Vietnam on the Verge
Issue 35 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
This week in the Pacific Corridor: in Vietnam, the top story still remains the 14th National Party Congress. Held from 19 to 23 January 2026, it was a chance not only to look back at what was achieved during the term of the 13th National Party Congress, but also to look ahead to the future. With the Congress now concluded, as one term ends and another begins, Vietnam stands on the verge of change.
Over in the Philippines, embattled President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. found himself facing back-to-back impeachment complaints as 2026 began — but just two weeks into February, both complaints were dismissed just as quickly as they had been filed. Looking beyond the failed impeachment bid, however, tells us something about the nature of political power in the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia.
Singapore, too, looks to the rest of the region in its drug control strategy. A recent anti-drug operation, conducted in Batam by Singapore’s Central Narcotics Bureau with Indonesian agencies, is both revealing of the city-state’s strict policy, as well as of just how far its surveillance of its citizens and residents can reach beyond its own borders.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Looking Back and Looking Ahead After the 14th National Party Congress
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
Held from 19 to 23 January 2026 at the Vietnam National Convention Center in Hanoi, Vietnam’s National Party Congress marked the regular five-year convening of the Communist Party’s highest decision-making body. The 1, 586 esteemed delegates — 1,070 appointed, 353 elected, and 163 ex officio — gathered for five consecutive days with three main priorities, including electing the next 200 members for the next interim Central Committee, revising the performance and governance of the Resolution of the 13th National Party Congress, and defining future strategies for national development and governance for the 14th National Party Congress’s resolution.
The 13th National Party Congress’s term (2021–2025) is characterized by harsh global circumstances with more challenges than visible advantages for Vietnamese leaders, particularly with the COVID-19 global pandemic, severe disruptions in the global supply chain, rising inflation worldwide, and geopolitical conflicts. Amid the turbulent regional and global landscape, the leadership had to demonstrate tactful strategy, adaptive governance, and diplomatic agility, reaping overall positive achievements over the five-year period.
First, by 2025, Vietnam’s economic size exceeded US$514 billion, ranking 32nd globally, while the state budget revenue recorded a 34% increase at US$100.85 billion. Second, infrastructure construction surpassed initial targets, as a total of 3,345 kilometers of expressways and 1,700 kilometers of coastal roads were completed. Third, the government submitted 178 laws, resolutions, and ordinances — such as the Land Law, the Housing Law, and the Law on Real Estate Business — for National Assembly approval. Fourth, Hanoi invigorated diplomatic ties and strengthened its positionality in the international political arena. Within the five-year period, Vietnam upgraded to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership status with the Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, France, Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The ultimate hallmark of the 13th National Party Congress is the administrative restructuring and reorganizing of provincial units into a two-tier local administration model, aimed at increasing efficiency.
The 14th National Party Congress Resolution defines 12 development orientations and five key tasks for the following five-year period. For the 2026–2030 period, Vietnam sets ambitious economic, social, and environmental targets. Economically, it aims for at least 10% annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth, per capita GDP of about US$8,500 by 2030, stronger manufacturing and digital sectors (28% and 30% of GDP respectively), higher productivity and investment levels, and improved growth quality driven by total factor productivity. Socially, goals include an HDI of around 0.8, life expectancy of 75.5 years, a more skilled workforce (35–40% certified), steady poverty reduction, and ranking among the world’s top 40 happiest countries. Environmentally, the country targets stable forest coverage (42–43%), improved wastewater treatment (65–70%), and an 8–9% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Self-evaluation has articulated many strengths in political leadership, with the aim of demonstrating the unity and forward-oriented thinking of the Vietnamese Communist Party. However, this should not overshadow ongoing developmental challenges. The implementation of the 14th National Party Congress Resolution must not only renovate growth models to be up-to-date with the contemporary era of digital transformation, but also to consider those left behind.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
What the Impeachment Attempts Against the Philippine President Reveal About Power
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
In January and early February 2026, multiple impeachment complaints were filed against Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. These complaints cited allegations ranging from corruption to abuse of authority and betrayal of public trust. None ultimately succeeded: on 4 February, the House Committee on Justice reported that the complaints “lacked substance,” and the same committee on February 9 approved a formal recommendation to dismiss them.
That swift procedural trajectory — two complaints in less than a fortnight, then two dismissals in a week — signals something important about the state of elite politics and institutional checks in the Philippines. Impeachment is rare in Southeast Asia: in the Philippines’ own history since 1987, only three presidents have faced formal impeachment proceedings (Joseph Estrada in 2000–01, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2005–07, and Rodrigo Duterte in 2024–25), and only one — Estrada — was ousted. Marcos Jr.’s case did not even reach plenary debate, much less a Senate trial.
Under the 1987 Constitution, an impeachment complaint must garner at least one-third of the House’s 316 members (i.e., 106 signatures) before transmission to the Senate. The justice committee, a key gatekeeper, can determine whether allegations meet constitutional thresholds for “culpable violations” and “betrayal of public trust.” The 2026 complaints were terminated at this committee stage, highlighting not only legal challenges but political math: a legislature with strong executive allies rarely delivers the 106-member threshold needed to proceed.
Yet numbers tell a deeper story. The Philippines’ House of Representatives is among the most dynasty-dominated in Southeast Asia: data from the 19th Congress showed that roughly 70% to 80% of House members come from political families with multiple relatives in elective office. This structural reality shapes oversight dynamics and makes president-level impeachment inherently difficult.
Public sentiment, however, has diverged. Massive grassroots protests against corruption — including two nationwide actions in September and November 2025 — drew tens of thousands to the streets and spotlighted concerns about budgetary transparency. Although street turnout doesn’t directly translate into House votes, it reveals that governance issues are salient among the electorate. These protests did not call for immediate impeachment in congressional terms, but they underscored a sense of dissatisfaction that made impeachment filings visible, not fringe.
Across ASEAN, constitutional mechanisms for accountability exist on paper, yet their effectiveness often depends on political will and shifting alliances rather than law alone. The region shows a recurring pattern in which oversight institutions function in moments of weakened executive support, but stall when power coalitions remain intact. The Marcos Jr. impeachment saga reflects a broader ASEAN reality: institutions may be designed to check authority, but their activation is ultimately shaped by political alignment as much as by constitutional principle.
Impeachment may have failed on paper, but its filing was itself a signal. It revealed fractures within the ruling coalition, anxieties beneath the surface of stability, and a citizenry unwilling to remain silent. The Constitution provides the mechanism; the people provide the meaning.
The question now is not whether the complaints prospered. It is whether institutions designed to check power can ever move beyond arithmetic loyalty and rise to moral courage — because when oversight falters, history keeps its own ledger. And it records not just the votes cast in halls of power, but the silences that followed.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore’s Drug Strategy: Deterrence, Enforcement, and Cross-Border Reach
by Ryan
Singapore’s approach to drugs is built around a clear objective: keep drug consumption low by combining strict laws with active enforcement and rehabilitation. Two recent operations conducted by the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) illustrate how this policy is applied both domestically and beyond Singapore’s borders, through coordinated raids, targeted investigations, and legal tools that extend to Singaporeans who consume drugs overseas.
On 17 January 2026, Singapore’s CNB participated in an anti-drug operation in Batam alongside Indonesia’s National Narcotics Board (BNN) and other Indonesian agencies. Five Indonesians were arrested at a public entertainment outlet, and more than 100 people, including four Singaporeans, were checked in the operation. Singapore authorities framed the raid as part of broader efforts to disrupt cross-border drug activity and deter drug use by Singaporeans abroad. A key feature of Singapore’s policy is its extraterritorial reach for drug consumption. Under Section 8A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA), Singapore citizens and permanent residents who consume controlled drugs overseas can be dealt with as if the offense occurred in Singapore. This provision aims to deter individuals from consuming drugs overseas to avoid Singapore’s drug laws.
A second recent operation highlights CNB’s domestic posture. From 2 to 6 February 2026, CNB conducted an island-wide anti-drug operation resulting in 99 arrests and the seizure of drugs valued at over SGD 38,000. The seizures included cannabis, heroin, methamphetamine (Ice), and ketamine, as well as vape-related products. CNB also seized 75 e-vaporizer pods believed to contain etomidate. Areas covered included Ang Mo Kio, Choa Chu Kang, Jurong, Marine Parade, Marsiling, and Sembawang. The reference to suspected etomidate-laced vaping products points to a broader shift in the drug landscape. Enforcement increasingly has to address new consumption channels, particularly where controlled substances are mixed into products that can be distributed and used with less visibility than traditional drugs.
Taken together, these cases show how Singapore deals with drugs in practice through three mutually reinforcing levers. First, deterrence is achieved through strict laws and clear signaling that drug use carries serious consequences, including for consumption overseas. Second, enforcement is operationally intensive and intelligence-led, combining multi-location raids in Singapore with cross-border collaboration to disrupt networks and deter repeat activity. Third, rehabilitation and prevention remain part of the broader policy mix, intended to reduce demand and recidivism, even though enforcement actions are typically the most visible element in public reporting.
Within Southeast Asia, Singapore’s strategy also sits against a regional backdrop where drug policy varies significantly, and these differences create cross-border incentives that enforcement agencies must manage. Indonesia maintains a hard-line stance and treats drug trafficking as a major security issue, which makes bilateral cooperation operationally relevant for maritime border areas where nightlife-linked consumption and trafficking routes can intersect. Thailand’s cannabis policy has been more fluid in recent years, with periods of liberalization followed by moves toward tighter controls, which can shift regional travel patterns and perceptions of risk. Malaysia has moved toward greater sentencing discretion for serious crimes, including drug-related offenses, signaling a different balance between deterrence and judicial flexibility. The Philippines continues anti-drug operations under a revised political framing, highlighting another model where enforcement remains central but debates persist over methods and effectiveness. In this context, Singapore’s combination of strict deterrence, frequent enforcement operations, and cross-border coordination can be read as a response to regional policy divergence, aiming to reduce both supply inflows and the incentive for residents to seek perceived “loopholes” elsewhere in the region.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Editorial Deadline 10/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
I really enjoy these summaries :)