Washington's Away Match Against Cyber Frauds
Issue 20 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week, our correspondents explore how the Mekong region is becoming the latest arena for Washington’s expanding fight against cybercrime, as the United States and its allies are tightening the grip on transnational scam networks that have turned Southeast Asia into the world’s cyber-fraud hub. So far, Washington has turned his attention mainly to Cambodia, where it launched, together with the U.K. and South Korea, a series of sanctions and asset freezes targeting cyberfraud networks and elites tied to them, and Myanmar, where the Congress’ investigation into Starlink’s role in scam compounds exposes a dilemma: how to fight digital crime without cutting off civilians’ lifelines to communication and education amid civil war. Meanwhile, transnational cybercrime is gathering growing attention also in Laos, where it was included in the areas where Laos and Thailand pledged to deepen cooperation during the Thai PM’s first official trip to Vientiane. Finally, Thailand is turning the attention to the impact of the Kok River’s contamination on rural communities, now struggling with illness and economic loss—a reminder that the costs of weak oversight often flow downstream.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Global Sanctions and Mounting Scrutiny Expose Cambodia’s Cybercrime Vulnerability and Test Its Economic Alignment
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
The United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea have taken an unusually firm stance against online fraud networks in Southeast Asia—particularly in Cambodia—through public condemnations, sanctions, and asset freezes targeting companies linked to cybercrime. Analysts see these moves as part of mounting international pressure on Phnom Penh, which has long been accused of neglecting the issue. Cambodian officials, however, maintain that the issue is a complex transnational crime that requires time and broad cooperation to resolve.
The moves by these major powers came in mid-October 2025, shortly after the US State Department placed Cambodia on its human trafficking blacklist for the fourth consecutive year and imposed sanctions on online fraud syndicates across the region. Cambodia’s reputation, already under scrutiny, took another blow when the FBI announced the seizure of cryptocurrencies linked to Prince Holding Group, allegedly tied to a $15 billion global fraud ring—one of the largest in history. The U.S. Department of Justice subsequently sanctioned the company, its owner Chen Zhi—a Cambodian tycoon of Chinese descent—and several affiliated entities.
In a press release, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to cracking down on transnational cybercrime, with the British government joining the effort. UK Ambassador to Cambodia Dominic Williams posted on social media that London “will not stand idly by while criminals threaten global security and rob innocent citizens of their livelihoods.”
Meanwhile, South Korea has also taken direct action. Following the death of a South Korean student in Cambodia linked to online fraud, Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Jina arrived in Phnom Penh under presidential orders. Kim met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, and both sides pledged to deepen cooperation on the matter. Seoul proposed establishing a “Korean Desk” in Cambodia to handle cybercrime cases involving South Koreans. Kim also met Interior Minister Sar Sokha to discuss information sharing, joint training, and the exchange of expertise.
Civil society groups say the growing foreign intervention underscores Cambodia’s failure to confront cybercrime. Am Sam Ath, Operations Director of LICADHO, told The ASEAN Frontier (TAF) that the involvement of multiple foreign governments has severely damaged Cambodia’s international image.
“Cambodia must show determination and political will to prevent, curb, and suppress online crimes through strict law enforcement,” he said. “Eliminating corruption and expanding regional and international cooperation are essential to restoring the country’s image and protecting its economy and social order.”
In response, Interior Ministry spokesman Touch Sokhak told TAF that some international narratives risk misrepresenting Cambodia’s situation and could be perceived as interference in domestic affairs. “Cambodia welcomes all bilateral and multilateral cooperation in combating this global crime,” he said. He then insisted that the government has never ignored online fraud and continues to pursue enforcement despite the challenges, arguing that: “We need to go after the masterminds. If we find anyone involved, no matter how powerful, they will not be spared.”
Sokhak reaffirmed the government’s commitment to addressing the issue, noting that under former Prime Minister Hun Sen, more than 20,000 foreign criminals linked to online scams were deported. The Hun Manet administration has since established a dedicated anti-fraud commission and intensified efforts to dismantle criminal networks.
Bradley Jensen Murg, a political scientist and affiliate fellow at the Pacific Forum, told TAF that the U.S. action against the Prince Group represents the most significant external intervention in Cambodia’s economy since the end of the United Nations transitional period in 1993. He noted that this is far more than a simple sanction, as it directly affects the flow of U.S. dollars into Cambodia, particularly foreign investment, given that roughly 91 percent of the country’s cash circulation is in U.S. currency.
“From late 2025 onward, Cambodia faces a multidimensional stress test,” Murg said. “The sanctions have disrupted elite wealth accumulation, cross-border arbitrage, and the real estate-driven liquidity cycle. The government must now decide whether to pursue reform and institutional realignment, or to retreat into strategic defiance by deepening its reliance on China’s financial networks.”
Cambodia thus stands at a triple crossroads: Phnom Penh must choose between maintaining its dollar-based system and pursuing Western-style reforms, pivoting toward Beijing and the yuan, a move that could bring economic and geopolitical risks, or strengthening the use of the Khmer riel, a move that could further isolate the economy. For now, Murg concludes, continuing to rely on the U.S. dollar remains Cambodia’s safest and most strategic option.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Washington Targets Starlink Over Scam Centers in Myanmar, but Civilians May Pay the Price
by Myat Moe Kywe
China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) announced on Wednesday the arrest of more than 570,000 Chinese nationals in a joint operation with Myanmar, marking one of Beijing’s most aggressive crackdowns yet on transnational online fraud.
For nearly a decade, the Golden Triangle region, which includes parts of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, has served as a major hub for criminal networks running large-scale cyber fraud operations targeting Chinese citizens, US nationals, and beyond. Following Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, these scam centres have grown dramatically, partly due to weak governance, corruption, and militia complicity—particularly from the Border Guard Forces (BGF), which have profited from the operations under minimal oversight.
With Beijing increasing pressure to dismantle these scam networks along the China–Myanmar border, many operators are reportedly relocating along the Thailand–Myanmar border, particularly around Shwe Kokko and towns near Myawaddy, according to DVB News. Facing rising international and regional criticism, even pro-military militias like Myanmar’s BGF—long accused of shielding scam operations—have begun arresting operators and ordering them to leave. In parallel, Thai authorities have also stepped up efforts to curb the spread of scam centers by cutting off internet access and electricity, essential resources for these online operations.
However, this proposed ban has sparked concern over its humanitarian impact. While the crackdown aims to target online fraud, it risks cutting off life-sustaining internet access for civilians in Myanmar’s conflict-affected areas. Since the military coup, the junta has systematically tightened control over digital communications, deploying surveillance tools, imposing censorship, and repeatedly shutting down the internet. The digital rights group Access Now has documented over 500 internet shutdowns, making Myanmar the world’s most affected country and most digitally isolated nation, with more than 300 townships experiencing prolonged blackouts since the coup.
In this context, Starlink has become a survival tool for residents, journalists, teachers, and humanitarian groups. As the independent satellite system allows Myanmar residents to “bypass” junta-imposed internet blackouts and access the news, many now depend on it to communicate, conduct business, access education, and share information in areas where the junta has tightened internet access. A resident interviewed by the BBC said banning Starlink would have a devastating effect, explaining that “without it, many small businesses relying on the internet would suffer.” Moreover, students in war-torn areas have likewise come to depend on the satellite service for access to online education.
However, the discovery of Starlink dishes on scam-centre roofs in Myanmar before a crackdown in February led the US Congress to set up a bipartisan committee to investigate the potential involvement of Elon Musk’s satellite business in providing internet access to Myanmar scam centres
In this context, the future of what is now Myanmar’s biggest internet provider hangs in the balance as part of a bigger dilemma. On the one hand, regional governments are under pressure to eradicate transnational scam networks that exploit digital technologies to victimise people under these large-scale frauds. On the other hand, a potential ban on Starlink risks deepening Myanmar’s digital isolation and punishing civilians who rely on it for communication and education in the midst of war.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Thailand’s New PM Visits Laos on his First Official Trip
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
Newly appointed Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul made his first official overseas trip to Laos this week, showcasing Thailand’s “neighbour-first” foreign policy and marking the 75th anniversary of Lao-Thailand diplomatic relations in 2025.
During the bilateral talks, the two leaders reaffirmed their “Strategic Partnership For Growth and Sustainable Development.” In particular, they pledged to intensify cooperation on trade, infrastructure, cross-border security, and environmental protection. Five key deliverables were announced, including a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on financial cooperation between the Export–Import Bank of Thailand and Laos’ Agricultural Promotion Bank, as well as support for narcotics suppression, vocational training, healthcare, and infrastructure planning.
Thailand is currently Laos’ largest trading partner and second-largest foreign investor. Both sides pledged to boost bilateral trade, which reached USD 8.3 billion in 2024, to a targeted USD 11 billion by 2027. Building on this momentum, the fifth Lao–Thai Friendship Bridge, linking Bolikhamxay Province with Thailand’s Bueng Kan Province, is set to be completed by the end of this year and is expected to further enhance regional logistics and trade flows.
Furthermore, as Lao ambitions in green energy continue to grow, Thailand—already a major importer of Lao hydropower—is eyeing broader investment in renewables, particularly solar energy. This follows the launch of Laos’ largest solar project in Oudomxay Province, which will supply electricity through China’s Yunnan energy grid. However, environmental concerns persist, as large-scale Thai investment in Lao risks contributing to ecological degradation if not carefully managed.
Thailand also pledged to support Laos in tackling narcotics smuggling, online scams, and human trafficking. Most drug smuggling occurs at night via natural border crossings and unregulated checkpoints, with traffickers often concealing narcotics internally. Thai funding and coordinated law enforcement efforts aim to disrupt these networks and curb rising crime trends.
On the environmental front, both governments endorsed a “Clear Sky Strategy” to tackle seasonal haze. Thailand will provide Laos with air quality monitoring systems, data-sharing platforms, and training in sustainable agricultural practices. Both sides emphasized the urgency of addressing pollution that disregards national boundaries.
Amid deepening economic integration, Laos must balance growth with responsible investment. The quality and sustainability of foreign capital—especially in the energy and infrastructure sectors—will be crucial to ensuring the country’s long-term, sustainable development.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand’s Kok River Contaminated by Upstream Mining in Myanmar, Impacting The Life of the Northern Communities
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Contamination in the Kok River leaves ripple effects on the local communities, threatening livelihoods and public health. The root cause is believed to stem from Chinese-owned mining operations along the upstream in Myanmar, sparking a transboundary environmental crisis that has drawn growing media and public attention since March. Nonetheless, the path to reach a solution seems to be a long way off.
Authorities in Chiang Rai’s Mae Ai District first detected contamination earlier this year, prompting warnings for residents to avoid using or fishing from the Kok River, their main source of day-to-day water consumption and income. Tests by the Office of Environmental and Pollution Control revealed levels of arsenic and other heavy metals, including nickel, far exceeding World Health Organization (WHO) safety standards. Residents have since reported skin rashes from daily water use and discovered fish with blisters and deformities, signs of severe contamination.
Nonetheless, the Department of Health declared that although the river’s arsenic level did surpass safety limits, the arsenic detected in school-aged children was still within reference values. The Transborder News noted that such mixed statement prompted locals to question the long-term impact on children’s physical and mental development should they continue to rely on the river’s fish and water. So far, officials have not provided clear answers.
While the Chinese Embassy has yet to confirm involvement, environmental experts point to Chinese-owned rare earth and mineral mines operating across the border in Myanmar. These companies reportedly use in-situ leaching, a chemical extraction technique that injects solvent mixtures into the ground to dissolve minerals. The process is suspected to be the cause of the contamination affecting farmlands and watercourses that flow into the Kok River, impacting communities beyond national boundaries. However, as most of these mining operations are conducted in areas that are not under the junta’s control, effective action would require coordination among ethnic armed groups, Naypyidaw, and Bangkok—a daunting challenge amid Myanmar’s ongoing conflict.
Fishermen have seen incomes collapse as consumers avoid river fish, while the tourism sector—a key livelihood in Chiang Rai—has also suffered. Tourist attractions along the river, including an elephant sanctuary in Chiang Rai, have observed an 80% reduction in the number of tourists, leading to insufficient income to sustain life.
As the crisis deepens, so does the locals’ frustration, as they did not see any government action or commitment to solve the issue. An earlier proposal to build a dam to “filter” heavy metals was widely criticized by environmentalists as scientifically unfeasible. Only in August 2025 did Thailand and Myanmar agree to form a joint monitoring mechanism for the Kok and Sai rivers. Despite being a first step, this is still not enough. Locals insist that there needs to be a constructive dialogue that includes local communities, academia, and local officials to monitor the toxin level, as well as better and more transparent communication between officials and the locals.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Editorial Deadline 17/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
