Fascinating analysis of Malaysia's semiconductor dilema! The mini-Taipei in Arizona detail really drives home how artificial the homeshoring push is - you can't just clone TSMC's institutional knowledge overnight. What really struck me was your point about the OSAT carve-out leverage - you're absolutly right that back-end processes are so cost and scale sensitive that forcing them stateside would be self-defeating. The C+1 bubble popping scenario is sobering, but I wonder if Malaysia's 65% US firm exposure might actually insulate it more than Vietnam which has heavier Chinese concentraton? Also the EU's 15% cap deal sets an interesting precedent - Malaysia could argue that disrupting its OSAT ecosystem would create more supply chain chaos than it prevents. The bargaining chip here is data-driven as you said - showing Washington exactly which critical packaging/testing nodes can't be easily replicated. Great piece on an under-covered angle of the semiconductor trade war!
Fascinating analysis of Malaysia's semiconductor dilema! The mini-Taipei in Arizona detail really drives home how artificial the homeshoring push is - you can't just clone TSMC's institutional knowledge overnight. What really struck me was your point about the OSAT carve-out leverage - you're absolutly right that back-end processes are so cost and scale sensitive that forcing them stateside would be self-defeating. The C+1 bubble popping scenario is sobering, but I wonder if Malaysia's 65% US firm exposure might actually insulate it more than Vietnam which has heavier Chinese concentraton? Also the EU's 15% cap deal sets an interesting precedent - Malaysia could argue that disrupting its OSAT ecosystem would create more supply chain chaos than it prevents. The bargaining chip here is data-driven as you said - showing Washington exactly which critical packaging/testing nodes can't be easily replicated. Great piece on an under-covered angle of the semiconductor trade war!