Change or Continuity?
Issue 31 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Is 2026 opening a new chapter or repeating an old one?
Across the Mekong, the new year begins with elections, congresses, and reform agendas that promise change, yet raise deeper questions about continuity. In Myanmar, the junta’s phased election unfolds amid civil war and mass exclusion, offering the choreography of transition while violence and repression continue unabated. In Thailand, voters head to the polls for a general election and a constitutional referendum that could redraw the country’s political rules—or reinforce a system long shaped by conservative power and military influence. In Laos, the ruling Party’s Congress signals generational renewal and ambitious development goals, even as centralized control and heavy debt constrain how far change can truly go. In Cambodia, steady economic growth and disciplined borrowing underpin a development-driven model that prioritizes stability, raising questions about how fiscal continuity will shape the country’s long-term resilience. And for Cambodia, 2026 opens with a dramatic arrest that suggests change, prompting hope that the episode signals a deeper departure from past patterns of law enforcement inefficiencies.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
First Phase of Myanmar Election Begins Under Heavy Scrutiny
by Myat Moe Kywe
As violence continues to spread across large parts of the country following the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s military proceeded with the first of a three-phase election on Sunday, December 28—an exercise widely denounced by observers as a “sham.” The remaining phases are scheduled for January 11 and January 25. Election monitors from Spring Sprouts warned that the staggered voting process could allow the junta to manipulate outcomes, enabling adjustments if early results do not go in its favor, the group told Myanmar Now.
According to junta-controlled media, The Global New Light of Myanmar, polling stations opened in 102 townships during the first phase, with another 100 townships set to vote in January. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military’s proxy party led by former military officers, claimed it secured around 80 percent of the seats—primarily in the upper house—while results for the lower house will be announced in later phases. Analysts quoted by local outlet The Irrawaddy said the USDP’s landslide was unsurprising, noting that the party relied heavily on advance voting to secure seats. Several parties participating in the election also alleged, speaking anonymously, that advance ballots gave the USDP an unfair advantage.
Only six political parties, including the USDP, are eligible to contest the nationwide vote, while 57 parties and independent candidates are competing in state and regional legislatures. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide victory in the 2020 election, has been excluded, with its leadership either imprisoned or forced into exile. Key political figures, including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, remain in detention. Alongside the NLD, other major parties that refused to register under the military-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) were dissolved in 2023.
Despite junta claims of strong voter turnout, residents described a starkly different atmosphere from previous elections. In 2020, polling stations were crowded, with voters lining up early and voting throughout the day. This time, observers reported that many polling stations remained quiet, even in major cities such as Yangon. In Nay Pyi Taw, the military-built capital, participation appeared higher, accompanied by a heavy security presence.
Further undermining the credibility of the vote, the military-run 2024 census acknowledged it could not collect data from an estimated 19 million of the country’s roughly 50 million people due to conflict and security constraints. As a result, polling was cancelled in 60 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. Concerns over legitimacy are compounded by the credibility of the UEC itself. Its chair, Than Soe, has been sanctioned internationally for undermining democracy and was appointed deputy minister of social welfare after the coup. The commission is widely criticized as a tool of military control rather than an independent body capable of overseeing free and fair elections. Meanwhile, the 2008 constitution—still enforced by the military—reserves 25 percent of parliamentary seats for the armed forces.
While junta chief Min Aung Hlaing claims the election will restore stability and advance democracy, conditions on the ground suggest deep public distrust and limited participation. By excluding major political parties and holding polls only in areas under its control, the military appears intent on entrenching power through its proxy party. Rather than resolving Myanmar’s political crisis, many observers view the election as an attempt to legitimize military rule while diverting attention from ongoing violence and large-scale offensives.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
New Year, New Election, and Referendum: What Does The Future Holds for Thais?
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Thailand enters the new year with great anticipation among the public for the upcoming election following Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s dissolution of the parliament in December. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has announced that the elections will be held on Sunday February 8th using the two-ballot system, which demands citizens to cast one ballot for a member of the House of Representatives and another for a political party.
What makes this election particularly significant is the accompanying referendum on whether a new constitution should be drafted, a decision that could shape Thailand’s political direction from the national to the grassroots level. The referendum will be held on the same day, meaning Thai voters will be asked to complete three ballots in total.
Years of political turbulence have left Thailand’s stability fragile. The country has seen three prime ministers in just three years, a pattern that has eroded public trust and raised concerns about policy continuity—an important factor for investment, trade, development, and economic growth. As a result, this election is widely viewed as a test of how Thailand may be governed over the next four years. It also reflects a broader political contest between conservative forces, led by parties such as Bhumjaithai and the Democrat Party, and the reform-oriented People’s Party, which has gained growing public support.
Amid intense campaigning, civil society groups are working to raise awareness about the referendum itself. Data from domestic and overseas out-of-area registrations show a notable gap between election and referendum registrants, likely due to the shorter registration period for the latter. The ECT provided only three days—from January 3 to 5, 2026—for voters unable to return to their home constituencies to register for the referendum.
Nonetheless, efforts to boost visibility are emerging. Led by the legal advocacy group iLaw, the “YES WE RUN” campaign aims to encourage public awareness and participation in the referendum. Because referendum polling stations are separate from election booths, some voters may be unaware of the vote altogether, potentially lowering turnout. This matters, as a new constitution could replace the current charter drafted under military rule in 2017, which critics say restricts public participation and reform. The referendum would allow citizens to directly influence the country’s political future.
Chalisa Krittichai, an organizer with the YES WE RUN campaign and a recent graduate of Chulalongkorn University, said she was grateful for the opportunity to support iLaw, citing its credibility, neutrality, and emphasis on youth participation. While acknowledging widespread political burnout stemming from repeated crises and disappointments, she stressed that every vote still counts in shaping Thailand’s direction. She expressed hope that the campaign would help raise public awareness ahead of voting day, noting that similar events will continue in the lead-up to the election.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos’ Ruling Party Charts the Road Ahead
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
The Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) concluded its 12th National Congress this week, which is held every 5 years to review past achievements and chart the country’s direction for the next phase. The three-day event brought together 835 delegates, representing more than 421,000 party members nationwide.
At the center of the Congress was the reappointment of Thongloun Sisoulith for a second term as Party Secretary General, the most powerful position in Laos’ political system. Now 80 years old, Thongloun is a veteran of the Pathet Lao insurgency.
The Congress also elected a new 12th Party Central Committee, comprising 73 members, from which the 13-member Politburo is drawn. Five new members were promoted to the Politburo, a level of turnover similar to the previous Congress in 2021. This reflected a gradual transition away from the revolutionary-era figures born in the 1940s to 1950s to younger generation of technocrats with background in governance and economic management.
Aside from the personnel changes, delegates also reviewed the Party’s achievements over the past five years and endorsed a series of key documents that set the tone for Laos’ medium- and long-term development.
The first is the Party’s third political programme, setting out the long-term national vision through 2055, the centenary of the LPRP. The programme sets an ambitious goal: “elevate Laos to the status of a developing nation with upper-middle-income levels, underpinned by a modern economy, a robust political system, and an enhanced quality of life for all ethnicities.”
The congress also ratified the 10th National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2020-2030), which is structured around 6 pillars: human resource development, improvement of living standards, the protection of natural resources and environment, the enhancement of regional and international connectivity, and public governance reform. The Party chief also announced the ambitious target of average annual economic growth of 6% during the plan period.
Still, the real test for the new leadership will lie beyond the Congress hall. While the public debt declines has decreased from 116% of GDP to 88% between 2022 and 2025, Laos continue to grapple with heavy external debt obligations, which contains government ability to stimulate growth and finance development in rural and underserved areas. Securing further debt relief, especially from China as the country’s largest external creditor, remains a key priority, while ensuring a smooth transition of the Lao graduation from the Least developed country status.
As the Congress ends, Lao will soon hold the nationwide election on 22 February to select members of the National Assembly of Laos and Provincial People’s council. The number of National Assembly seats will increase up to 175, from 164 in current legislature. The newly formed assembly will then convene to elect key government officials and endorse the development agenda approved at the Congress.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Arrests and Extradites Online Fraud Kingpin Chen Zhi
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
In early 2026, a significant development emerged in the ASEAN region as Cambodian authorities confirmed the arrest and extradition of Chen Zhi, a Southeast Asian online fraud ringleader and Cambodian billionaire of Chinese origin. Analysts have widely interpreted the move as a positive signal that Cambodia is intensifying efforts to dismantle transnational criminal networks operating within its borders—an essential step toward restoring its international image, strengthening domestic security, and attracting foreign investment.
The arrest was first reported by Chinese media outlet CC-Time on the afternoon of January 7, 2026, and later confirmed by Cambodia’s Ministry of Interior in a press release issued the same evening. According to the ministry, the arrest was carried out as part of a joint law-enforcement operation between Cambodian and Chinese police, targeting Chen Zhi, chairman of the Prince Holding Group.
Chen Zhi was blacklisted by the US Department of Justice in October 2025 for his alleged involvement in a large-scale online fraud network spanning Southeast Asia. The FBI reportedly seized approximately US$15 billion in cryptocurrency linked to the Prince Group. Although Chen Zhi previously held Cambodian citizenship, it was revoked in December 2025. He had also held influential positions in Cambodia, including serving as a personal adviser to former Prime Minister Hun Sen.
Beyond the United States, the United Kingdom had also launched a manhunt for Chen Zhi and his associates. Transparency International UK identified London as a second home for Chen Zhi’s alleged illicit financial activities, estimating that his operations could be worth up to £46 billion (approximately US$61 billion). The broader issue of Southeast Asian online fraud has long attracted international scrutiny, particularly as Cambodia’s reputation has suffered from perceptions that it serves as a haven for online scam operations. These concerns were further amplified when Thailand cited online fraud as part of its justification for military action against Cambodia in December 2025.
According to Cambodian officials, however, China’s Public Security Bureau has been investigating Chen Zhi since 2020, which explains Phnom Penh’s decision to extradite him to China. Touch Sokhak, spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, told The ASEAN Frontier that Beijing had requested cooperation from Cambodia for several months and emphasized that Chen Zhi is of Chinese origin. He said the arrest forms part of the Cambodian government’s long-standing efforts to crack down on online fraud and illegal online gambling—policies pursued from the administration of Hun Sen through the current leadership of Prime Minister Hun Manet. Authorities, he added, will continue to intensify nationwide operations against criminal networks.
Addressing public questions over why Cambodia extradited Chen Zhi to China rather than to the United States or the United Kingdom—both of which are also pursuing legal action—Touch Sokhak explained that China has the strongest legal basis for extradition due to Chen Zhi’s nationality and longstanding judicial cooperation with Cambodia. Other countries seeking prosecution, he said, may pursue their cases through Chinese legal channels without Cambodia’s direct involvement.
Civil society organizations have largely welcomed the move. Am Sam Ath, operations director of LICADHO, which monitors online fraud and human rights issues in Cambodia, described the extradition of senior criminal figures as a positive step in Cambodia’s cooperation with the international community. He attributed the outcome in part to strong relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing, and said such actions are crucial to restoring Cambodia’s international reputation after years of criticism that it has become a hub for transnational crime—an image that has negatively affected tourism, investment, and social stability. He urged the government to deepen international cooperation further, particularly by exposing high-level masterminds behind these networks to safeguard Cambodia’s long-term national interests.
Following Chen Zhi’s arrest, the National Bank of Cambodia announced that Prince Bank would no longer be permitted to offer new services. Existing customer operations will be transferred to Morisonkak MKA Audit-Accounting Co., Ltd., which has been authorized to manage current accounts.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Editorial Deadline 9/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
