end of a season of political uncertainty with the election of a new cabinet under Anutin Charnvirakul opens a rare window to tackle structural economic weakness—if fiscal reform proves stronger than short-term populism. Meanwhile, Laos is laying tracks to the sea with a railway project, betting that controlling logistics corridors can redefine its post-LDC trajectory, even as debt and environmental risks linger beneath the surface. Cambodia is climbing the global AI rankings, yet the real race is not about position—it’s about controlling talent, data, and digital infrastructure before ambition outruns capacity. And in Myanmar, an honorary doctorate for the junta leader at Yangon University shows how even historic institutions are being folded into the struggle for legitimacy.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Can Anutin End Thailand’s ‘Sick Man of Asia’ Narrative?
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
It appears increasingly certain that Anutin Charnvirakul of the conservative Bhumjaithai Party will become Thailand’s 33rd prime minister following the February 8 general election. While concerns have been raised about the transparency of the vote, the progressive People’s Party has acknowledged that even a recount is unlikely to alter the outcome. Nevertheless, it continues to argue that any irregularities in the electoral process are unacceptable.
Despite questions surrounding the election, economists and local media largely agree that an Anutin administration may offer a rare opportunity to address Thailand’s long-standing structural economic weaknesses. For decades, the country has struggled with limited productivity growth, mounting household debt, and persistent fiscal deficits—issues that have often been sidelined amid recurring political instability.
With political uncertainty temporarily reduced, the Bhumjaithai Party—also known as the Proud Thai Party— has vowed to implement policies aimed not only at boosting short-term domestic consumption, such as the co-payment scheme, but also at introducing medium-term measures to address Thailand’s structural economic challenges over the next four years.
Among these proposals is the Thailand Individual Savings Account (TISA), designed to encourage household savings while reforming a tax-relief structure that places pressure on the fiscal budget. Another initiative, the Thailand Fast Pass, seeks to attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI) by streamlining bureaucratic procedures and reducing regulatory bottlenecks.
Kobsak Pootrakool, Chairman of the Federation of Thai Capital Market Organizations (FETCO), told Krungthep Turakij that he is optimistic the Bhumjaithai Party will not rely solely on populist spending but will also pursue structural reforms, particularly given Thailand’s decade-long pattern of budget shortfalls.
However, fiscal experts remain cautious. Professor Atipat Mutitajaroen, a former official at the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and a specialist in Thailand’s fiscal policy, told Krungthep Turakij that while the party’s short- and medium-term measures are promising, they lack a clear long-term strategy for restoring fiscal sustainability. Sound public finances, he argued, are a prerequisite for effective policymaking and long-term economic resilience.
Atipat further noted that Thailand lacks an independent fiscal institution tasked with evaluating government spending and assessing the long-term viability of public policies. In contrast, countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom rely on institutions like the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) to provide nonpartisan fiscal oversight. The absence of similar mechanisms in Thailand raises concerns about accountability and policy discipline.
In short, Thailand may now enjoy a rare moment of political clarity compared to some of its ASEAN peers. Yet political certainty alone will not guarantee sustainable growth. To translate stability into economic resilience, the new administration will need to prioritize fiscal consolidation—and signaling a commitment to establishing an independent fiscal watchdog could be an important first step.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos-Vietnam Railway: Connecting the Mekong to the Sea
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Laos is preparing to transform its “landlocked” geography with an ambitious USD 6.6 billion railway linking Vientiane to Vietnam’s Vung Ang Port. Building on the momentum of the Laos–China Railway (LCR), the project is being framed as a strategic step toward deeper regional integration as the country approaches its 2026 graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status.
Still, the new railway emerges amid mounting fiscal pressures and persistent concerns over debt sustainability that have long shadowed Laos’ infrastructure ambitions.
Since its launch in December 2021, the LCR has surpassed expectations. By early 2026, it had transported more than 65 million passengers and 72.5 million tons of freight. The line connects Laos to 19 countries via Kunming, generates over USD 100 million annually, and has reduced travel time between Vientiane and Boten from 14 hours to just two. Tourism has risen sharply—arrivals to Luang Prabang doubled following the railway’s opening—while exports of potash, timber, and agricultural products have expanded significantly.
Announced at a December 2025 investment conference in Vientiane, the new 571-kilometer railway will run 452 kilometers through Laos—from Vientiane Capital through Khammouane Province to the Vietnamese border—and 119 kilometers onward to Vung Ang Port in Ha Tinh Province, Vietnam. Structured as a public-private partnership (PPP) led by Lao and Vietnamese firms, the project has reportedly completed 90 percent of pre-construction work, with 80% of financing secured.
The PPP model marks a deliberate shift from earlier debt-heavy financing approaches, particularly as Laos’ public debt remains close to 90% of GDP. Groundbreaking on the Lao side is expected in 2026, with Vietnam set to begin construction in 2027. The electrified, standard-gauge railway—designed for speeds exceeding 100 kilometers per hour—is targeted to begin operations in 2030. Once completed, it will link with the LCR at Vientiane Station, creating a continuous corridor from Kunming through Vientiane to Vung Ang and onward to Hanoi.
Environmental concerns have also surfaced. Sections of the railway will pass through Khammouane’s ecologically sensitive karst landscapes, including areas near Hin Nam No National Protected Area, designated Laos’ first natural UNESCO World Heritage site in July 2025. Environmental advocates have called for strict adherence to impact assessments and mitigation measures to safeguard fragile ecosystems.
Strategically, the project centers on access to the Vung Ang Economic Zone Port, where Laos has secured priority use of deep-water wharves capable of handling 100,000-ton vessels. Direct rail access is expected to reduce sea transit times from 7–10 days via Thai ports to just 1–2 days, potentially cutting logistics costs by 30–50%. Annual freight capacity is projected to exceed 20 million tons, focusing on hydropower equipment, potash, rubber, and rice exports.
Trade ties with Vietnam are already expanding. Bilateral trade reached USD 2.98 billion in 2025, a 32.7% year-on-year increase, making Vietnam Laos’ third-largest trading partner. High-level commitments were reaffirmed during a February 2026 visit by Vietnamese leaders to Vientiane, with both sides pledging coordinated completion by 2030. The railway will complement the 5th Lao–Thai Friendship Bridge, opened in December 2025, reinforcing a multimodal transport network linking Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Projections suggest the railway could boost Laos’ GDP by 10–15%, positioning the country as a key logistics hub in the Mekong subregion. However, realizing these gains will depend on careful fiscal management, credible environmental safeguards, and sustained cross-border coordination.
As Laos prepares to graduate from LDC status, the railway symbolizes a broader pivot—from aid dependency toward partnership-driven infrastructure development. Whether it becomes a transformative success will hinge on how effectively the country balances ambition with risk in the years ahead.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Rises in AI Readiness but Faces Talent and Infrastructure Gaps
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia is accelerating its push to position itself in the global race for artificial intelligence (AI). According to the 2025 Government AI Readiness Index, the country climbed to 118th place out of 195 countries, up from 145th the previous year. The improvement signals a strategic shift toward building stronger digital foundations, even as structural constraints in human capital and infrastructure continue to pose challenges.
Digital transformation is now embedded in Cambodia’s national development agenda. Under the government’s Pentagonal Strategy, “Technology” has been designated a fifth strategic priority to address the Fourth Industrial Revolution and support economic diversification. This ambition is reinforced by the Cambodia Digital Economy and Society Policy Framework 2021–2035, which aims to strengthen digital infrastructure and promote technology adoption across sectors. The Digital Government Policy 2022–2035 focuses on modernizing public administration, while the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications has announced plans for a National AI Strategy centered on workforce development, governance frameworks, and infrastructure expansion.
Concrete progress is visible in the development of digital public infrastructure. The Cambodia Data Exchange (CamDX) platform enables secure data sharing among government institutions. To address the linguistic complexity of the Khmer language, authorities have introduced AI-driven tools such as TranslateKH, Khmer ASR (speech-to-text), and Sarika. Regional initiatives like the SEA-LION project, which seeks to develop a Khmer-language large language model (LLM), aim to tackle the scarcity of local-language datasets necessary to train AI systems effectively.
Despite these advances, adoption remains constrained by a significant human capital gap. Only around 30 percent of the population is estimated to possess basic digital skills, and just 1 percent hold advanced IT capabilities. Low enrollment in STEM fields has resulted in a shortage of local developers and data scientists. At the same time, Cambodia continues to face brain drain, as skilled engineers and AI specialists are drawn to higher salaries in regional hubs such as Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia.
AI-driven automation also presents social risks. In the textile sector—one of Cambodia’s key industries—up to 88 percent of jobs are considered highly vulnerable to automation. Infrastructure constraints compound these concerns. Electricity costs, at approximately USD 0.14 per kilowatt-hour, remain higher than in neighboring markets. The country lacks high-capacity domestic data centers and affordable access to advanced semiconductor technologies. Data scarcity further limits AI development, as many institutions still rely on manual record-keeping, and the widespread preference for voice communication reduces the availability of usable text-based data.
Investment conditions present additional hurdles. Startup funding remains modest—around USD 16 million compared to Vietnam’s USD 400 million—while reputational concerns linked to cybercrime and online scam operations have dampened investor confidence.
Overall, Cambodia is steadily aligning itself with global AI trends. However, translating policy ambition into sustained impact will require bridging the digital literacy gap, strengthening domestic talent pipelines, improving infrastructure, and restoring investor trust. The country’s rise in international rankings marks meaningful progress—but the deeper transformation is still underway.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Junta Robs Honorary Doctorate From Historic University
by Mozart
Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has been awarded an honorary doctorate in Public Administration from the University of Yangon—an institution long regarded as the birthplace of the country’s major political movements, from the independence struggle to anti-dictatorship uprisings. The decision has been widely condemned by Myanmar’s academic community, particularly those involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), who view the award as a degradation of the university’s historic legacy.
After largely disappearing from public view following the recent election, Min Aung Hlaing re-emerged on February 5 as the recipient of the honorary degree at a special graduation ceremony. The award was conferred under the leadership of Dr. Chaw Chaw Sein, former Head of the Department of International Relations at the university and now the junta-appointed Minister of Education. She justified the decision as recognition of the junta leader’s “outstanding” leadership in managing political and economic challenges, promoting peace and national reconciliation, and successfully conducting a multi-party general election.
Her praise made no mention of the human rights violations widely attributed to junta forces—airstrikes on schools, killings of civilians, burning of villages, and the displacement of millions across the country. The ceremony also took place at a time when thousands of students and teachers have abandoned their studies in protest against the coup, with many fleeing abroad or working low-wage jobs in neighboring countries amid worsening conscription policies.
Alumni of the University of Yangon—including CDM-affiliated academics, the anti-junta interim university council, student organizations, and members of the public—have denounced the ceremony as a “black stain” on the institution’s proud history. Founded in 1920 as Rangoon University, the institution was once one of Southeast Asia’s leading academic centers before successive military regimes suppressed student activism and curtailed academic freedom. For many observers, the conferral of the degree represents a continuation of that politicization of higher education.
Student resistance groups have described the act as “dressing a hellhound in academic robes,” arguing that granting Min Aung Hlaing academic recognition amounts to militarizing education itself. While Myanmar’s military governments have long undermined the education sector, critics say honoring a leader accused internationally of crimes against humanity represents a profound distortion of academic integrity—turning a center of knowledge into a tool of authoritarian propaganda.
During the ceremony, Min Aung Hlaing stated that the award placed upon him a “greater responsibility” for the country’s future, signaling his continued political ambitions. He also compared himself to previous international recipients of honorary doctorates from the university, including Josip Broz Tito and Ho Chi Minh, attempting to frame himself as a globally recognized statesman.
For many in Myanmar, however, the episode reflects something else: a strategic effort to manufacture legitimacy by appropriating the symbolic authority of a historic institution. In doing so, critics argue, the junta has blurred the line between education and propaganda—reshaping a center of learning into a platform for consolidating power.
Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.
Editorial Deadline 13/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
