Will The Bamboo Bend?
Issue 35 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
As 2026 gathers momentum, the Mekong Belt is moving through a season of political renewal, with governments across the region heading into—or emerging from—elections that are quietly testing old rules, alliances, and assumptions. In Thailand, “bamboo diplomacy” faces its sharpest stress test yet, as a billion-dollar invitation to Trump’s Board of Peace forces Bangkok to weigh neutrality against access in a pay-to-play global order right ahead of parliamentary elections. In Myanmar, the junta’s rushed creation of a Union Consultative Council shows how elections are being paired with new legal tools to lock in military control, confirming existing doubts on the elections’ function. Meanwhile, Lao PDR’s upcoming elections, while politically predictable, carry outsized weight as the country prepares to graduate from LDC status, testing whether institutional continuity can deliver inclusive development. Finally, in Cambodia, Phnom Penh looks inward and outward at once, betting on trade corridors and trilateral integration with Vietnam and Laos as a steadier path to growth amid unresolved regional tensions.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Can Thailand’s Bamboo Still Bend in a Pay-to-Play World?
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
For decades, Thailand’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’ has allowed the country to bend with the geopolitical winds without ever breaking. However, on January 19, 2026, Thailand received a letter inviting Thailand to take a seat on the newly minted US-led Board of Peace (BoP). In preparation for the February 8 general election, Thailand is thus facing a billion-dollar question: is this an opportunity to lead on the global stage, or a transactional trap that threatens its century-old foreign policy of neutrality. Its decision will signal whether the ‘bamboo’ is finally choosing a side in a world increasingly defined by pay-to-play diplomacy, instated by the Trump administration.
The invitation to Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s caretaker government includes a USD 1 billion USD price tag for permanent membership and a charter that installs Trump as Chairman for Life. The Board of Peace is designed to serve as the administrative backbone of Trump’s 20-point “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” signaling a radical move from UN-led multilateralism in international security and peace. By overseeing the National Committee for the Administrative of Gaza (NCAG), the BoP effectively replaces traditional UN humanitarian efforts with a transactional “investment club” model, offering lucrative reconstruction contracts in exchange for significant financial buy-in.
For a country seeking to escape the “middle-income trap,” the BoP is presented as a high-yield gateway. Membership could grant Thai conglomerates in construction, logistics, and hospitality early access to the multi-billion-dollar Gaza Reconstruction Fund. Politically, participation would also deepen the Thai-US alliance. Amid intensifying US-China decoupling, a billion-dollar commitment to a Trump-led initiative could function as strategic insurance, strengthening trade and defense ties while elevating Thailand’s diplomatic profile.
However, the pay-to-play model also poses a staggering fiscal burden. The entry fee, estimated at around 31 billion baht, represents a heavy fiscal burden at a time of sluggish economic growth. More fundamentally, the BoP risks undermining UN-based multilateralism. For smaller states like Thailand, international law and multilateral institutions have long served as safeguards against power asymmetries. Bypassing the UN Security Council challenges the very international law that protects smaller nations like Thailand. Moreover, aligning too closely with a Trump-centric initiative also risks straining relations with China, Thailand’s largest trading partner, and with other Global South countries that view the BoP as an instrument of Western or US hegemony.
Thailand’s choice, however, need not be a simple “yes” or “no.” A third option may lie in pursuing observer or limited membership status, allowing Bangkok to monitor developments without absorbing the full financial shock. By advocating a coordinated ASEAN approach, Thailand could preserve its neutrality while engaging as part of a regional bloc rather than as an individual investor, reinforcing ASEAN’s collective voice in global peace initiatives.
With the February 8 election now concluded, the decision has shifted from a caretaker’s desk to the first major decision for the incoming government. The new administration must now decide if the bamboo will continue to bend, or if it is finally time to take a stand in a world where peace carries a billion-dollar price tag.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
The Lesson The Junta Learned from the Civilian Government
by Mozart
As Myanmar’s junta moves toward convening a new parliament following the final phase of its three-stage election, it has rushed through a new order-like piece of legislation establishing a five-member Union Consultative Council. Enacted by the junta’s National Defence and Security Council, the move has triggered renewed debate over how the military intends to manage power, authority, and governance under a nominally civilian framework.
Shortly after completing the planned three-phase election, the junta enacted the Union Consultative Council Law, broadly framing its objectives as strengthening democracy, federalism, peace, and food security. The law would allow junta leader Min Aung Hlaing to retain a position above—or closely parallel to—the presidency while maintaining decisive control over the military. The move echoes the timing of the 2016 State Counsellor Law passed under the National League for Democracy (NLD), though with fundamentally different political intent.
In 2016, the NLD introduced the State Counsellor Law to allow Aung San Suu Kyi to assume a prime minister-like role after the 2008 Constitution barred her from becoming president. While both laws sought to work around constitutional constraints, the comparison highlights a key contrast: the State Counsellor Law was passed through an elected legislature despite strong opposition from military MPs, who argued it was unconstitutional. By contrast, the Union Consultative Council Law has been enacted by a single ruling body under military rule.
Critics argue that the newly created council will function as a “super body,” overseeing all branches of government—including the executive, legislature, judiciary, and the military itself. When combined with the military’s guaranteed 25% of parliamentary seats, its control over the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs, the dominance of the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the new parliament, and the existence of independent courts-martial under the commander-in-chief, the council would further entrench the junta’s power and leave little space for opposition.
Under the law, the council’s term will mirror that of the president, who is required to form the body and appoint its chair and secretary. Regardless of who assumes the presidency—likely from the USDP—the arrangement signals a strategic effort by the military to sustain long-term political control. Ironically, the creation of the council may also weaken the role of the Constitutional Tribunal, an institution already widely viewed as ineffective during the decade of quasi-civilian rule between 2011 and 2020.
Although ASEAN does not recognize the junta’s election, the council appears designed to push regional actors—including China and India—toward recognizing a nominally civilian government, alongside continued endorsement from Russia. Compared to the State Counsellor Law, which aimed to enable governance within constitutional limits, the junta’s Union Consultative Council represents a calculated maneuver within the constitutional framework to preserve military dominance.
Regardless of who sits on the council, the military’s trajectory—marked by escalating violence and systematic abuses—remains unaccountable. The law ultimately reinforces a political system in which power is concentrated, insulated, and removed from meaningful civilian oversight.
Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Why Lao PDR’s 2026 Elections Matter Beyond the Ballot
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
When Lao PDR holds parliamentary elections on February 22, 2026, voters will select members of the 10th National Assembly, an expanded legislature now comprising 175 seats. While the elections take place within the country’s one-party political system, they remain a significant institutional moment, renewing legislative mandates and aligning the Assembly with the broader five-year political and development cycle. Ongoing preparations—from candidate finalization to election-day logistics—highlight how the process reinforces institutional continuity and state functionality.
Elections in Lao PDR occur within a structured political environment where strategic direction is set before voting, a feature reinforced by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) National Congress held just weeks earlier. The Congress defines leadership appointments and policy priorities for the next five years, shaping the framework within which the National Assembly operates. As a result, the Assembly’s primary role lies in implementation rather than political contestation—an institutional design that prioritizes stability and continuity.
What makes the 2026 elections particularly significant is their timing. The upcoming parliamentary term will coincide with Lao PDR’s planned graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status, a milestone that will reshape access to international aid, concessional finance, and trade preferences. Recent constitutional and institutional reforms adopted between 2024 and 2025 further heighten the importance of effective legislative oversight during this transition.
Newly elected parliamentarians will have a central role in navigating this moment. They are responsible for approving the government cabinet, debating and passing legislation, and overseeing implementation of the 2026-2030 National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP), a key policy instrument setting targets for economic transformation, social protection, and international integration. How they shape laws on investment, public finance, trade, and social policy will directly influence the inclusiveness of the development trajectory.
Ensuring the inclusivity during this period is essential. Economic transition after LDC graduation may unevenly affect communities, making it crucial for parliamentarians to uphold principles of equitable participation and representation. International governance and human rights standards emphasize meaningful public participation and parliamentary oversight as core components of accountable and sustainable development.
Regional dynamics further underscore the significance of the elections. ASEAN prioritizes stability, predictability, and non-interference, principles that shape cooperation frameworks in trade, connectivity, digital transformation, and social development. A smooth institutional transition in Lao PDR would support ASEAN cohesion and strengthens the country’s ability to implement regional initiatives as it deepens engagement beyond LDC status.
Ultimately, the 2026 elections matter not because they will alter political leadership, but because they will shape how Lao PDR navigates a pivotal development transition. The next five years will test whether political stability can be translated into inclusive growth, stronger governance, and effective regional integration. In this sense, the elections matter far beyond the ballot box.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Pushes Trilateral Trade with Vietnam and Laos
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
In a strategic move aimed at stimulating deeper regional economic integration, Cambodia has unveiled a plan to develop trade milestones, aiming to make bilateral trade with Vietnam reach USD 20 billion and that with Laos to reach USD 700 million.
The proposal was outlined during a trilateral summit held in Phnom Penh on February 6–7, where Hun Manet acknowledged steady progress in economic cooperation among the three countries and presented proposals to further expand trade, including reaching USD 700 million in trade with Laos by 2030 and USD 20 billion with Vietnam in the coming years.
According to Cambodia’s General Department of Customs and Excise (GDCE), bilateral trade between Cambodia and Vietnam reached USD 7.79 billion in 2025, placing Vietnam among Cambodia’s top 20 trading partners. Trade with Laos, however, remains more limited and has yet to reach comparable levels.
Hun Manet encouraged the three governments to strengthen people-to-people exchanges and deepen connectivity across multiple sectors, including infrastructure, transport, energy, tourism, and cultural cooperation. He also called on technical teams to accelerate work on key cross-border infrastructure projects, particularly the Phnom Penh–Bavet Expressway and its planned linkage with Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh–Moc Bai Expressway.
In response, Prime Ministers Sonexay Siphandone and Pham Minh Chinh expressed readiness to further promote investment in Cambodia and reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing regional connectivity. The leaders agreed to continue cooperation in areas such as transportation, electricity, education, and skills training, while promoting tourism under the “Three Countries, One Destination” framework.
Prior to the summit, an analyst expressed hope that trilateral talks with Vietnam and Laos could help mitigate the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute. Political researcher Pa Chanroeun noted that ongoing friction with Thailand poses risks to Cambodia’s sovereignty and could undermine economic and cultural development. He argued that deeper coordination with fellow ASEAN members like Vietnam and Laos is a crucial step toward de-escalating the situation. However, as seen in the result from the talks, there have been no points that talked about the conflict.
In conclusion, Cambodia wants to grow its economy by trading more with Vietnam and Laos. By building new high-speed roads and focusing on business instead of border arguments with Thailand, the three countries hope to get richer together through tourism and trade.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Editorial Deadline 06/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
