Editor’s Note
by Nabil Haskanbancha, in Bangkok
In today’s issue, we observe rising tensions across countries of the Mekong Belt. In Thailand, public frustration over the Prime Minister’s handling of the Thai-Cambodian crisis sparked heated discussions about potential reshuffles in the parliament. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government is exploring other channels to resolve the dispute, including multilateral options such as the International Court of Justice. In Myanmar, the ongoing economic crisis has left many victims vulnerable to scam call centers, a transnational problem affecting many ASEAN countries. In Laos, the Boten Special Economic Zone reflects China’s growing influence under the Belt and Road Initiative, where Chinese language, currency, and infrastructure in the region shape both tourism and illicit activities.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Whose Growth? Boten at the Border
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
When I stepped off the train at the final station on the Lao section of the Laos–China Railway, it felt different from the rest of the country. The freight yard was crowded with trucks and containers. A short ride into town, the road turned from red dirt to concrete, lined with half-finished high-rises. Street signs were in Chinese. I could not find a single Lao restaurant. Shops were stocked with Chinese goods, and transactions were preferably done in Chinese Yuan.
This is the Boten Special Economic Zone (SEZ), situated in the Luang Namtha province of northern Laos. Once a border town known for casinos and cross-border crime, Boten is now recast as the “first stop” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Southeast Asia.
As of 2022, the SEZ had attracted more than 260 companies, with registered capital nearing US$51 million. The zone includes 4 functional areas: an international finance center, a tourist resort area, a logistics processing park, and an education and medicare park.
Under a 90-year concession, the Lao government handed management to Yunnan Haicheng Industrial Group, which holds a 50-year lease with options to extend. The group was conferred full authority over land development, regional management, and investment approval. Foreign investors are allowed full ownership and enjoy a bonded policy of “within national territory but custom territory”.
Scholars describe this structure as “soft extraterritoriality”, where Chinese firms operate with little interference and normal state regulations are relaxed. Laos, like other financially constrained states, is increasingly adopting a “commodified sovereignty” approach: leasing land and relaxing laws in exchange for investment. At the same time, it favors China’s expanding reach in the region.
In 2015, the Lao and Chinese governments signed the Common Masterplan for the China-Laos Mohan-Boten Cross Border Cooperation Zone, making Boten a critical node in the China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, a key overland route under the BRI. It also strengthens Yunnan, China’s only province bordering both Southeast and South Asia, providing quick access to regional markets. The Laos–China Railway, which runs through Boten, boosts trade and helps China avoid its “Malacca Dilemma”. As Laos advances its goal of becoming a land-linked country, as seen in the recent agreement on the Malaysia-Lao port corridor, Boten's strategic value continues to grow.
But the benefits to locals remain contested. While construction continues, an illicit economy is thriving. A surrogacy clinic operates in town. At night, young Lao girls, some underage, wait for clients along the main street. Researchers have also documented village relocations, inadequate compensation, and cultural marginalization. Boten was once home to the Tai Lue ethnic group and was known for salt production. A reconstructed “traditional village” now aims to attract tourists, but reviews on Chinese platforms like Xiaohongshu call it overpriced and inauthentic.
Whether Boten becomes a true gateway to prosperity for Laos will depend not only on foreign investment but on the strength of government oversight and the inclusion of local voices in shaping its future.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Could Cambodia–Thailand Military Clashes Escalate?
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Tensions between Cambodia and Thailand have risen sharply following a deadly border clash and escalating disagreements over how to resolve the issue. While Cambodia has appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Thailand has rejected this, insisting on bilateral negotiations. The rift has deepened more than 20 days after a Cambodian soldier was killed on May 28, 2025, in the Mum Bei Area, sparking diplomatic fallout, troop deployments, and rising nationalist sentiment on both sides.
Prime Minister Hun Manet confirmed in a June 15 Facebook post that Cambodia is bringing the dispute to the ICJ, focusing on four key areas: Ta Moan Thom Temple, Ta Moan Tauch Temple, Ta Krabei Temple, and the Mum Bei (Chong Bok) area. Thailand, however, maintains that bilateral frameworks such as the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC), Regional Border Committee (RBC), and General Border Committee (GBC) remain the proper avenues for resolution.
Yet, at the sixth JBC meeting, held over two days, both sides discussed technical issues but avoided the current clash. Cambodia called for Thai cooperation in accepting ICJ jurisdiction and referencing the historic “1:200,000 map” from the Franco-Siamese Commission, but Thailand declined. A Thai Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused Cambodia of undermining bilateral trust, while the Cambodian People’s Party Spokesman Chea Thyrith responded that it was Thailand who first violated Cambodian territory and avoided negotiation.
With tensions rising, on June 17, Cambodia banned Thai fruit and vegetable imports in retaliation for Thailand’s closure of several border crossings. Cambodia claims the ban will only be lifted once those crossings reopen. In a broader response, Cambodia also suspended Thai film and TV broadcasts and halted electricity and internet purchases from Thailand. Earlier, on June 7, Thailand had already closed tourist border checkpoints due to security concerns.
Amidst these developments, local analysts warn of the rising risk of armed conflict. Yang Peou, Secretary-General of the Royal Academy of Cambodia, told The ASEAN Frontier (TAF) that nationalist fervor and the impasse over dispute resolution could further heighten tensions. Whether this results in armed conflict, he said, will depend on shifts within Thailand’s domestic politics, while Cambodia remains committed to pursuing legal channels through the ICJ.
Moreover, a leaked phone call between Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen and Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra revealed rising personal and political friction. Hun Sen later announced the end of his family's decades-long friendship with the Thai PM’s family, blaming the current Thai government for what he referred to as “diplomatic unprofessionalism”. Yang Peou also warned that, regardless of intentions, this rupture could inflame the situation further.
His view was echoed by geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly, who told TAF that further confrontation is highly likely, ranging from trade restrictions to full border closures. He noted that based on the leaked conversation, pressure on Cambodia appears to stem more from Thailand’s military establishment than its civilian leadership.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
PM Paetongtarn Struggles to Contain Nationalist Backlash as Political Crisis Deepens
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Following the deadly incident on May 28, 2025, near the Emerald Triangle, Thailand now faces a precarious situation, with its Prime Minister under intense scrutiny over her handling of the border crisis.
After the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) meeting on June 14, 2025, stagnating progress and delayed responses to negotiations with Cambodian officials have heightened public anxiety. To make matters worse, a recent confidential call between PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra, and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen was leaked, leading to widespread criticism on social media platforms and raising questions about Paetongtarn’s ability to defuse the conflict. Shortly afterwards, the Bhumjaithai Party withdrew from the governing coalition in protest, leaving the Thai parliament in crisis and discord, with growing concerns over a potential cabinet reshuffle.
The Bhumjaithai Party is a key member in the governing coalition, having helped Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai form the current government by securing a parliamentary majority. Hence, the withdrawal could further undermine the government’s credibility in resolving external and internal issues. Yet what is perhaps most concerning is that as Paetongtarn’s popularity plummets, that of the military soars, leading many to speculate about a potential coup d'état- an event that could set Thailand back politically and tarnish its global image, especially as a Human Rights Council (HRC) member.
Strong nationalist sentiment among Thais is fueled by longstanding hostility toward Cambodians and growing frustration with the civilian government's mishandling of the crisis. Many Cambodians in Thailand work in low-wage, manual labor jobs, forming a vital part of the country’s economy. However, the recent border tensions have deepened social divisions and intensified anti-Cambodian attitudes, with many Cambodians being stereotyped as thieves and viewed as second-class citizens. Examples of such prejudice against Cambodians are blatantly evident in news titles from major outlets that propagate such condescending narratives, like this news report, with its title labelling Cambodians as "invaders."
Amid growing public anxiety, many Thais have redirected their anger at Paetongtarn; some groups are demanding her immediate resignation. With the PM’s popularity in decline, conservative factions, among others, are attempting to capitalize by organizing demonstrations against the government and fueling nationalist sentiments.
Yet the central question remains: has the ongoing political instability placed Thai democracy at risk? What is clear for now is that the PM faces intense domestic backlash, creating an opening for conservative forces to mobilize in protest and push for military intervention. The coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether Paetongtarn can weather the storm and restore trust among the Thai people.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar's Foreseeable Economic Collapse and the Rise of Exploitation
by May
Myanmar's economy is now forecast to post its worst performance since the pandemic. The recent earthquake has affected regions that account for one-third of Myanmar's GDP, including key tourist and historical sites, and The World Bank now forecasts a 2.5% reduction in GDP for the upcoming year. Based on Myanmar's Economic Monitor (MEM), that downturn is primarily due to direct damage to tangible assets, estimated at around $11 billion (14% of the country’s GDP). Yet, the earthquake's economic repercussions have also coincided with persistent issues like power outages, inflation, and trade restrictions, as the prices of household items have dramatically increased by 34.1% from the start of 2024 to April 2025.
Kim Edwards, Senior Economist at The World Bank, stated that the poor state of the economy is affecting the majority of households, due to the compounding crises of factory closures, supply chain constraints, labour shortages, and infrastructure damage. Consequently, this has led citizens to work for lower-value-added jobs and hindered Myanmar's long-term recovery and growth. As inflation increases, workers are demanding a daily wage increase from MMK 6,700 (around $2) to MMK 12,000 (around $5). While a $3 increase may sound inconsequential, in Myanmar, this amount is sufficient to cover basic food and medical bills. Migrant workers in particular often eat less to save money for remittances; many face high financial pressure to seek better job opportunities, only to be deceived by false promises and fall into human trafficking schemes. The victims are forced to work for the notorious scam operations, most of which are run by Chinese syndicates along the Thai-Myanmar border, taking advantage of Myanmar's weak rule of law.
Despite these poor economic conditions, Myanmar remains a key supplier of rare earth metals to China, particularly dysprosium and terbium, which are located in the eastern part of the country. China’s main objective in securing access to these minerals is to use them as strategic leverage in its trade war with the United States. While roughly 70% of the world’s rare earth minerals are mined in China, the rest come primarily from Myanmar, Australia, and the U.S. However, China refines nearly 90% of the global supply, including almost all of Myanmar’s output. Chinese mining firms, many of which are closely tied to Myanmar’s military junta, thrive in the country’s loosely regulated environment, where business records are rarely maintained and remain difficult to access. According to Neha Mukherjee of London-based Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, operating a rare earth metals facility in Myanmar without Chinese assistance poses a significant challenge, as China controls the key processing technology essential for the efficient extraction of heavy rare earths.
Myanmar’s economic unraveling is no longer a looming threat, but a reality shaping daily life for millions. As Chinese-backed rare earth operations continue largely untouched, ordinary citizens are left to navigate soaring prices, shrinking wages, and an alarming rise in labor exploitation and trafficking. The earthquake damage only compounds a crisis already defined by conflict, inflation, and state dysfunction. Without urgent structural and humanitarian intervention, Myanmar’s collapse may soon be more than economic — it may be systemic.
May has previously worked in the editorial department at a media group in Myanmar. She also has experience in film and photography, and engages with people-centered stories through her travels and creative work.
Editorial Deadline 20/06/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
