Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week, we look past the facades. In Myanmar, the military has traded uniforms for suits, lifting the state of emergency to make way for elections already stacked in its favor. However, behind the civilian mask lies the same grip on power, rebranded for international consumption. In northern Laos, the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone still markets itself as a shimmering investment haven, but beneath the palm-lined boulevards lies one of Southeast Asia’s most entrenched hubs of organized crime, cyberfraud, and drug trafficking. Meanwhile, on the Cambodian-Thai border, a ceasefire agreement is being hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough. But behind the headlines, regional order is far from restored as nationalist backlash continues to surge: in Thailand, Cambodian and even Burmese migrants now face rising xenophobia in the conflict’s shadow, revealing that violence doesn’t always stop when the guns do.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
New Government, Same Old Junta: Myanmar’s Military Rebrands Without Letting Go
by Mattia Peroni
As of Thursday, July 31, Myanmar is officially under a new “Union Government.” But for anyone hoping this could signal a democratic opening, reality is far less encouraging, as the move brings absolutely no change to the status quo in Myanmar. In fact, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing will retain control over all key levers of power, merely exchanging his military title of Senior General for the more civilian-sounding role of “acting president.”
This move comes as part of a bigger transition that sees Myanmar out of a state of emergency for the first time since the coup in 2021. Beyond a rhetorical shift toward what resembles a civilian government, the transition does not signal any real move away from military rule. On the contrary, the junta’s move is primarily aimed at laying the groundwork for elections planned for December, widely viewed by analysts and opposition figures as a calculated bid to manufacture legitimacy rather than restore democracy.
The elections are expected to be tightly controlled and heavily restricted, prompting many opposition parties to boycott and leaving little chance for genuine political change. So, why is the junta going to such lengths to stage an election they are virtually guaranteed to win?
Beyond the performative attempt to appear “legitimate” to the public and the international community, the real reason lies in Myanmar’s constitution, under which, elections cannot be held while a state of emergency is in place.
It is thus clear that despite lifting the state of emergency and forming an “interim government,” Myanmar is not actually on the path to a political renaissance. In practice, the same figures remain in power, and the repressive mechanisms of their rule remain unchanged.
The move has faced widespread criticism. Human rights lawyer U Kyee Myint, now in hiding within Myanmar, described it as “handing power from the left hand to the right.” Similarly, independent analyst David Mathieson noted that “they are just rearranging the same pieces and calling the regime a new name.”
Despite public scepticism, the December elections represent Min Aung Hlaing’s most concrete opportunity in years to claim an ounce of legitimacy — and potentially persuade some countries to normalize relations with the military-led government. A glimmer of hope emerged for the regime in July, when U.S. President Donald Trump first addressed a letter on tariff adjustments directly to the supposedly unrecognized junta, and later lifted sanctions on several junta-linked businessmen.
While not an outright endorsement, the gesture signals a noticeably softer stance — one that could offer a diplomatic window at a critical moment. With Myanmar holding vast reserves of rare earth minerals critical to global supply chains, the United States may be tempted to recalibrate their stance in pursuit of strategic resource access. As China currently controls around 90% of the world's rare earth processing, securing access to Myanmar’s resources could represent a key step in reducing U.S. dependency on Beijing — a strategy that may ultimately outweigh Washington's stated vision of a democratic future for Myanmar.
Mattia has a background in international politics with a regional specialization in Asian affairs. He currently serves as a Junior Analyst for the Asia/Oceania desk at the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI), where he focuses on conflict dynamics, maritime security, and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. His work reflects a strong interest in security studies and regional geopolitics, with a particular focus on Myanmar’s political crisis, ethnic dynamics, and its implications for regional stability.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Inside Laos’ Golden Triangle SEZ: From Investment Dream to Drugs and Criminal Empire
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Bokeo Province in northern Laos has become a flashpoint in the region’s fight against transnational organized crime, where record-breaking drug seizures and entrenched cyberfraud operations converge inside the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ).
Once marketed as a glittering investment hub, the GTSEZ now stands accused of serving as a base for drug trafficking, money laundering, and online scams targeting victims worldwide.
Since the start of 2025, Bokeo authorities have seized over 75 million methamphetamine pills, along with large amounts of ketamine, heroin, ecstasy, and crystal meth. Major busts include: 4.16 million meth pills and 159 packs of crystal meth from a truck on July 22, 1.9 tons of ketamine, nearly two million pills, and other drugs on July 7, and the year’s largest haul, over 20 million pills, on April 21.
These seizures are part of a wider regional surge in synthetic drug production.
According to a report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) in May, around 236 tons of methamphetamine were confiscated across East and Southeast Asia in 2024, representing a 24% surge from the previous year. The epicenter remains Myanmar’s conflict-torn Shan State, where civil unrest and financing demands have facilitated the spawn of industrial-scale production facilities.
UNODC lead analyst Inshik Sim noted that trafficking corridors linking Cambodia with Myanmar through Laos have rapidly expanded, positioning Bokeo as a crucial transit point just kilometers away from Shan State’s manufacturing centers.
Much of this illicit flow intersects with the GTSEZ, a 10,000-hectare enclave on the Mekong River established in 2007 under a 99-year lease to the Chinese-owned Kings Romans Group. Marketed as a tourism and investment destination, the zone boasts casinos, hotels, and palm-lined boulevards.
Analysts and law enforcement agencies describe it as a “Las Vegas in Laos”, a façade for a lucrative criminal ecosystem.
The zone’s criminal reputation crystallized in 2024, when a specialized task force arrested 771 suspects from 15 countries for online fraud activities. The development’s founder, Zhao Wei, currently faces sanctions from both the United States and the United Kingdom for what officials described as “horrendous illicit activities” encompassing human trafficking, narcotics distribution, and forced labor operations.
Despite periodic crackdowns by Lao and Chinese authorities, UNODC warns that the GTSEZ’s role as a storage, trafficking, and laundering hub is likely to expand. International agencies are thus urging Laos to strengthen border security, curb corruption, and enhance cooperation with regional partners.
With synthetic drugs flooding markets and cybercrime networks adapting to enforcement attempts, Bokeo Province sits at the crossroads of two of Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing criminal economies. Ultimately, whether regional cooperation can keep pace with this evolving threat remains an urgent and open question.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia-Thailand Ceasefire Tests ASEAN’s Diplomacy and Reliance on Major Powers
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
After nearly a week of intense border fighting, Cambodia and Thailand agreed to a ceasefire on July 28, brokered with the support of ASEAN Chair Malaysia, as well as representatives from the United States and China. While the international community is momentarily focused on the ceasefire’s immediate results, the question remains: what will ASEAN’s next step be toward deeper integration — especially when regional conflicts demand tough diplomacy and the involvement of powerful external actors?
ASEAN’s commitment to peaceful resolution among its members was evident as the bloc, led by Malaysia, swiftly urged de-escalation and dialogue. However, Thailand’s preference for direct, bilateral negotiations limited ASEAN’s ability to mediate. In the broader international response, the UN Security Council convened an emergency session, where major powers, including the United States, China, and others, called for an immediate ceasefire and the protection of civilians.
The conflict had been brewing for over two months before finally erupting into open violence. Current estimates suggest that more than 300,000 civilians on both sides have been affected, with widespread disruptions to livelihoods, infrastructure, and regional economic activity.
During the resolution process, the U.S. and China played distinct but complementary roles in halting the conflict. Washington applied public, high-level pressure, tying a ceasefire to trade negotiations, while Beijing favored quiet, back-channel diplomacy to ensure stability. This dual approach proved crucial for the eventual ceasefire brokered by ASEAN and Malaysia.
Notably, U.S. trade policy served as a powerful lever. President Donald Trump's administration had already imposed steep tariffs on the two countries’ exports—36% for Thailand and 49% for Cambodia—during the early stages of the crisis. As fighting escalated, President Trump warned that negotiations on tariff reductions would not proceed unless both sides ended hostilities. Following the ceasefire, the U.S. reduced tariffs for both countries to 19%, offering a strong economic incentive for compliance. Both Cambodian and Thai leaders publicly acknowledged Washington’s role in brokering peace and welcomed the trade concessions.
As defined by The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law, a ceasefire is a temporary suspension of hostilities, either declared unilaterally or negotiated by the parties involved. Therefore, while the current agreement marks a crucial step, it does not constitute a final resolution.
To build on this momentum, Cambodia and Thailand have committed to further bilateral dialogue, beginning with the General Border Committee (GBC) meeting scheduled for August 4. These discussions—closely monitored by ASEAN—aim at normalizing diplomatic ties, reducing troop presence, and establishing mechanisms for de-escalation and civilian protection.
While the ceasefire represents a success for multilateral diplomacy and attests to ASEAN’s commitment to a peaceful resolution, it also underscores the bloc’s current dependency on major external actors for effective crisis management. The coming weeks will reveal whether this ceasefire evolves into sustained peace—or simply marks another pause in a conflict rooted in unresolved historical tensions.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Borders and Bias: How the Thai-Cambodian Conflict Shapes Public Perception of Migrants in Thailand
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
After weeks of escalating tensions, Thailand and Cambodia agreed to an immediate ceasefire on July 28, 2025, following regional pressure and international mediation. However, this ceasefire and the on-the-ground conditions remain fragile. In Thailand, nationalist sentiment continues to shape public attitudes toward both Thai civilians and Cambodian migrants. In some cases, the hostility has become indiscriminate, with migrants from other countries, such as Myanmar, being mistakenly targeted amid the wave of anti-Cambodian sentiment.
According to the International Organization of Migration’s 2024 Thailand Annual Report, Thailand hosts at least 5.3 million foreign nationals with over 3 million registered migrant workers, predominantly from Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. As Thailand faces severe labor shortages due to its aging population, migrant workers are much needed, to fill critical labor needs. Over 500,000 Cambodian migrant workers make up around 12% percent of Thailand’s foreign workforce. The actual number of Cambodian migrant workers, accounting for unregistered workers, could have reached up to 1 million prior to the flare-up. The majority of Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand are employed in sectors such as construction, wholesale and retail trade, real estate, and fishing. Their departure could thus severely disrupt the country’s key economic sectors, with many reportedly having already returned to Cambodia due to recent tensions.
While the ceasefire has commenced, the conflict’s social and psychological impacts are still visible. In the days following the border clashes, Thai social media platforms saw a surge in nationalist rhetoric against Cambodian migrant workers. More concerning, however, is how such rhetoric has spilled beyond online spaces and into real life. The Migrant Working Group has reported several cases of assault and discrimination against Cambodian workers, including cases where Cambodians have been physically attacked by Thai nationalists. However, this wave of hostility has not only been aimed at Cambodian nationals. In a harsh reminder of how nationalism can turn indiscriminate, migrant workers from other countries have also been mistakenly targeted. In one reported case, Burmese migrant workers were assaulted by a group of Thais who mistook them for Cambodians.
In response to rising public tensions, Cambodia’s Ministry of Labour called on Thai businesses and international brands to protect Cambodian migrant workers, citing reports and online footage. Thailand’s Ministry of Labour denied claims of widespread abuse, arguing that, given the country’s reliance on Cambodian workforce, systematic mistreatment is unlikely. Thai authorities have also condemned any violence against migrant workers. Even so, isolated cases of public harassment have been documented, and the situation remains unstable, warranting close monitoring.
In times of political tension, it becomes all too easy to let fear override empathy. No ceasefire can be truly meaningful if hatred persists within society. Migrant workers, regardless of origin, are not enemies. They are neighbors, colleagues, and contributors to Thailand’s economy and society. As nationalism rises, so must our commitment to human dignity. Ending xenophobia and ensuring the safety of all migrants is not only a moral duty, but also a test of Thailand’s and ASEAN’s values and resilience in times of crisis. Let us hope that this will be a moment for cooperation, not division.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Editorial Deadline 01/08/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
