Thailand Turns to Anutin After Shinawatra’s Fall
Issue 14 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Winds of change are blowing on the nations of the Mekong Belt, and this issue of the Frontier Brief is looking to explore where these shifting currents are steering the region’s boats. In Thailand, our special coverage examines the interventionist nature of the Constitutional Court and whether Anutin Charnvirakul, Thailand’s third prime minister in just two years, can deliver the stability his predecessors failed to secure. Across the border, in Cambodia, the parallel diplomatic ventures of Hun Sen and Hun Manet revive questions about Phnom Penh’s reliance on China and Vietnam amid simmering tensions with Thailand, testing ASEAN’s centrality. Meanwhile, Myanmar refugees see a glimmer of hope after a Thai policy shift that opens limited work opportunities for those long confined to border camps. Despite limitations linked to registration rules and heavy bureaucracy that risk leaving many behind, the shift represents an important first step toward better living conditions for Myanmar refugees. Lastly, in Laos, Vientiane’s first BRT line signals a push to modernize urban mobility and ease chronic congestion—small steps that could reshape how the capital moves and grows.
Special Coverage
Thailand 🇹🇭
A Special Analysis Piece by TAF’s Thailand Desk on the Country’s Political Turmoil
Three Prime Ministers in Two Years: Can Anutin Bring Stability to Thai Politics?
by Natamon Aumphin, Paranut Juntree & Nabil Haskanbancha, in Bangkok
Thailand once again stands at a political crossroad. The Constitutional Court’s (CC) removal of PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, following in the footsteps of both her father and aunt, has revived long-running doubts about the court’s authority and its impact on elected governments. In just two years, the country has cycled through three prime ministers, deepening public unease about the health of Thai democracy. Into this climate of uncertainty has stepped Anutin Charnvirakul, sworn in on September 5th as the country’s 32nd leader. His immediate challenge is to steady the government, hold together fragile coalitions, and respond to the People Party’s demands for constitutional reform. How Anutin manages this moment will shape not only his personal legacy but also public confidence in Thailand’s institutions.
The Closing Chapter of Paetongtarn’s Leadership
History has repeated itself once again in Thailand. Another Shinawatra prime minister, this time Paetongtarn from the Pheu Thai Party, was forced from office by the Constitutional Court (CC) on August 29, 2025, echoing the fates of her father, Thaksin and aunt Yingluck before her. The charge was a leaked phone call with Cambodian President Hun Sen during a tense border conflict. The consequence, once again, is political paralysis. On September 5, 2025, Anutin Charnvirakul rose to the premiership, tasked with steering the country through this period of turmoil. Thailand has now seen three prime ministers in only two years, with the CC notoriously implicated in the downfall of several leaders. As the parliament is dissolving and political alliances fracture, the episode has reopened Thailand’s political scars, revealing once more how the CC can tip the balance of democracy itself.
The controversy that ignited the chain of events started when Paetongtarn had held a private 17-minute call with Hun Sen, discussing the escalating border tensions. During that call, Paetongtarn was heard appeasing Hun Sen, referring to him as “uncle”. More troubling, Paetongtarn criticized Thai military commander General Boonsin Padklang, portraying the military as being on the “opposite side.” To many in Thailand, the remarks struck at national pride and suggested undue personal familiarity. Three days later, Hun Sen is claimed to have leaked a full recording of the call online, igniting a political firestorm. Pheu Thai Party’s major partner, Bhumjaithai Party, quickly pulled its support from the government coalition. Protests against Paetongtarn erupted, and opposition parties quickly seized on the scandal to demand her removal. The Constitutional Court eventually ruled 6-3, dismissing Paetongtarn Shinawatra from office for ethics violations. The Constitutional Court argued that her reliance on family ties compromised the dignity of the premiership and potentially weakened Thailand’s position by allowing Cambodia to interfere in domestic affairs.
Paetongtarn’s removal revived familiar narratives from the Shinawatra family’s polarizing history, their connections with Cambodia, and their recurring clashes with Thailand’s conservative elite. Her father, Thaksin Shinawatra, rose as a populist prime minister in 2001, expanding welfare programs before being ousted in the 2006 coup. Her aunt, Yingluck Shinawatra, suffered a similar fate when she was removed by the Constitutional Court in 2014 over the unlawful transfer of a senior military official, coupled with negative public perception of her rice pledging scheme. Her removal was also followed by a coup. Their personal ties with Cambodia further fueled the recent controversy. Thaksin kept close ties with Hun Sen as prime minister and later served as Cambodia’s economic advisor after his ouster. Against this backdrop, Paetongtarn’s leaked phone call to Hun Sen during border tensions revived old public suspicions of divided loyalties, making it politically explosive.
Yet despite the heavy political baggage, Paetongtarn sought to present herself as a reformist leader. Since Settha’s removal, she continued Pheu Thai’s THB10,000 digital wallet scheme, despite doubts over its effectiveness. She also secured the THB3.78 trillion 2026 budget, expanded the 30-baht healthcare scheme to 76 provinces, welcomed marriage equality legislation–the first in Southeast Asia–and promoted cultural diplomacy by steering the new National Soft Power Committee to boost Thailand’s creative industries. However, her removal destabilized the government coalition, plunging parliament into gridlock and leaving it facing dissolution without a clear leader.
A Constitutional Court That Shapes Thailand’s Political Destiny
This outcome highlighted once more the decisive hand of the Constitutional Court. The CC, according to increasing voices, has moved well beyond its original purpose as a neutral arbiter of law. In fact, the institution has become a part of political actors, as its decision to rule presidents changes the spectrum of Thai politics. The Shinawatra family was not the only one to suffer from the CC’s jurisdiction; over the past two decades, numerous politicians and political parties have faced similar circumstances, often despite unproven allegations of wrongdoing.
In principle, the CC was established to check and balance certain political disputes. Generally, its scope of power is two-fold: to prevent conflicts between legislation and the constitution, and to settle constitutional disputes, including questions of qualification to hold political office and overlapping duties among governmental bodies. Nonetheless, because there is no higher authority above the CC, accountability must ultimately come from the people through their representatives in parliament to ensure transparency and responsibility.
The intervention of the court is far from new in Thai politics. The CC has become a political tool for conservative groups to maintain their power, rather than as an institution to reinforce checks and balances in a democratic system. In political disputes, the court often rules arbitrarily, relying on moral grounds such as labelling actions “unpatriotic” or “unrighteous,” rather than basing its judgments on concrete evidence. This leads to an increase in negative sentiments among ordinary Thais over the arbitrary manner of the court. According to Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University, the court’s arbitrary jurisdiction could jeopardize democratic progress and erode public trust in democracy among Thai citizens.
Negative sentiment reached a peak when the court ordered the dissolution of the Move Forward Party in 2024, despite its election victory, ruling that its campaign to amend the lese-majeste law was unconstitutional. The court also revoked Pita Limjarownrat’s political rights for ten years on the grounds that he held shares in a defunct media company. Similarly, Paetongtarn’s phone call remarks were judged as unethical by the CC.
The ruling was seen as a political tool to preserve conservative power due to the judges being chosen from what is known as the upper house- a non-elected entity in Thailand’s parliament, selected by the military junta group that committed the coup d'état in 2014. The court decisions were infamous due to judging in favor of conservative interests while having a high tendency to go against reformist politicians.
Anutin’s Rise to Premiership
This judicial intervention left Thailand once again searching for stability. As of September 5, 2025, the political vacuum was filled when Anutin Charnvirakul of the Bhumjaithai Party emerged as the country’s new prime minister, reshaping the political landscape. His arrival marked a shift, not through broad consensus but through compromise, a fragile deal to keep the system moving after Paetongtarn’s abrupt removal. He will likely serve only four months before new elections, yet the coming weeks matter.
As a veteran politician who began his career with Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party in the early 2000s, Anutin previously held various high-ranking political positions. He emerged as the leader of the Bhumjaithai Party in 2012 and steadily rose in influence. When he served as the Public Health Minister, he oversaw Thailand’s COVID-19 response and pushed for cannabis decriminalization in 2022, a policy that remains closely tied to his legacy. He later served as interior minister under Paetongtarn’s administration before becoming Prime Minister on September 5, 2025.
Anutin clinched his majority parliamentary votes by drawing support from the progressive People's Party. The People’s Party’s backing of Anutin marks a clear break from the usual coalition bargaining, but their support is far from unconditional. They have insisted on strict terms, the most important being the dissolution of parliament within four months. This would limit Anutin to a caretaker role, with his main duty to call early elections.
Despite his new role as a “neutral” caretaker, Anutin is hardly an outsider. His Bhumjaithai Party is seen as part of Thailand’s conservative backbone, aligned with the military and loyal to the monarchy. That reputation reassures traditional elites wary of sudden political change. At the same time, it puts him at odds with reformist voices who see his leadership as a pause button, not a fresh start. To many voters, he is less the face of change than a manager of continuity.
Thailand has cycled through three prime ministers in two years, each one leaving behind more turbulence than stability. Anutin must prove he can keep his coalition partners together while addressing immediate crises. The situation in Cambodia is one: political struggles across the border threaten to spill into trade and migration flows. At home, he faces mounting public fatigue with endless reshuffles and legal battles. Whether Anutin succeeds or simply buys time for the next election, his brief tenure will shape how Thais view the future. Stability may be the minimum standard, but in a country long caught between reform and reaction, even that is no small task.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Hun Family Diplomacy Raises Questions on Cambodia’s agency vis-a-vis China and Vietnam
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Since late August, Cambodia’s top leaders have been increasingly involved on the diplomatic stage, particularly Prime Minister Hun Manet and Senate President Hun Sen. The father-and-son duo has been particularly visible amid rising tensions with Thailand over their disputed border, engaging both regionally and internationally within a single week. Yet, concerns remain that Cambodia’s agency could again be overshadowed by Chinese and Vietnamese influence, an issue analysts warn may undermine ASEAN’s centrality, with Cambodia increasingly viewed through the lens of Beijing and Hanoi.
On August 30, 2025, Prime Minister Hun Manet traveled to Tianjin, China, to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where Cambodia has held dialogue-partner status for more than a decade. In his remarks, Hun Manet welcomed the SCO’s role in promoting multilateralism, regional security, and sustainable development, and signaled Cambodia’s support for China’s newly announced Global Governance Initiative (GGI).
During his visit, Hun Manet met leaders from six countries, including China, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Nepal, and India. In particular, his talks with President Xi Jinping and Wang Huning, a top Chinese Communist Party official, reinforced Beijing’s pledge to deepen cooperation with Cambodia under the “Diamond Hexagon” framework agreed in early 2023.
Meanwhile, Hun Sen visited Vietnam from September 1–2 to attend ceremonies marking the 80th anniversary of the August Revolution and Vietnam’s National Independence Day. During his visit, Hun Sen met with General Secretary To Lam, as well as Vietnam’s National Assembly Chairman and Prime Minister—leaders his son had also encountered in China just days earlier during the SCO summit. Both sides pledged to deepen cooperation, particularly between the two governments and ruling parties.
Before his trip to Hanoi, Hun Sen also hosted Myanmar opposition leader U Khin Yi of the Union Solidarity and Development Party, with whom the Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) signed memorandums of understanding to enhance party-to-party cooperation. Upon returning from Vietnam, Hun Sen met with U.S. Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Bridgette L. Walker, expressing gratitude to U.S. President Donald Trump for helping initiate a ceasefire between Cambodia and Thailand, and discussing ways to strengthen bilateral ties.
Still, public concerns have surfaced over whether Cambodia’s leaders are quietly negotiating with China and Vietnam amid the current border tensions with Thailand. Ear Sophal, an associate professor at Arizona State University’s Thunderbird School of Global Management, told The ASEAN Frontier (TAF) that Chinese and Vietnamese influence over Cambodia is “undeniable,” shaped by both geography and history. He noted that China has been Cambodia’s leading economic partner for more than two decades, while Vietnam maintains a steady diplomatic presence.
He argued that Hun Manet and Hun Sen’s respective visits reflect a calculated division of labor within the family. “This is the Cambodian People’s Party’s long-term strategy: to rely on China as an economic and political partner, while treating Vietnam as a critical regional security partner,” he said. Such a strategy, he warned, offers Cambodia leverage as a small state during tensions with Thailand, but risks deepening ASEAN divisions and casting doubt on Phnom Penh’s neutrality, thereby undermining ASEAN centrality.
Government officials, however, strongly rejected such criticisms. Pen Bona, spokesman for the Cambodian government, told TAF that the visits by Hun Manet and Hun Sen were “fully public and transparent,” denying any suggestion of secret negotiations. He also stressed that “Cambodia adheres to the principles of neutrality, non-alignment, and peaceful coexistence with all nations, in line with the constitution, which prohibits the country from joining or opposing any bloc.”
Similarly, Chea Thyrith, a Cambodian People’s Party spokesman and personal assistant to Hun Sen, told TAF that Hun Sen’s trip to Vietnam was meant solely to strengthen ties with a neighboring country. He dismissed the idea that Vietnam influences Cambodian politics as a decades-old narrative fueled by extremist opposition groups. “Samdech Hun Sen is not a puppet of Vietnam or any other country. He is a Cambodian,” he said.
Amid these rumors of back-channel negotiations, it is still unclear whether Cambodia’s strategy will manage to strengthen the country’s posture in a tense regional environment or end up entrenching perceptions of dependency, with potential repercussions on ASEAN’s cohesion in the years ahead.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
New Work Permits Bring Hope to Myanmar Refugees After Aid Cuts
by Mattia Peroni
On August 26, Thailand’s cabinet approved a resolution allowing Myanmar refugees living in camps along the border to apply for work permits. Through this measure, refugees granted permission will be allowed to work for up to one year in sectors not restricted to foreigners, such as services, retail, and manufacturing. Considering that nearly half of the 108,000 refugees residing in the camps were born there and never allowed to leave, for many, the measure represents the first real chance to land formal employment and a stable source of income.
The new policy offers an unexpected relief for Myanmar refugees, whose situation has become increasingly precarious over the past year. For decades, the Thai government has blocked refugees from working legally, moving freely, or accessing public services, leaving their survival heavily dependent on foreign aid. This vulnerability became ever so critical this year due to the drastic cuts to U.S. aid funding, which reduced the monthly allowance for Burmese refugees to just US$2.30 per adult, leaving many families struggling to meet basic needs. With Human Rights Watch reporting that many refugees had expressed a strong desire to work if given the opportunity, the Thai government’s policy can be seen as finally granting that wish.
While UNHCR Thailand’s Representative Tammi Sharpe described the measure as a “turning point,” its scope remains limited. In fact, only refugees already registered with the Thai government—around 80,000 people—are eligible for the newly introduced work permits, and when factoring in age and other requirements, the number of potential beneficiaries shrinks to roughly 42,000 working-age individuals.
Moreover, concerns remain about the limiting effects of bureaucracy associated with the policy. To qualify, applicants must first secure health insurance and a valid permit allowing them to leave their designated shelters. In this context, while waiving permit fees for first-time applicants is intended to ease the financial burden, the heavy documentation requirements still risk excluding many refugees who lack the means to navigate the process.
Despite these limitations, the policy marks an important step toward improving the lives of Myanmar refugees, giving them not only access to a source of income but also the chance to build self-reliance and dignity. Moreover, the measure is also expected to have a positive effect on Thailand’s domestic economy, potentially alleviating the country’s labour shortages in crucial sectors such as retail and manufacturing.
Ultimately, Thailand’s decision to grant work permits to Myanmar refugees should be seen as a first step toward improving the lives of thousands confined to border camps. Still, their struggles extend far beyond a lack of financial means. In this context, although the newly introduced policy is a step in the right direction, lasting progress will require policies that address broader rights, such as freedom of movement and access to essential services.
Mattia has a background in international politics with a regional specialization in Asian affairs. He currently serves as a Junior Analyst for the Asia/Oceania desk at the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI), where he focuses on conflict dynamics, maritime security, and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. His work is shaped by a strong interest in security studies and regional geopolitics, with a particular focus on Myanmar’s political crisis, ethnic dynamics, and its implications for regional stability.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Launches Its First Electric BRT
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
In recent weeks, Vientiane’s main roads have been busy. Workers are finishing new stations and painting the central lanes blue. All of this is to prepare for the capital’s first bus rapid transit (BRT) line, which will begin trials this month offering three months of free rides for passengers.
The BRT marks a significant change in Vientiane’s cityscape. For decades, the city’s streets have been dominated by motorbikes, private cars, and tuk-tuks. Although there have been some occasional donations of green minibuses from Japan, these vehicles only operate on limited routes and schedules.
The first phase of the BRT will cover about 12 kilometers with 27 stations, served by an electric fleet. This project is supported by the Asian Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the Global Environment Facility, and the OPEC Fund. A second phase is planned to extend the route to Wattay Airport and the Lao-China Railway Station, aiming to ease travel for tourists.
With the BRT, students and workers who don’t drive may finally have an alternative to expensive taxis or tuk-tuks. The project fits well into Laos’ green transition agenda. The 2022-23 fuel crisis, when foreign exchange shortages left petrol stations empty, remains a vivid reminder of the risks of oil dependence. Also, with lower EV costs driven by China’s surplus, many drivers have already started switching to electric cars, creating an opportunity for Laos to transition to eco-friendly options.
But doubts remain among the locals. As the buses run in the middle of the road, passengers are forced to cross heavy traffic to commute between the station and the sidewalk. Without proper pedestrian crossings, safety remains a concern. Meanwhile, congestion during rush hours has increased as lanes for other vehicles have been narrowed.
Furthermore, the limited route leaves many residential neighborhoods unserved, and persuading commuters to shift from their long-established reliance on motorbikes and private cars to public transport will take time. Hence, the BRT’s long-term success remains to be seen.
Across the region, Phnom Penh’s donor-funded bus network remains underused, while Hanoi and Bangkok are pushing ahead with large electric fleets. Vientiane’s trial will show whether Laos can carve its own path, or whether these new yellow e-buses will run half empty.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Editorial Deadline 05/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
